# Off-Case

## 1

#### “Curtail” means to restrict

Webster’s 15 – Webster's New World College Dictionary, 4th Ed., “curtail”, http://www.yourdictionary.com/curtail

verb

To curtail is defined as to restrict something, stop something or deprive of something.

An example of curtail is when a town wants to stop drunk driving.

#### Violation - “Restrictions” are direct governmental limitations –

Viterbo 12 (Annamaria, Assistant Professor in International Law – University of Torino, PhD in International Economic Law – Bocconi University and Jean Monnet Fellow – European University Institute, International Economic Law and Monetary Measures: Limitations to States' Sovereignty and Dispute, p. 166)

In order to distinguish an exchange restriction from a trade measure, the Fund chose not to give relevance to the purposes or the effects of the measure and to adopt, instead, a technical criterion that focuses on the method followed to design said measure.

An interpretation that considered the economic effects and purposes of the measures (taking into account the fact that the measure was introduced for balance of payments reasons or to preserve foreign currency reserves) would have inevitably extended the Fund's jurisdiction to trade restrictions, blurring the boundaries between the IMF and the GATT. The result of such a choice would have been that a quantitative restriction on imports imposed for balance of payments reasons would have fallen within the competence of the Fund.

After lengthy discussions, in 1960 the IMF Executive Board adopted Decision No. 1034-(60/27).46 This Decision clarified that the distinctive feature of a restriction on payments and transfers for current international transactions is "whether it involves a direct governmental limitation on the availability or use of exchange as such\*.47 This is a limitation imposed directly on the use of currency in itself, for all purposes.

#### The plan does not curtail - enacting Strict Scrutiny Standards may have an effect of possibly curtailing surveillance in the distant future, but it does not have a direct effect as of the 1ac plantext of curtailing surveillance much less restricting it.

#### **Assess whether the means themselves are a limit---allowing actions that effect a reduction ruins precision**

Randall 7 (Judge – Court of Appeals of the State of Minnesota, “Dee Marie Duckwall, Petitioner, Respondent, vs. Adam Andrew Duckwall, Appellant”, 3-13, <http://law.justia.com/cases/minnesota/court-of-appeals/2007/opa0606> 95-0313.html#\_ftnref2)

[2] When referring to parenting time, the term "restriction[,]" is a term of art that is not the equivalent of "reduction" of parenting time. "A modification of visitation that results in a reduction of total visitation time, is not necessarily a restriction' of visitation.' Danielson v. Danielson, 393 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Minn. App. 1986). When determining whether a reduction constitutes a restriction, the court should consider the reasons for the change as well as the amount of the reduction." Anderson v. Archer, 510 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1993).

#### 4. Voting issue---

#### a. Limits---allowing effectual reductions explodes the topic. Any action can potentially result in less surveillance. Limits are key to depth of preparation and clash. They get more ground to weigh as offense against counterplans or to link turn DAs like politics, at the expense of negative preparation, because it’s impossible to research every single non-topical trick the aff could deploy. That crushes competitive equity which comes first because debate is a game. It’s very unlikely that a direct effect of the plan is a curtailment of surveillance, hold them to a very high standard.

#### b. Ground---our interpretation is key to establish a stable mechanism of legal prohibition that guarantees core ground based on *topic direction*. They allow the Aff to defend completely different processes like “oversight” that dodge core DAs and rob the best counterplan ground. The aff must be a decrease in surveillance, not an increase in policies that might lead to a decrease in surveillance – we lose ground on generics like the terror disad or any surveillance bad argument or link – the aff can potentially spike out of any 1nc offense, creating an extreme amount of aff ground.

## 2

#### We advocate the entirety of the 1AC, replacing the term “Islamophobia” with “Anti-Muslimism”

#### Using the term “Islamophobia” reinscribes discrimination- it labels racism as an irrational fear rather than a conscious individual choice and dehistoricizes Anti-Muslim discrimination

Richardson 2012 [Robin (director of Runnymede Trust, pioneer in Muslim Studies),“Islamophobia or anti-Muslim racism – or what?– concepts and terms revisited”, http://www.insted.co.uk/anti-muslim-racism.pdf, Accessed 7/24/15, AX]

The disadvantages of the term Islamophobia are significant. Some of them are primarily about the echoes implicit in the concept of phobia. Others are about the implications ofthe term Islam. For convenience, they can be itemised as follows. 1.Medically, phobia implies a severe mental illness of a kind that affects only a tiny minority of people. Whatever else anxiety about Muslims may be, it is not merely a mental illness and does not merely involve a small number of people.2.To accuse someone of being insane or irrational is to be abusive and, not surprisingly, to make them defensive and defiant. Reflective dialogue with them is then all but impossible. 3.To label someone with whom you disagree as irrational or insane is to absolve yourself of the responsibility of trying to understand, both intellectually and with empathy, why they think and act as they do, and of seeking through engagement and argument to modify their perceptions and understandings.4.The concept of anxiety is arguably more useful in this context than the concept of phobia. It is widely recognised that anxiety may not be (though certainly may be)warranted by objective facts, for human beings can on occasions perceivedangers that do not objectively exist, or anyway do not exist to the extent that is imagined. Also it can sometimes be difficult to identify, and therefore to name accurately, the real sources of an anxiety. 5.The use of the word Islamophobia on its own implies that hostility towards Muslims is unrelated to, and basically dissimilar from, forms of hostility such as racism, xenophobia, sectarianism, and such as hostility to so-called fundamentalism (Samuels 2006).Further, it may imply there is no connection with issues of class, power, status and territory; or with issues of military, political or economic competition and conflict. 6.The term implies there is no important difference between prejudice towards Muslim communities within one’s own country and prejudice towards cultures and regimes elsewhere in the world where Muslims are in the majority, and with which ‘the West’ is in military conflict or economic competition. 7.The term is inappropriate for describing opinions that are basically anti-religion as distinct from anti-Islam. ‘I am an Islamophobe,’ wrote the journalist Polly Toynbee in reaction to the Runnymede 1997 report, adding ‘... I am also a Christophobe. If Christianity were not such a spent force in this country, if it were powerful and dominant as it once was, it would still be every bit as damaging as Islam is in those theocratic states in its thrall... If I lived in Israel, I'd feel the same way about Judaism’. 8. The key phenomenon to be addressed is arguably anti-Muslim hostility, namely hostility towards an ethno-religious identity within western countries (including Russia), rather than hostility towards the tenets or practices of a worldwide religion. The 1997 Runnymede definition of Islamophobia was ‘a shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam – and, therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims’. In retrospect, it would have been as accurate, or arguably indeed more accurate, to say ‘a shorthand way of referring to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims – and, therefore, dread or hatred of Islam’.

## 3

#### We affirm the entirety of the 1ac except for the plan text.

#### It’s net beneficial –solves better because it doesn’t start at the place of the state or include the pretended fiated action we will get links to.

#### The assumption of 1AC solvency papers over reality with normative legal talk, emotionally disconnecting them from the implications of the speech act- this strengthens bureaucratic institutions and destroys individual autonomy by buying into a system that prevents us from addressing the root causes of our problems

Delgado 1991 [Richard (Professor of civil rights and critical race theory @ University of Alabama Law School), “Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal Thought,” U Penn Law Review, Vol. 139: 933, http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3742&context=penn\_law\_review, Accessed 7/21/15, pg. 957-958, AX]

Normativity not only anesthetizes powerful actors, making it easier for them to do their work, it can ~~paralyze~~ the rest of us, leading us to cooperate passively in our own mistreatment. The principal danger to human autonomy and worth today is large bureaucracies -- corporations, Health Maintenance Organizations, mega-universities, and the like. Because of their own internal structures and needs, these organizations function best if they can treat the rest of us like numbers, according to routine. 99 Yet this must not appear to be so -- we would revolt, would demand more personalized treatment, which would disrupt the routine. Bureaucracies thus adopt the discourse of normativity to make us think we are being treated with care and consideration when we are not. And they employ a host of smiling agents -- publicists, insurance adjusters, account clerks, claims agents, and other "front" persons to talk soothing normatives with us. "We want, of course, to do what is fair. You must, however, acknowledge your responsibility in this situation. Surely you don't think our HMO should grant every claim -- we must think of our other patients." Yet the script always ends up having been written by the Home Office. The insurance adjuster, it turns out, does not really care for us as persons. 100 If we enter into this numbing, but vaguely reassuring formal discourse, we will cause little trouble. But we will, from time to time, get a small jolt -- end up blind-sided by the inexorable weight of the bureaucracy behind the adjuster. We are like the doe in the headlights, transfixed at the approaching automobile. Like the doe, we sometimes think we have been spared. The automobile swerves, the kind driver slows. The adjuster turns out to have a little discretion, which he or she exercises in our favor: The doctor will see us next month, after all. But the doe's problem is not the car -- it is the road. Another car will come along. Staring at the headlights prevents the doe from seeing that problem, just as entering into platitudinous, scripted discourse with the various insurance [\*958] adjusters of the world prevents us from appreciating our own dilemma.

#### The preoccupation with pretending to be policymakers traps them in a spectator position and bars them from recognizing the bureaucratic violence of the legal praxis

Schlag 90(Pierre Schlag, professor of law@ univ. Colorado, stanford law review, november, page lexis)

All of this can seem very funny. That's because it is very funny. It is also deadly serious. It is deadly serious, because all this normative legal thought, as Robert Cover explained, takes place in a field of pain and death. n56 And in a very real sense Cover was right. Yet as it takes place, normative legal thought is playing language games -- utterly oblivious to the character of the language games it plays, and thus, utterly uninterested in considering its own rhetorical and political contributions (or lack thereof) to the field of pain and death. To be sure, normative legal thinkers are often genuinely concerned with reducing the pain and the death. However, the problem is not what normative legal thinkers do with normative legal thought, but what normative legal thought does with normative legal thinkers. What is missing in normative legal thought is any serious questioning, let alone tracing, of the relations that the practice, the rhetoric, the routine of normative legal thought have (or do not have) to the field of pain and death. And there is a reason for that: Normative legal thought misunderstands its own situation. Typically, normative legal thought understands itself to be outside the field of pain and death and in charge of organizing and policing that field. It is as if the action of normative legal thought could be separated from the background field of pain and death. This theatrical distinction is what allows normative legal thought its own self-important, self-righteous, self-image -- its congratulatory sense of its own accomplishments and effectiveness. All this self-congratulation works very nicely so long as normative legal [\*188] thought continues to imagine itself as outside the field of pain and death and as having effects within that field. n57 Yet it is doubtful this image can be maintained. It is not so much the case that normative legal thought has effects on the field of pain and death -- at least not in the direct, originary way it imagines. Rather, it is more the case that normative legal thought is the pattern, is the operation of the bureaucratic distribution and the institutional allocation of the pain and the death. n58 And apart from the leftover ego-centered rationalist rhetoric of the eighteenth century (and our routine), there is nothing at this point to suggest that we, as legal thinkers, are in control of normative legal thought. The problem for us, as legal thinkers, is that the normative appeal of normative legal thought systematically turns us away from recognizing that normative legal thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presentation of the field it claims to describe and regulate. The problem for us is that normative legal thought, rather than assisting in the understanding of present political and moral situations, stands in the way. It systematically reinscribes its own aesthetic -- its own fantastic understanding of the political and moral scene. n59Until normative legal thought begins to deal with its own paradoxical postmodern rhetorical situation,it will remain something of an irresponsible enterprise. In its rhetorical structure, it will continue to populate the legal academic world with individual humanist subjects who think themselves empowered Cartesian egos, but who are largely the manipulated constructions of bureaucratic practices -- academic and otherwise.

#### Our impact is especially true in context of racialized law- one step reforms are trumpeted as complete wins and used to ignore systemic problems

Delgado 1991 [Richard (Professor of civil rights and critical race theory @ University of Alabama Law School), “Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal Thought,” U Penn Law Review, Vol. 139: 933, http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3742&context=penn\_law\_review, Accessed 7/21/15, pg. 945-946, AX]

The ability of normative assertion to change the way we perceive reality was demonstrated by Stanley Milgram in an experiment now considered a classic.40 Milgram, a psychologist at Yale University, told volunteers that they would be participating in an experiment on learning. In fact, the purpose of the experiment was to see whether the subjects could be induced to violate their ethical norms and inhibitions. Each subject -was seated in front of a console with acalibrated dial, and told that by turning the dial they would administer electric shocks to a "learner" seated in another room. The subjects were told in no circumstances to turn this dial beyond a point marked with red-doing so could administer a fatal dose of electricity to the other subject. After the rules were explained, a second investigator, wearing a white coat and an authoritative demeanor, entered the room and directed the subjects to turn the dials to particular settings. Each time, a trained actor in the other room emitted a realistic groan or exclamation of pain. The investigator directed the subjects to turn the dial to higher and higher settings and eventually to exceed the point marked in red. A high percentage of the subjects cooperated with the experiment, even administering what they thought might be a lethal dose ofelectricity. Afterward, many subjects confessed to doubts aboutwhat they were doing, but said they went along with the experiment because, "If he (meaning the high-authority doctor in charge) said it was all right, then it must be so." Apparently, the investigator's assurances that administering pain was permissible and part of theexperiment actually changed the way they saw their behavior.41Ordinary life is full of similar examples in which the mere pronouncement of something as normatively good or bad changes our perception of it. The decision in Brown v. Board of Education changed the way we thought about minorities. Reagan and Reaganomics changed things back again.43 During war, we demonize our enemies, and thereafter actually see them as grotesque, evil and crafty monsters deserving of their fate on the battlefield.44 Later, during peacetime, they may become our staunch allies once again. Derrick Bell and other Critical Race theorists have been pointing out the way in which standard, liberal-coined civil rights law injures the chances of people of color and solidifies racism.45 Accordingto these writers, one function of our broad system of race-remedies law is to free society of guilt. Although the remedies are ineffective, they enable members of the majority group to point to the array of civil rights statutes and case law which ostensibly assure fair and equal treatment in schools, housing, jobs, and many other areas of life. With all these elaborate anti discrimination laws on the books, if black people are still poor and unhappy-well, what can be done? The law's condemnation of racism thus enables us to blame the victim, praise ourselves for our liberality, and thereby deepen the dilemma of people of color.

#### It’s legit – they get 100% of the plan to generate offense versus the cp, this is a necessary test against critical affirmatives.

## 4

#### The aff is engaged in a war of words when in reality they do nothing for the Muslims being surveilled by the NSA- the starting point for advocacy should be to confront our own privilege

Chow ‘93**.** Rey Chow, Professor of English and Comp Lit, Writing Diaspora: tactics of intervention in contemporary cultural studies, pg. 17

While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons – especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek privilege – I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is hegemony formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), but how they can resist, as Michel Foucault said, the forms of power that transform them into its objects and instrument in the sphere of knowledge, truth, consciousness and discourse. Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci‘s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational space? Because borders have so clearly meandered into so many intellectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation between borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought as the creation of new fields. Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders – of borders, that is, as para-sites that never take over a field in its entirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau is a helpful for the formulation of this parasitical intervention.De Certeau distinguished between strategy and another practice – tactic – in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces. . Strategy therefore belongs to an economy of the proper place and to those who are committed to the building, growth,, and fortification of a field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy ?a cultural weapon, a private hunting preserve,? or ?a means of social stratification? in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus (de Certeau, p. 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old rules of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case ben concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture (de Certeau. P. xi). Why are tactics useful at this moment? As discussions about multiculturalism, interdisiplinarity, the third world intellectual, and other companion issue develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness ensuring from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used merely to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness – **all these forces creates new solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned**. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense. We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly not directly changing the downtrodden lives of those who seek their survival in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan space alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarity-with-the-oppressed), but **the power, wealth, and privilege** that ironically accumulate from their oppositional viewpoint,and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault saidintellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, is that if a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business,. . . he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen.28 Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising?How do we resist the turning-into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics – that which is without any base where it could stockpile its winnings? (deCerteau, p.37)–from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?

#### The aff’s victimization of Arab Americans projects more surveillance onto these communities

**Spivak and Barlow ’04.** GayatriChakravortySpivak, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Human- ities and Director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, Tani E. Barlow, T.T. and W.F. Chao Professor of History and director of the Chao Center for Asian Studies at Rice University,“Not Really a Properly Intellectual Response: An Interview with GayatriSpivak,” positions: east asia cultures critique, Volume 12, Number 1, Spring 2004, pg. 140

GayatriChakravortySpivak: My problem is that I am unable to give a general response. It is a pity in all of this postnational talk that this cruel nationalism—taking pleasure in the death of others—begins with the shock of the death of one’s own. It is a cause for great sorrow that this event brings out the worst kind of “herd mentality”—to quote Nietzsche—in human beings, and it falls under nationalism. Bush’s spin doctors have told him to say that Islam is a wonderful religion and the hijackers hijacked it. There- fore one must now endlessly be nice to Arab Americans even as there is relentless racial profiling and undercover incarceration. Feminism is show- ing its problems too. Why are members of the Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan suddenly taken to be prophets? We don’t know much about their values. They are a good group. They haven’t appeared all of a sudden, but they have only now been picked up because the Taliban hate their women. But people know little about their specific problems. They also cannot give them real informed sympathy because they are taken as a kind of fetish that will justify support for the war, although they themselves oppose it. On the other side, you have the picture that CNN showed of U.S. women on aircraft carriers who are actually chief programmers, wielding sextants and so on. And the guy even said that there can be no more sexist jokes about women drivers. There is this wonderful blond girl. Midwestern-looking, freckled cheeks, saying, “If I can drive an aircraft carrier, I can drive a truck.” These are issues I wrote about in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” twenty years ago. Who could question that these are terrible things? You would be foolish to say there was any justification for burning widows or stoning adulter- esses. On the other hand, this sudden exposure of visible violence by people, justifying war, killing Afghans, does nothing to guarantee that the subaltern women’s epistemic production will be one iota altered. I am interested not only in the fact that men do harm to women, but the fact that when it comes to the subaltern woman, nobody is interested in the patience that is required, in order to make her not acquiesce when they arrive at the point of visible violence.

#### The aff acts as the maoist – criticizing civil society while also benefiting from their own privilege

**Chow ‘93.** Rey, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities at Brown Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, pg. 10-11

The Orientalist has a special sibling whom I will, in order to highlight her significance as a kind of representational agency, call the Maoist. ArifDirlik, who has written extensively on the history of political movements in twentieth-century China, sums up the interpretation of Mao Zedong commonly found in Western Marxist analyses in terms of a "Third Worldist fantasy"—"a fantasy of Mao as a Chinese reincarnation of Marx who fulfilled the Marxist premise that had been betrayed in the West."16 The Maoist was the phoenix which arose from the ashes of the great disillusionment with Western culture in the 1960s and which found hope in the Chinese Communist Revolution.17 In the 1970s, when it became possible for Westerners to visit China as guided and pampered guests of the Beijing establishment, Maoists came back with reports of Chinese society's absolute, positive difference from Western society and of the Cultural Revolution as "the most important and innovative example of Mao's concern with the pursuit of egalitarian, populist, and communitarian ideals in the course of economic modernization" (Harding, p. 939). At that time, even poverty in China was regarded as "spiritually ennobling, since it meant that [the] Chinese were not possessed by the wasteful and acquisitive consumerism of the United States" (Harding, p. 941). Although the excessive admiration of the 1970s has since been replaced by an oftentimes equally excessive denigration of China,the Maoist is very much alive among us, and her significance goes far beyond the China and East Asian fields. Typically, the Maoist is a cultural critic who lives in a capitalist society hut who is fed up with capitalism—a cultural critic, in other words, who wants a social order opposed to the one that is supporting her own undertaking. The Maoist is thus a supreme example of the way desire works: What she wants is always located in the other, resulting in an identification with and valorization of that which she is not/does not have. Since what is valorized is often the other's deprivation—"having" poverty or "having" nothing—the Maoist's strategy becomes in the main a rhetorical renunciation of the material power that enables her rhetoric. In terms of intellectual lineage, one of the Maoist’s most important ancestors is Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre. Like Jane, the Maoist’s means to moral power is a specific representational position—**the position of powerlessness**. In their reading of *Jane Eyre*, Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse argue that the novel exemplifies the paradigm of violence that expresses its dominance through a representation of the self as powerless: Until the very end of the novel,Janeis always excluded from every available form of social power. Her survival seems to depend on renouncing what power might come to her as a teacher, mistress, cousin, heiress, or missionary’s wife. She repeatedlyflees from such forms of inclusion in the field of power, as if her status as an exemplary subject, like her authority as narrator, depends entirely on her claim to a kind of truth which can only be made from a position of powerlessness. By creating such an unlovely heroine and subjecting her to one form of harassment after another, Bronte demonstrates the power of words alone.This reading of Jane Eyre highlights her not simply as the female underdog who is often identified by feminist and Marxist critics, but as the intellectual who acquires power through a moral rectitude that was to become the flip side of Western imperialism’s ruthlessness. Lying at the core of Anglo-American liberalism, this moral rectitude would accompany many territorial and economic conquests overseas with a firm sense of social mission. When Jane Eyre went to the colonies in the nineteenth century, she turned into the Christian missionary. It is this understanding—that Bronte’s depiction of a socially marginalized English woman is, in terms of ideological production, fully complicit with England’s empire building ambition rather than opposed to it—that prompted GayatriSpivak to read Jane Eyre as a text in the service of imperialism. Referring to Bronte’s treatment of the “madwoman,” Bertha Mason, the white Jamaican Creole character, Spivak charges Jane Eyre for, precisely, its humanism, in which the “native subject” is not created as an animal but as the object of what might be termed the terrorism of the categorical imperative.This kind of creation is imperialism’s use/travesty of the Kantian metaphysical demand to “make the heathen into a human so that he can be treated **as an end himself.”**In the twentieth century, as Europe’s former colonies became independent, Jane Eyre became the Maoist. Michel de Certeau describes the affinity between her two major reincarnations, one religious and the other political, this way: The place that was formerly occupied by the Church or Churches vis-à-vis established powers remains recognizable, over the past two centuries, in the functioning of the opposition known as leftist…There is a vis-à-vis the established order, a relationship between the Churches that defended an other world and the parties of the left, which since the nineteenth century, have promoted a different future. In both cases, similar functional characteristics can be discerned. The Maoist retains many of Jane’s awesome features, chief of which are a protestant passion to turn powerlessness into “truth” and an idealist intolerance of those who may think differently from her. Whereas the great Orientalist blames the living “third world” natives for the loss of the ancient non-Western civilization, his loved object, the Maoist applauds the same natives for personifying and fulfilling her ideals. For the Maoist in the 1970s, the mainland Chinese were, in spite of their “backwardness,” a puritanical alternative to the West in human form—a dream come true.

#### Their project amounts to a politics of self-subalternization, where the judge is encouraged to find solidarity with the other of the 1ac - their rhetorical strategy amounts to nothing more than a sham renunciation authorized by the same structures of power that produce alterity in the first place

**Spivak ’88.**GayatriChakravortySpivak, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Human- ities and Director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, edited by Carl Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, pg. 24-25

SOME OF THE most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for this ' subject of knowledge. Although the history of Europe as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo—political determinations.’The much publicized critique of the sovereign subject thus actually inaugurates a Subject. . . . This S/subject, curiously sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side of the international division of labor. 5 It is impossible for contemporary French intellectuals to imagine the kind ' of Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other of Europe. It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the production of that Other,supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, in the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could ‘ occupy (invest?) its itinerary - not only by ideological and scientiﬁc production, but also by the institution of the law. . . . In the face of the possibility that the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow, a possibility of political practice for the intellectual would be to put the economic ‘under erasure,’ to see the economic ' factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it claims to be the ﬁnal determinant or the transcendental signiﬁed. The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, far-flung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other. This project is also the asymetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subjectivity. It is well known that Foucault locates epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the episteme, in the redeﬁnition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century. But what if that particular redeﬁnition was only a part of the narrative of history in Europe as well as in the colonies? What if the two projects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and unacknowledged parts of a vast two-handed engine? Perhaps it is no more than to ask that the subtext of the palimpsestic narrative of imperialism be recognized as ‘subjugated knowledge,’ ‘a whole set of "knowledges that have been disqualiﬁed as inadequate to their task or insufﬁciently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientiﬁcity’ (Foucault 1980: 82). This is not to describe ‘the way things really were’ or to privilege the narrative of history as imperialism as the best version of history. It is, rather, to offer an account of how an explanation and narrative of reality' - was established as the normative one. . . . Let us now move to consider the margins (one can just as well say the silent, silenced center) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, the lowest strata of the urban subproletariat. According to Foucault and Deleuze (in the First World, under the standardization and tegimentation of socialized capital, though they do not seem to recognize this) the oppressed, if given the chance (the problem of representation cannot be bypassed here), and on the way to solidarity through alliance politics (a Marxist thematic is at work here) can speak and know their conditions. We must now confront the following question: On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, can the subaltern speak?**. . .**

#### Close your eyes to the 1ac—any knowledge or political productivity they can generate will be redeployed to destroy the very subjects they hope to help.

Spanos ’00.William V. Spanos, distinguished professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, Binghamton, New York; he is a founder and editor of the critical journal boundary 2, PhD, 1964, University of Wisconsin, Madison: Literary theory, literature and philosophy, “America’s Shadow: An Anatomy of Empire” 2000. p. 48-50

To restore a region from its present barbarism to its former classical greatness; to instruct (for its own benefit) the Orient in the ways of the modern West; to subordinate or underplay military power in order to aggrandize the project of glorious knowledge acquired in the process of political domination of the Orient; to formulate the Orient, to give it shape, identity, definition with full recognition of its place in memory, its importance to imperial strategy, and its "natural" role as an appendage to Europe; to dignify all the knowledge collected during colonial occupation with the title "contribution to modern learning" when the natives had neither been consulted nor treated as anything except as pre-texts for a text whose usefulness was not to the natives; to feel oneself as a European in command, almost at will, of Oriental history, time, and geography; to institute new areas of specialization; to establish new disciplines; to divide, deploy, schematize, tabulate, index, and record everything in sight(and out of sight); to make out of every observable detail a generalization and out of every generalization an immutable law about the Oriental nature, temperament, mentality, custom, or type; and, above all, to transmute living reality into the stuff of texts, to possess (or think one possesses) actuality mainly because nothing in the Orient seems to resist one's powers: these are the features of Orien- talist projection entirely realized in the Description de l'£gypte, itself enabled and reinforced by Napoleon's wholly Orientalist en- gulfment of Egypt by the instruments of Western knowledge and power.89 Nor, finally, is it an accident that the emergent Linnaean system of classification — of identifying, naming, and classifying the flora and fauna of nature — inaugurated the global taxonomic projects, most no- tably that of his student Anders Sparrman,90 that became the essential European means of producing a modern orneoimperialist discourse, a discourse that,in the name of the truth of empirical science, invents or constructs the Other in the image of the First World. I am referring to what Mary Louise Pratt, in her Foucauldian study of the relation- ship between scientific travel writing and colonialism in South Africa and Latin America, has calledthe "anti-conquest narrative." This is the narrative "in which the naturalist naturalizes the bourgeois European'sown global presence and authority" to differentiate its "benign" truth- producing motive from an earlier, overtly violent imperial narrative. In a way that recalls Foucault's and Said's differentiation of the visible and "inefficient" deployment of power in the ancien regime from the more invisible and materially and politically economical version of the Enlightenment, Pratt observes: Natural history asserted an urban, lettered, male authority over the whole of the planet;it elaborated a rationalizing, extractive, dissociative understanding which overlaid functional, experiential relations among people, plants, and animals. In these respects,it figures a certain kind of global hegemony, notably one based on possession of land and resources rather than control over routes. At the same time, in and of itself, the system of nature as a descriptive paradigm was an utterly benign and abstract appropriation of the planet. Claiming no transformative potential whatsoever, it differed sharply from overly imperial articulations of conquest, conversion, territorial appropriation, and enslavement. The system created... a Utopian, innocent vision of European global authority, which I refer to as an anti-conquest. The term is intended to emphasize the relational meaning of natural history, the extent to which it became meaningful specifically in contrast with an earlier imperial, and prebourgeois, European expansionist presence.91The difference between an earlier, pre-Enlightenment, and a later, post-Enlightenment, configuration of the internal space of the imperial circle is, of course, crucial to any understanding of the essence of imperial practice. But my purpose in thus invoking Foucault's analysis of the complicity of the classificatory table of the Enlightenment with the domination of the Other in the disciplinary society, and Said's and Pratt's extension of Foucault's genealogical insight to includethe modern European imperial project, is not to bring a story about the development of the technology of European colonialism to its fulfillment and narrative closure, one that renders prior technologies of power anachronistic. It is, rather, to retrieve a fundamental dimension of this story that has been obliterated from memory even as it resonates unthought in the very contemporary language these postcolonial critics use to indict the truth discourse of the West as "imperial." I want to suggest that the classificatory table, as microcosm of a larger spatial totality and as the model for wider "imperial" practices (the mass production process, the pan- optic penal system, the medical and psychiatric hospital, the family, the classroom, the nation-state, the colonial administration, and so on), is grounded in and enabled by the metaphysical principle of principles or, as Enrique Dussel puts it, "the ideology of ideologies":92 that Identity is the condition for the possibility of difference and not the other way around.Unlike its predecessor in the ancien regime, metaphysical inquiry at this advanced Enlightenment stage does not obliterate the contradictory, amorphous, unimproved, and "ahistorical" Other from the vantage point of a visible "center elsewhere."It "acknowledges" this Other's claims as contributive to(the knowledge of)the larger self-identical Whole. In other words, it "classifies" the amorphous Others from the vantage point of an invisible "center elsewhere." It differentiates these Others into discrete phenomena — attributes distinguishing identities to them— within and in behalf of a prior encompassing self-present total Identity. This individuation of the amorphous Other conveys a sense of the sovereign integrity of the differentiated entities, but it obscures the fact that their uniqueness is entirely dependent on a dominant synchronic Totality, the always present and determining center of which is always out of sight.To acquire validity the differentiated entity must accommodate its differential partiality to the prior Totality, must, that is, objectify and subordinate itself to — take its proper place within — the gridded structure of the dominant Identity. To become a subject it must heed the call — the hailing — of the Subject. As his invocation of the ontological metaphorics of the center and the circle should suggest, what the Lacanian Marxist Louis Althusser says about "the interpel- lation of the individual as subject" — the (subjected) subject invented by the bourgeois capitalist Enlightenment — applies by extension to the spatial economy of the (neo)imperial project as such:

## 5

#### Kundnani’s scholarsip ignores the intricacies of the Muslim culture and fails to analyze gender hierarchy

Rashid, 14—a Research Associate in the Sociology Department at the University of Manchester, PhD in Sociology from the London School of Economics (Dr. Naaz, May 2014, "Book Review: The Muslims Are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror by Arun Kundnani", The London School of Economics and Political Science, blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2014/07/08/book-review-the-muslims-are-coming-islamophobia-extremism-and-the-domestic-war-on-terror-by-arun-kundnani/)//twemchen

The issue of terrorism continues to dominate the news whether in relation to the allegations of extremism in Birmingham schools or the long term repercussions of young British Muslims going to fight in Syria and Iraq. What links these two stories is the common sense understanding about how people come to commit acts of terrorist violence. In his new book, The Muslims are Coming, Arun Kundnani’s primary focus is the ‘radicalization thesis’ which underpins the moral panics underlying both phenomena. That is, the idea that people become radicalised through exposure to ‘extremist’ ideologies which can then lead them to engage in acts of terrorism. Through his rigorously researched analysis of preventive counterterrorism measures in the UK and US, Kundnani skilfully and articulately deconstructs the central tenets of these dominant discourses regarding radicalisation and extremism. Kundnani’s stated aims are to consider: firstly, how Islamic ideology has come to be regarded as the root cause of terrorism; and secondly, that acceptance of Muslims as citizens is predicated on them (us) distancing themselves from any particular set of ideological beliefs. He argues that “official and popular understandings of terrorism are more a matter of ideological projection and fantasy than of objective assessment.” (p. 17). He suggests that the events in both Boston and Woolwich fit the “current war on terror paradigm of young Muslim men becoming radicalised through their exposure to Islamist ideology”. This is despite the fact that in both instances, although not acting entirely alone, the perpetrators were amateurs with no connection to wider networks or terrorist cells. The transatlantic comparison allows Kundnani to showcase his detailed scholarship of policies, both in theory and in practice, weaving together the continuities and parallels between each country’s experiences. Common to both countries is the underlying belief in ‘the myth of radicalization’. As Kundnani writes, the term was little used prior to 2001, whereas by 2004 it “had acquired its new meaning of a psychological or theological process by which Muslims move toward extremist views”; so much so that by 2010 over 100 articles on the topic were being published in peer-reviewed academic journals each year (p 119). Despite this wealth of research, however, Kundnani argues that the underlying ideological assumptions mean that radicalization scholars systematically fail to address the reality of the political conflicts they claim to understand. Kundnani delineates the divergent histories of the UK and US’s respective Muslim populations in the context of very different, albeit occasionally intertwined, histories of (neo)imperialism, migration, and racial politics. He goes on to suggest, however, that 2005 represented a watershed year in which the 7/7 bombings in London brought the UK into close alignment with the US. As a result, the substantive historical, socio-political and demographic differences fell away and the UK and the US were united, not only in their ideologically inspired military encroachments, but also in their preventive counter terrorism measures against ‘home grown’ terrorism. This is perhaps where it could be argued that the book’s weakness lies. Kundnani’s scrupulous attention to detail that so enriches his critique of the common sense logic regarding the relationship between radicalization and terrorism is absent in this analysis. If, as he argues, the fundamental flaw with the radicalization thesis is its failure to take into account the wider socio- and geo-political context within which such political violence occurs, then equally, in order to assess the outcome of policies based on it, the localised differences between and within the US and UK surely warrant more nuanced analysis. At times he does address US-specific contexts such as the more overt tactics of create and capture used there, which almost amounts to the entrapment of potential terrorists. He also writes a coruscating indictment of Obama’s term in office in which the militaristic jingoism of George Bush has become dangerously banal, bureaucratic, and routine, such that the practice and function of the anti-Muslim racism which has been fostered has rendered invisible “the violence of the US empire” (p 14). On balance, however, the differences between the two countries are flattened out and the differential country-specific impacts of such initiatives remain somewhat unexplored. In the British context for example, the Prevent agenda cannot be assessed in isolation from the community cohesion agenda which preceded it and broader debates on multiculturalism and Britishness which foreground it. An underexplored side effect of the Prevent agenda in the UK is its impact on ‘inter community’ relations given the particularities of the postcolonial British experience. Sikhs have not, for example, been widely ‘misrecognised’ as Muslims in the UK as they have in the US (where the ‘Don’t Freak I’m a Sikh’ campaign emerged). Similarly, it is not clear whether Sikhs in the US have been drawn to far-right groups premised on an anti-Muslim platform as has occurred in the case of the BNP and the EDL in the UK. Given Kundnani’s previous work for the anti-racist left organisation the Institute of Race Relations (IRR) as well as his earlier publications, such as The End of Tolerance and Spooked! – his analysis of such differences would undoubtedly have been astute. Furthermore, the book does not situate the radicalisation debate in relation to the wider cultural pathologisation of Muslims in both countries as well as across the globe, for example, in relation to Muslim women, and the way in which these discourses are so heavily gendered. Nonetheless, given the virulent tenacity with which the violent extremism/radicalisation/counterterrorism discourse matrix permeates the public policy imaginary, in spite of little evidence to support the conceptual framework which underlies it, the book is a very timely intervention. Kundnani draws on a wide range of material to support his case, ranging from the work of Arendt to the analysis of populist representations of terrorism in TV series such as Homeland and South Park. There is also a wealth of research into and analysis of particular cases of counter terrorist activity and interventions which can challenge the established orthodoxies prevailing on both sides of the Atlantic (although these in depth examples might have benefitted from a more conventional bibliography and index). The Muslims are Coming should be required reading for officials and Ministers in the Home Office, Department of Communities & Local Government, the Department of Education, and the Department for Homeland Security, as well as for political commentators everywhere. However, for those engaged in critical studies of the racialised (and gendered) politics of the war on terror, fewer examples and more critical, country-specific analysis of the impact of such measures would have been welcome.

#### Failure to interrogate sexual difference guarantees extinction and genocide

Irigaray, 91 (Luce, Famous french scholar, The irigaray Reader, p.33)

Even a vaguely rigorous analysis of claims to equality shows that they are justified at the level of a superficial critique of culture, and Utopian as a means to women's liberation. The exploitation of women is based upon sexual difference, and can only be resolved through sexual difference. Certain tendencies of the day, certain contemporary feminists, are noisily demanding the neutralization of sex *[sexe].* That neutralization, if it were possible, would correspond to the end of the human race. The human race is divided into two genres which ensure its production and reproduction. Trying to suppress sexual differ­ence is to invite a genocide more radical than any destruction that has ever existed in History. What is important, on the other hand, is defining the values of belonging to a sex-specific *genre.* What is indispensable is elaborating a culture of the sexual which does not yet exist, whilst respecting both *genres.* Because of the historical time gaps between the gynocratic, matriarchal, patriarchal and phallocratic eras, we are in a sexual position which is bound up with generation and not with *genre* as sex. This means that, within the family, women must be mothers and men must be fathers, but that we have no positive and ethical values that allow two sexes of the same generation to form a creative, and not simply procreative, human couple. One of the major obstacles to the creation and recognition of such values is the more or less covert hold patriarchal and phallocratic roles have had on the whole of our civilization for centuries. It is social justice, pure and simple, to balance out the power of one sex over the other by giving, or restoring, cultural values to female sexuality. What is at stake is clearer today than it was when *The Second Sex* was written.

#### Their refusal to integreate the perspective of Muslim women is another example of silencing—the alternative eavesdrops with permission—it uses our privileged positions as students to open discussion on the everyday experiences of these women

Dreher, 9—professor at University of Technology, Sydney (Tanja, "Eavesdropping with Permission: the Politics of Listening for Safe Speaking Spaces", Borderlands E-Journal, Volume 8 Number 1, [www.borderlands.net.au/vol8no1\_2009/dreher\_eavesdropping.pdf)//twemchen](http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol8no1_2009/dreher_eavesdropping.pdf)//twemchen)

What’s a middle class white feminist to do? Given these pitfalls, what is a middle class white woman to do? Is there any role for me in the work of creating safe spaces for new conversations? Scholarship which works across feminism, antiracism, postcolonial and critical race and whiteness studies offers many provocative suggestions. The tradition of transnational feminism tends to focus on strategies of alliances and intersectional politics, while scholars engaging with whiteness and Indigenous sovereignties emphasise the need to unlearn privilege and give up power. Aileen Moreton-Robinson concludes her analysis of whiteness and Australian feminisms by arguing that, ‘the real challenge for white feminists is to theorise the relinquishment of power’ (2000: 186). In her analysis of speaking positions, the role of academic research and violence against Indigenous women, Sonia Smallacombe argues that the central challenge is ‘whether feminists and their institutions interrogate their own power base and whether they are willing to move aside to give space for Indigenous women’s voices’ (2004: 51). Fiona Nicoll (2004) reflects on her own experiences as a middle-class white woman teaching critical race and whiteness studies in Indigenous sovereignties and suggests that this teaching must challenge students to locate ‘their own position within racialised networks of power’ and should ‘shift focus from the racialised oppression of Indigenous Australians to the white middle-class subject position that is a direct product of this oppression’. According to Nicoll, ‘the task of non-Indigenous students and teachers becomes that of observing and beginning to denaturalize the everyday invasiveness of policies and practices underpinned by patriarchal white sovereignty’ (2004: 6). These are compelling reminders that white women must do their own race work and focus attention on their own privileges and power (see also Ratcliffe 2005: 5-6). This can be difficult and uncomfortable work, in which good intentions are deeply suspect. Alison Jones (1999) contends that ‘even good intentions by the dominant group are not always sufficient to enable their ears to ‘hear’, and therefore for the other to ‘speak’. Many authors analyse the ways in which racism is perpetuated under the guise of ‘good intentions’ and Damien Riggs (2004: 9) highlights Jane Haggis’ suggestion that Australian critical race and whiteness studies ‘should not be about making non-Indigenous people ‘comfortable’, but should instead continue to destabilise the assumptions of privilege that inform non-Indigenous belonging’. My involvement in this project, and the writing of this paper, has been uncomfortable and uncertain. I have experienced levels of panic far greater than my usual nervousness before public speaking — and this anxiety has manifested bodily, in sleeplessness and loss of appetite and nausea and shivering. Mindful of Sara Ahmed’s (2004) analyses of ‘bad feeling’, I reflect on these discomforts as a register of the violent colonial histories and ongoing racisms which form the possibilities for action and change, rather than as markers of an end to or an overcoming of racism. Rather than transcending ‘bad feeling’ the challenge is to work to redistribute risk and discomfort as a means to developing better possibilities for listening and speaking.

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# On-Case

## Solvency

#### The 1AC speaks from a privileged position of disinvestment with the stories of the Muslim Americans that they have chosen to tell—their universalization of Muslim subject positions isn’t an act of speaking on behalf of others, it’s an act of speaking for others and silencing the subaltern

Kapoor, 8—Professor of Critical Development Studies at the Faculty of Environmental Studies at York University (Ilan, Spring 2008, "Introduction: Islam and Cultural Politics", *Topia: Canadian Journal Of Cultural Studies*, pg. 3-5)//twemchen

The Postcolonial View: Islam as Open and Political But there is another perspective on culture—a postcolonial one. Calling it postcolonial may be a sleight of hand, given that it has multiple variants and relies on several sources (cultural anthropology, cultural marxism, discursive analysis, deconstruction). I would like to draw out two themes for the purposes of this introduction. First, rather than asking Huntington’s “what is culture?” which gives way to the reification of culture, the postcolonial perspective asks “how is culture made?” emphasizing its more active and transformative role. Culture is seen as a semiotic practice (Geertz 1973) grounded in everyday life, through which shared signs and symbols are deployed to represent our world. Raymond Williams refers to it as “the signifying system through which necessarily ... a social order is communicated, reproduced, experienced, and explored” (Williams 1982: 13; cf. Hall 1977: 328). Rather than focusing on cultural identity, which fixes and unifies culture, the idea here is to see culture as signifying process: this means that culture is dynamic rather than static, slippery and unfixed rather than stable, plural and hybrid rather than whole, and “negotiated and constructed rather than a ‘given’” (Clammer 2005: 103; cf. Williams 1979: 154; Bhabha 1994; Appadurai 1996: 12). The second theme of discursivity is what gives the postcolonial perspective its critical bent. The semiotic construction of culture involves a “will to power,” wherein knowledge is systematized and disseminated (Said 1978: 12; 1983: 216). This process includes the deployment of discursive strategies such as the use of rhetoric or the construction, repetition and reification of powerful images and stereotypes (Bhabha 1994: 66ff.; Derrida 1982: 307ff.), such as the images of Islam and Muslims discussed above. This critique also takes into account the enactment of discourse in institutional practices, for instance the state or corporate media which fund and widely disseminate a favoured body of knowledge. A power politics is thus at play, entailing domination of and/or contestation between representational practices. This postcolonial perspective enables us to view culture not as something separate and beyond, whose outlines can be precisely and objectively determined from afar (as in Huntington’s multiculturalism or Islamism), but rather as an immediate and inescapable shaping of experience. Its contours may well be shifting and imprecise, but we cannot view, interpret or make our world without it. Culture tints, filters, gives perspective; yet privileging one colour means excluding others; filtering in also means filtering out. Islam, in this view, is not a collection of clearly definable values or “customs,” but rather a contested terrain of lived practices and contingent interpretations. Fixating on one set of meanings—a “real” Islam or the “true” Muslim woman—is an attempt to contain, control or hierarchize the Other. Many of the contributions in this issue aim at unsettling the propagation of powerful stereotypes that reduce Islam or Muslim culture to a religious category, equate Muslims with terrorism or sexual perversion, or assume Islamic religious practice to be monolithic or static. Thus, Liz Philipose cautions against the feminist view that all “traditional” or Muslim law is necessarily oppressive to women. And Shahnaz Khan emphasizes that holding only local Afghan patriarchies to account for Afghan women’s “oppression” is linked to a desire to “rescue 8women,” and may well be used as an argument to rationalize foreign military intervention. This contested cultural terrain obliges us to be more self-reflexive about, and accountable to, our positioning as privileged intellectuals, Western(ized) elites, or women or men; otherwise we run the risk of universalizing our positions or speaking for others, thus silencing the subaltern (Spivak 1988). This is certainly the argument put forth by Burwell, Davis and Taylor, who problematize their own pedagogical practices in general, and the reading of Nafisi’s Reading Lolita in Tehran in particular, within the current context of neo-Orientalism and Islamophobia. In response, they offer an expressly qualified and personalized hermeneutical account of Nafisi’s text. For the postcolonial critic, accountable positioning often means having to chart a complex course. Jasmin Zine speaks, in this regard, of having to confront oppression “from within and without” her community, that is, in a way that agrees with neither mainstream media arguments about Muslim women nor Islamist ones, and that resists both outwardly “secular” explanations and straightforwardly “religious” ones. This complex positioning often implies having to occupy a borderline position, on the margins of any mainstream. Yet such positioning, such contestation from the margins, is precisely what enables a “cultural politics”: it shows that culture does not only mediate our lives, but is the very site of agency and change. This is evident in Zine’s study of Muslim girls who challenge the gender-segregated spaces within their schools and attempt to negotiate a position that accommodates the status of women in Islam. It is evident in the work of women’s groups in North America and Nigeria which Liz Philipose highlights, that try to claim women’s rights by reinterpreting Islam in a feminist light. It is manifest in the “queer Muslim punk” groups described by Ibrahim Abraham; they demonstrate the possibility of same-sex intimacy without conforming to either the mainstream bourgeois hetero-homo binary or the hidden homosexual practices within Muslim communities. And finally, agency and change are apparent in Sayed Kashua’s book, Dancing Arabs, which, as Catherine Rottenberg tells us, challenges Jewish readers to re-examine their assumptions about Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. All of this lays bare notions of the West as necessarily culturally hegemonic, of Islam as homogeneous and fixed, and of Muslims as victims in need of rescue. The postcolonial view thus underlines the importance of culture to the contested present. It alerts us to how dominant contemporary discourses on Islam are constructed, and reveals their attempts to de-politicize, naturalize and mainstream their Orientalist depictions of Muslims. It warns against dominant strategies to centre or privilege some discourses (the corporate media, the nation-state, Western “civilization,” social elites, religious patriarchs) and produce others (Islam, Muslims, women, queers, the Third World). And it sensitizes us to those cultural acts of resistance aimed at interrogating, deflecting or re-presenting domination. The articles that follow in this special issue of TOPIA bring much needed attention to these important postcolonial insights and preoccupations.

#### Speaking for others re-enforces violence, coercion, and oppression while silencing Muslim Americans—their stories are inevitably twisted and construed to fit the current hierarchy of power

Alcoff, 91—Associate Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies and the Meredith Professor for Teaching Excellence at Syracuse University (Linda, Winter 1991, “The Problem of Speaking for Others,” Cultural Critique, No. 20, p. 5-32)//twemchen

These examples demonstrate the range of current practices of speaking for others in our society. While the prerogative of speaking for others remains unquestioned in the citadels of colonial administration, among activists and in the academy it elicits a growing unease and, in some communities of discourse, it is being rejected. There is a strong, albeit contested, current within feminism which holds that speaking for others---even for other women---is arrogant, vain, unethical, and politically illegitimate. Feminist scholarship has a liberatory agenda which almost requires that women scholars speak on behalf of other women, and yet the dangers of speaking across differences of race, culture, sexuality, and power are becoming increasingly clear to all. In feminist magazines such as Sojourner, it is common to find articles and letters in which the author states that she can only speak for herself. In her important paper, "Dyke Methods," Joyce Trebilcot offers a philosophical articulation of this view. She renounces for herself the practice of speaking for others within a lesbian feminist community, arguing that she "will not try to get other wimmin to accept my beliefs in place of their own" on the grounds that to do so would be to practice a kind of discursive coercion and even a violence.3 Feminist discourse is not the only site in which the problem of speaking for others has been acknowledged and addressed. In anthropology there is similar discussion about whether it is possible to speak for others either adequately or justifiably. Trinh T. Minh-ha explains the grounds for skepticism when she says that anthropology is "mainly a conversation of `us' with `us' about `them,' of the white man with the white man about the primitive-nature man...in which `them' is silenced. `Them' always stands on the other side of the hill, naked and speechless...`them' is only admitted among `us', the discussing subjects, when accompanied or introduced by an `us'..."4 Given this analysis, even ethnographies written by progressive anthropologists are a priori regressive because of the structural features of anthropological discursive practice. The recognition that there is a problem in speaking for others has followed from the widespread acceptance of two claims. First, there has been a growing awareness that where one speaks from affects both the meaning and truth of what one says, and thus that one cannot assume an ability to transcend ~~her~~ [their] location. In other words, a speaker's location (which I take here to refer to her social location or social identity) has an epistemically significant impact on that speaker's claims, and can serve either to authorize or dis-authorize one's speech. The creation of Women's Studies and African American Studies departments were founded on this very belief: that both the study of and the advocacy for the oppressed must come to be done principally by the oppressed themselves, and that we must finally acknowledge that systematic divergences in social location between speakers and those spoken for will have a significant effect on the content of what is said. The unspoken premise here is simply that a speaker's location is epistemically salient. I shall explore this issue further in the next section. The second claim holds that not only is location epistemically salient, but certain privileged locations are discursively dangerous.5 In particular, the practice of privileged persons speaking for or on behalf of less privileged persons has actually resulted (in many cases) in increasing or reenforcing the oppression of the group spoken for. This was part of the argument made against Anne Cameron's speaking for Native women: Cameron's intentions were never in question, but the effects of her writing were argued to be harmful to the needs of Native authors because it is Cameron rather than they who will be listened to and whose books will be bought by readers interested in Native women. Persons from dominant groups who speak for others are often treated as authenticating presences that confer legitimacy and credibility on the demands of subjugated speakers; such speaking for others does nothing to disrupt the discursive hierarchies that operate in public spaces. For this reason, the work of privileged authors who speak on behalf of the oppressed is becoming increasingly criticized by members of those oppressed groups themselves.6 As social theorists, we are authorized by virtue of our academic positions to develop theories that express and encompass the ideas, needs, and goals of others. However, we must begin to ask ourselves whether this is ever a legitimate authority, and if so, what are the criteria for legitimacy? In particular, is it ever valid to speak for others who are unlike me or who are less privileged than me? We might try to delimit this problem as only arising when a more privileged person speaks for a less privileged one. In this case, we might say that I should only speak for groups of which I am a member. But this does not tell us how groups themselves should be delimited. For example, can a white woman speak for all women simply by virtue of being a woman? If not, how narrowly should we draw the categories? The complexity and multiplicity of group identifications could result in "communities" composed of single individuals. Moreover, the concept of groups assumes specious notions about clear-cut boundaries and "pure" identities. I am a Panamanian-American and a person of mixed ethnicity and race: half white/Angla and half Panamanian mestiza. The criterion of group identity leaves many unanswered questions for a person such as myself, since I have membership in many conflicting groups but my membership in all of them is problematic. Group identities and boundaries are ambiguous and permeable, and decisions about demarcating identity are always partly arbitrary. Another problem concerns how specific an identity needs to be to confer epistemic authority. Reflection on such problems quickly reveals that no easy solution to the problem of speaking for others can be found by simply restricting the practice to speaking for groups of which one is a member. Adopting the position that one should only speak for oneself raises similarly difficult questions. If I don't speak for those less privileged than myself, am I abandoning my political responsibility to speak out against oppression, a responsibility incurred by the very fact of my privilege? If I should not speak for others, should I restrict myself to following their lead uncritically? Is my greatest contribution to move over and get out of the way? And if so, what is the best way to do this---to keep silent or to deconstruct my own discourse? The answers to these questions will certainly depend on who is asking them. While some of us may want to undermine, for example, the U.S. government's practice of speaking for the "Third world," we may not want to undermine someone such as Rigoberta Menchu's ability to speak for Guatemalan Indians.7 So the question arises about whether all instances of speaking for should be condemned and, if not, how we can justify a position which would repudiate some speakers while accepting others. In order to answer these questions we need to become clearer on the epistemological and metaphysical issues which are involved in the articulation of the problem of speaking for others, issues which most often remain implicit. I will attempt to make these issues clear before turning to discuss some of the possible responses to the problem and advancing a provisional, procedural solution of my own. But first I need to explain further my framing of the problem. In the examples used above, there may appear to be a conflation between the issue of speaking for others and the issue of speaking about others. This conflation was intentional on my part, because it is difficult to distinguish speaking about from speaking for in all cases. There is an ambiguity in the two phrases: when one is speaking for another one may be describing their situation and thus also speaking about them. In fact, it may be impossible to speak for another without simultaneously conferring information about them. Similarly, when one is speaking about another, or simply trying to describe their situation or some aspect of it, one may also be speaking in place of them, i.e. speaking for them. One may be speaking about another as an advocate or a messenger if the person cannot speak for herself. Thus I would maintain that if the practice of speaking for others is problematic, so too must be the practice of speaking about others.8 This is partly the case because of what has been called the "crisis of representation." For in both the practice of speaking for as well as the practice of speaking about others, I am engaging in the act of representing the other's needs, goals, situation, and in fact, who they are, based on my own situated interpretation. In post-structuralist terms, I am participating in the construction of their subject-positions rather than simply discovering their true selves. Once we pose it as a problem of representation, we see that, not only are speaking for and speaking about analytically close, so too are the practices of speaking for others and speaking for myself. For, in speaking for myself, I am also representing my self in a certain way, as occupying a specific subject-position, having certain characteristics and not others, and so on. In speaking for myself, I (momentarily) create my self---just as much as when I speak for others I create them as a public, discursive self, a self which is more unified than any subjective experience can support. And this public self will in most cases have an effect on the self experienced as interiority. The point here is that the problem of representation underlies all cases of speaking for, whether I am speaking for myself or for others. This is not to suggest that all representations are fictions: they have very real material effects, as well as material origins, but they are always mediated in complex ways by discourse, power, and location. However, the problem of speaking for others is more specific than the problem of representation generally, and requires its own particular analysis. There is one final point I want to make before we can pursue this analysis. The way I have articulated this problem may imply that individuals make conscious choices about their discursive practice free of ideology and the constraints of material reality. This is not what I wish to imply. The problem of speaking for others is a social one, the options available to us are socially constructed, and the practices we engage in cannot be understood as simply the results of autonomous individual choice. Yet to replace both "I" and "we" with a passive voice that erases agency results in an erasure of responsibility and accountability for one's speech, an erasure I would strenuously argue against (there is too little responsibility-taking already in Western practice!). When we sit down to write, or get up to speak, we experience ourselves as making choices. We may experience hesitation from fear of being criticized or from fear of exacerbating a problem we would like to remedy, or we may experience a resolve to speak despite existing obstacles, but in many cases we experience having the possibility to speak or not to speak. On the one hand, a theory which explains this experience as involving autonomous choices free of material structures would be false and ideological, but on the other hand, if we do not acknowledge the activity of choice and the experience of individual doubt, we are denying a reality of our experiential lives.9 So I see the argument of this paper as addressing that small space of discursive agency we all experience, however multi-layered, fictional, and constrained it in fact is. Ultimately, the question of speaking for others bears crucially on the possibility of political effectivity. Both collective action and coalitions would seem to require the possibility of speaking for. Yet influential postmodernists such as Gilles Deleuze have characterized as "absolutely fundamental: the indignity of speaking for others"10 and important feminist theorists have renounced the practice as irretrievably harmful. What is at stake in rejecting or validating speaking for others as a discursive practice? To answer this, we must become clearer on the epistemological and metaphysical claims which are implicit in the articulation of the problem. I. A plethora of sources have argued in this century that the neutrality of the theorizer can no longer, can never again, be sustained, even for a moment. Critical theory, discourses of empowerment, psychoanalytic theory, post-structuralism, feminist and anti-colonialist theories have all concurred on this point. Who is speaking to whom turns out to be as important for meaning and truth as what is said; in fact what is said turns out to change according to who is speaking and who is listening. Following Foucault, I will call these "rituals of speaking" to identify discursive practices of speaking or writing which involve not only the text or utterance but their position within a social space which includes the persons involved in, acting upon, and/or affected by the words. Two elements within these rituals will deserve our attention: the positionality or location of the speaker and the discursive context. We can take the latter to refer to the connections and relations of involvement between the utterance/text and other utterances and texts as well as the material practices in the relevant environment, which should not be confused with an environment spatially adjacent to the particular discursive event. Rituals of speaking are constitutive of meaning, the meaning of the words spoken as well as the meaning of the event. This claim requires us to shift the ontology of meaning from its location in a text or utterance to a larger space, a space which includes the text or utterance but which also includes the discursive context. And an important implication of this claim is that meaning must be understood as plural and shifting, since a single text can engender diverse meanings given diverse contexts. Not only what is emphasized, noticed, and how it is understood will be affected by the location of both speaker and hearer, but the truth-value or epistemic status will also be affected. For example, in many situations when a woman speaks the presumption is against her; when a man speaks he is usually taken seriously (unless his speech patterns mark him as socially inferior by dominant standards). When writers from oppressed races and nationalities have insisted that all writing is political the claim has been dismissed as foolish or grounded in ressentiment or it is simply ignored; when prestigious European philosophers say that all writing is political it is taken up as a new and original "truth" (Judith Wilson calls this "the intellectual equivalent of the `cover record'.")11 The rituals of speaking which involve the location of speaker and listeners affect whether a claim is taken as true, well-reasoned, a compelling argument, or a significant idea. Thus, how what is said gets heard depends on who says it, and who says it will affect the style and language in which it is stated. The discursive style in which some European post-structuralists have made the claim that all writing is political marks it as important and likely to be true for a certain (powerful) milieu; whereas the style in which African-American writers made the same claim marked their speech as dismissable in the eyes of the same milieu. This point might be conceded by those who admit to the political mutability of interpretation, but they might continue to maintain that truth is a different matter altogether. And they would be right that acknowledging the effect of location on meaning and even on whether something is taken as true within a particular discursive context does not entail that the "actual" truth of the claim is contingent upon its context. However, this objection presupposes a particular conception of truth, one in which the truth of a statement can be distinguished from its interpretation and its acceptance. Such a concept would require truth to be independent of the speakers' or listeners' embodied and perspectival location. Thus, the question of whether location bears simply on what is taken to be true or what is really true, and whether such a distinction can be upheld, involves the very difficult problem of the meaning of truth. In the history of Western philosophy, there have existed multiple, competing definitions and ontologies of truth: correspondence, idealist, pragmatist, coherentist, and consensual notions. The dominant modernist view has been that truth represents a relationship of correspondence between a proposition and an extra-discursive reality. On this view, truth is about a realm completely independent of human action and expresses things "as they are in themselves," that is, free of human interpretation. Arguably since Kant, more obviously since Hegel, it has been widely accepted that an understanding of truth which requires it to be free of human interpretation leads inexorably to skepticism, since it makes truth inaccessible by definition. This created an impetus to reconfigure the ontology of truth, from a locus outside human interpretation to one within it. Hegel, for example, understood truth as an "identity in difference" between subjective and objective elements. Thus, in the Hegelian aftermath, so-called subjective elements, or the historically specific conditions in which human knowledge occurs, are no longer rendered irrelevant or even obstacles to truth. On a coherentist account of truth, which is held by such philosophers as Rorty, Donald Davidson, Quine, and (I would argue) Gadamer and Foucault, truth is defined as an emergent property of converging discursive and non-discursive elements, when there exists a specific form of integration among these elements in a particular event. Such a view has no necessary relationship to idealism, but it allows us to understand how the social location of the speaker can be said to bear on truth. The speaker's location is one of the elements which converge to produce meaning and thus to determine epistemic validity.12 Let me return now to the formulation of the problem of speaking for others. There are two premises implied by the articulation of the problem, and unpacking these should advance our understanding of the issues involved. Premise (1): The "ritual of speaking" (as defined above) in which an utterance is located always bears on meaning and truth such that there is no possibility of rendering positionality, location, or context irrelevant to content. The phrase "bears on" here should indicate some variable amount of influence short of determination or fixing. One important implication of this first premise is that we can no longer determine the validity of a given instance of speaking for others simply by asking whether or not the speaker has done sufficient research to justify her claims. Adequate research will be a necessary but insufficient criterion of evaluation. Now let us look at the second premise. Premise (2): All contexts and locations are differentially related in complex ways to structures of oppression. Given that truth is connected to politics, these political differences between locations will produce epistemic differences as well. The claim here that "truth is connected to politics" follows necessarily from Premise (1). Rituals of speaking are politically constituted by power relations of domination, exploitation, and subordination. Who is speaking, who is spoken of, and who listens is a result, as well as an act, of political struggle. Simply put, the discursive context is a political arena. To the extent that this context bears on meaning, and meaning is in some sense the object of truth, we cannot make an epistemic evaluation of the claim without simultaneously assessing the politics of the situation. Although we cannot maintain a neutral voice, according to the first premise we may at least all claim the right and legitimacy to speak. But the second premise suggests that some voices may be dis-authorized on grounds which are simultaneously political and epistemic. Any statement will invoke the structures of power allied with the social location of the speaker, aside from the speaker's intentions or attempts to avoid such invocations. The conjunction of Premises (1) and (2) suggest that the speaker loses some portion of control over the meaning and truth of her utterance. Given that the context of hearers is partially determinant, the speaker is not the master or mistress of the situation. Speakers may seek to regain control here by taking into account the context of their speech, but they can never know everything about this context, and with written and electronic communication it is becoming increasingly difficult to know anything at all about the context of reception. This loss of control may be taken by some speakers to mean that no speaker can be held accountable for her discursive actions. The meaning of any discursive event will be shifting and plural, fragmented and even inconsistent. As it ranges over diverse spaces and transforms in the mind of its recipients according to their different horizons of interpretation, the effective control of the speaker over the meanings which she puts in motion may seem negligible. However, a partial loss of control does not entail a complete loss of accountability. And moreover, the better we understand the trajectories by which meanings proliferate, the more likely we can increase, though always only partially, our ability to direct the interpretations and transformations our speech undergoes. When I acknowledge that the listener's social location will affect the meaning of my words, I can more effectively generate the meaning I intend. Paradoxically, the view which holds the speaker or author of a speech act as solely responsible for its meanings ensures the speaker's least effective determinacy over the meanings that are produced. We do not need to posit the existence of fully conscious acts or containable, fixed meanings in order to hold that speakers can alter their discursive practices and be held accountable for at least some of the effects of these practices. It is a false dilemma to pose the choice here as one between no accountability or complete causal power. In the next section I shall consider some of the principal responses offered to the problem of speaking for others. II. First I want to consider the argument that the very formulation of the problem with speaking for others involves a retrograde, metaphysically insupportable essentialism that assumes one can read off the truth and meaning of what one says straight from the discursive context. Let's call this response the "Charge of Reductionism", because it argues that a sort of reductionist theory of justification (or evaluation) is entailed by premises (1) and (2). Such a reductionist theory might, for example, reduce evaluation to a political assessment of the speaker's location where that location is seen as an insurmountable essence that fixes one, as if one's feet are superglued to a spot on the sidewalk. For instance, after I vehemently defended Barbara Christian's article, "The Race for Theory," a male friend who had a different evaluation of the piece couldn't help raising the possibility of whether a sort of apologetics structured my response, motivated by a desire to valorize African American writing against all odds. His question in effect raised the issue of the reductionist/essentialist theory of justification I just described. I, too, would reject reductionist theories of justification and essentialist accounts of what it means to have a location. To say that location bears on meaning and truth is not the same as saying that location determines meaning and truth. And location is not a fixed essence absolutely authorizing one's speech in the way that God's favor absolutely authorized the speech of Moses. Location and positionality should not be conceived as one-dimensional or static, but as multiple and with varying degrees of mobility.13 What it means, then, to speak from or within a group and/or a location is immensely complex. To the extent that location is not a fixed essence, and to the extent that there is an uneasy, underdetermined, and contested relationship between location on the one hand and meaning and truth on the other, we cannot reduce evaluation of meaning and truth to a simple identification of the speaker's location. Neither Premise (1) nor Premise (2) entail reductionism or essentialism. They argue for the relevance of location, not its singular power of determination, and they are non-committal on how to construe the metaphysics of location. While the "Charge of Reductionism" response has been popular among academic theorists, what I call the "Retreat" response has been popular among some sections of the U.S. feminist movement. This response is simply to retreat from all practices of speaking for; it asserts that one can only know one's own narrow individual experience and one's "own truth" and thus that one can never make claims beyond this. This response is motivated in part by the desire to recognize difference and different priorities, without organizing these differences into hierarchies. Now, sometimes I think this is the proper response to the problem of speaking for others, depending on who is making it. We certainly want to encourage a more receptive listening on the part of the discursively privileged and to discourage presumptuous and oppressive practices of speaking for. And the desire to retreat sometimes results from the desire to engage in political work but without practicing what might be called discursive imperialism. But a retreat from speaking for will not result in an increase in receptive listening in all cases; it may result merely in a retreat into a narcissistic yuppie lifestyle in which a privileged person takes no responsibility for her society whatsoever. She may even feel justified in exploiting her privileged capacity for personal happiness at the expense of others on the grounds that she has no alternative. The major problem with such a retreat is that it significantly undercuts the possibility of political effectivity. There are numerous examples of the practice of speaking for others which have been politically efficacious in advancing the needs of those spoken for, from Rigoberta Menchu to Edward Said and Steven Biko. Menchu's efforts to speak for the 33 Indian communities facing genocide in Guatemala have helped to raise money for the revolution and bring pressure against the Guatemalan and U.S. governments who have committed the massacres in collusion. The point is not that for some speakers the danger of speaking for others does not arise, but that in some cases certain political effects can be garnered in no other way. Joyce Trebilcot's version of the retreat response, which I mentioned at the outset of this essay, raises other issues. She agrees that an absolute prohibition of speaking for would undermine political effectiveness, and therefore says that she will avoid speaking for others only within her lesbian feminist community. So it might be argued that the retreat from speaking for others can be maintained without sacrificing political effectivity if it is restricted to particular discursive spaces. Why might one advocate such a partial retreat? Given that interpretations and meanings are discursive constructions made by embodied speakers, Trebilcot worries that attempting to persuade or speak for another will cut off that person's ability or willingness to engage in the constructive act of developing meaning. Since no embodied speaker can produce more than a partial account, and since the process of producing meaning is necessarily collective, everyone's account within a specified community needs to be encouraged. I agree with a great deal of Trebilcot's argument. I certainly agree that in some instances speaking for others constitutes a violence and should be stopped. But Trebilcot's position, as well as a more general retreat position, presumes an ontological configuration of the discursive context that simply does not obtain. In particular, it assumes that one can retreat into one's discrete location and make claims entirely and singularly within that location that do not range over others, and therefore that one can disentangle oneself from the implicating networks between one's discursive practices and others' locations, situations, and practices. In other words, the claim that I can speak only for myself assumes the autonomous conception of the self in Classical Liberal theory--that I am unconnected to others in my authentic self or that I can achieve an autonomy from others given certain conditions. But there is no neutral place to stand free and clear in which one's words do not prescriptively affect or mediate the experience of others, nor is there a way to demarcate decisively a boundary between one's location and all others. Even a complete retreat from speech is of course not neutral since it allows the continued dominance of current discourses and acts by omission to reenforce their dominance. As my practices are made possible by events spatially far away from my body so too my own practices make possible or impossible practices of others. The declaration that I "speak only for myself" has the sole effect of allowing me to avoid responsibility and accountability for my effects on others; it cannot literally erase those effects. Let me offer an illustration of this. The feminist movement in the U.S. has spawned many kinds of support groups for women with various needs: rape victims, incest survivors, battered wives, and so forth, and some of these groups have been structured around the view that each survivor must come to her own "truth" which ranges only over herself and has no bearing on others. Thus, one woman's experience of sexual assault, its effect on her and her interpretation of it, should not be taken as a universal generalization to which others must subsume or conform their experience. This view works only up to a point. To the extent it recognizes irreducible differences in the way people respond to various traumas and is sensitive to the genuinely variable way in which women can heal themselves, it represents real progress beyond the homogeneous, universalizing approach which sets out one road for all to follow. However, it is an illusion to think that, even in the safe space of a support group, a member of the group can, for example, trivialize brother-sister incest as "sex play" without profoundly harming someone else in the group who is trying to maintain her realistic assessment of her brother's sexual activities with her as a harmful assault against his adult rationalization that "well, for me it was just harmless fun." Even if the speaker offers a dozen caveats about her views as restricted to her location, she will still affect the other woman's ability to conceptualize and interpret her experience and her response to it. And this is simply because we cannot neatly separate off our mediating praxis which interprets and constructs our experiences from the praxis of others. We are collectively caught in an intricate, delicate web in which each action I take, discursive or otherwise, pulls on, breaks off, or maintains the tension in many strands of the web in which others find themselves moving also. When I speak for myself, I am constructing a possible self, a way to be in the world, and am offering that, whether I intend to or not, to others, as one possible way to be. Thus, the attempt to avoid the problematic of speaking for by retreating into an individualist realm is based on an illusion, well supported in the individualist ideology of the West, that a self is not constituted by multiple intersecting discourses but consists in a unified whole capable of autonomy from others. It is an illusion that I can separate from others to such an extent that I can avoid affecting them. This may be the intention of my speech, and even its meaning if we take that to be the formal entailments of the sentences, but it will not be the effect of the speech, and therefore cannot capture the speech in its reality as a discursive practice. When I "speak for myself" I am participating in the creation and reproduction of discourses through which my own and other selves are constituted. A further problem with the "Retreat" response is that it may be motivated by a desire to find a method or practice immune from criticism. If I speak only for myself it may appear that I am immune from criticism because I am not making any claims that describe others or prescribe actions for them. If I am only speaking for myself I have no responsibility for being true to your experience or needs. But surely it is both morally and politically objectionable to structure one's actions around the desire to avoid criticism, especially if this outweighs other questions of effectivity. In some cases, the motivation is perhaps not so much to avoid criticism as to avoid errors, and the person believes that the only way to avoid errors is to avoid all speaking for others. However, errors are unavoidable in theoretical inquiry as well as political struggle, and they usually make contributions. The pursuit of an absolute means to avoid making errors comes perhaps not from a desire to advance collective goals but a desire for personal mastery, to establish a privileged discursive position wherein one cannot be undermined or challenged and thus is master of the situation. From such a position one's own location and positionality would not require constant interrogation and critical reflection; one would not have to constantly engage in this emotionally troublesome endeavor and would be immune from the interrogation of others. Such a desire for mastery and immunity must be resisted. The final response to the problem of speaking for others that I will consider occurs in Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's rich essay "Can the Subaltern Speak?"14 Spivak rejects a total retreat from speaking for others, and she criticizes the "self-abnegating intellectual" pose that Foucault and Deleuze adopt when they reject speaking for others on the grounds that their position assumes the oppressed can transparently represent their own true interests. According to Spivak, Foucault and Deleuze's self-abnegation serves only to conceal the actual authorizing power of the retreating intellectuals, who in their very retreat help to consolidate a particular conception of experience (as transparent and self-knowing). Thus, to promote "listening to" as opposed to speaking for essentializes the oppressed as non-ideologically constructed subjects. But Spivak is also critical of speaking for which engages in dangerous re-presentations. In the end Spivak prefers a "speaking to," in which the intellectual neither abnegates his or her discursive role nor presumes an authenticity of the oppressed, but still allows for the possibility that the oppressed will produce a "countersentence" that can then suggest a new historical narrative. Spivak's arguments show that a simple solution can not be found in for the oppressed or less privileged being able to speak for themselves, since their speech will not necessarily be either liberatory or reflective of their "true interests", if such exist. I agree with her on this point but I would emphasize also that ignoring the subaltern's or oppressed person's speech is, as she herself notes, "to continue the imperialist project."15 Even if the oppressed person's speech is not liberatory in its content, it remains the case that the very act of speaking itself constitutes a subject that challenges and subverts the opposition between the knowing agent and the object of knowledge, an opposition which has served as a key player in the reproduction of imperialist modes of discourse. Thus, the problem with speaking for others exists in the very structure of discursive practice, irrespective of its content, and subverting the hierarchical rituals of speaking will always have some liberatory effects. I agree, then, that we should strive to create wherever possible the conditions for dialogue and the practice of speaking with and to rather than speaking for others. Often the possibility of dialogue is left unexplored or inadequately pursued by more privileged persons. Spaces in which it may seem as if it is impossible to engage in dialogic encounters need to be transformed in order to do so, such as classrooms, hospitals, workplaces, welfare agencies, universities, institutions for international development and aid, and governments. It has long been noted that existing communication technologies have the potential to produce these kinds of interaction even though research and development teams have not found it advantageous under capitalism to do so. However, while there is much theoretical and practical work to be done to develop such alternatives, the practice of speaking for others remains the best option in some existing situations. An absolute retreat weakens political effectivity, is based on a metaphysical illusion, and often effects only an obscuring of the intellectual's power. There can be no complete or definitive solution to the problem of speaking for others, but there is a possibility that its dangers can be decreased. The remainder of this paper will try to contribute toward developing that possibility. III. In rejecting a general retreat from speaking for, I am not advocating a return to an unself-conscious appropriation of the other, but rather that anyone who speaks for others should only do so out of a concrete analysis of the particular power relations and discursive effects involved. I want to develop this point by elucidating four sets of interrogatory practices which are meant to help evaluate possible and actual instances of speaking for. In list form they may appear to resemble an algorithm, as if we could plug in an instance of speaking for and factor out an analysis and evaluation. However, they are meant only to suggest the questions that should be asked concerning any such discursive practice. These are by no means original: they have been learned and practiced by many activists and theorists. (1) The impetus to speak must be carefully analyzed and, in many cases (certainly for academics!), fought against. This may seem an odd way to begin discussing how to speak for, but the point is that the impetus to always be the speaker and to speak in all situations must be seen for what it is: a desire for mastery and domination. If one's immediate impulse is to teach rather than listen to a less-privileged speaker, one should resist that impulse long enough to interrogate it carefully. Some of us have been taught that by right of having the dominant gender, class, race, letters after our name, or some other criterion, we are more likely to have the truth. Others have been taught the opposite and will speak haltingly, with apologies, if they speak at all.16 At the same time, we have to acknowledge that the very decision to "move over" or retreat can occur only from a position of privilege. Those who are not in a position of speaking at all cannot retreat from an action they do not employ. Moreover, making the decision for oneself whether or not to retreat is an extension or application of privilege, not an abdication of it. Still, it is sometimes called for. (2) We must also interrogate the bearing of our location and context on what it is we are saying, and this should be an explicit part of every serious discursive practice we engage in. Constructing hypotheses about the possible connections between our location and our words is one way to begin. This procedure would be most successful if engaged in collectively with others, by which aspects of our location less obvious to us might be revealed.17 One deformed way in which this is too often carried out is when speakers offer up in the spirit of "honesty" autobiographical information about themselves, usually at the beginning of their discourse as a kind of disclaimer. This is meant to acknowledge their own understanding that they are speaking from a specified, embodied location without pretense to a transcendental truth. But as Maria Lugones and others have forcefully argued, such an act serves no good end when it is used as a disclaimer against one's ignorance or errors and is made without critical interrogation of the bearing of such an autobiography on what is about to be said. It leaves for the listeners all the real work that needs to be done. For example, if a middle class white man were to begin a speech by sharing with us this autobiographical information and then using it as a kind of apologetics for any limitations of his speech, this would leave to those of us in the audience who do not share his social location all the work of translating his terms into our own, apprising the applicability of his analysis to our diverse situation, and determining the substantive relevance of his location on his claims. This is simply what less-privileged persons have always had to do for ourselves when reading the history of philosophy, literature, etc., which makes the task of appropriating these discourses more difficult and time-consuming (and alienation more likely to result). Simple unanalyzed disclaimers do not improve on this familiar situation and may even make it worse to the extent that by offering such information the speaker may feel even more authorized to speak and be accorded more authority by his peers. (3) Speaking should always carry with it an accountability and responsibility for what one says. To whom one is accountable is a political/epistemological choice contestable, contingent and, as Donna Haraway says, constructed through the process of discursive action. What this entails in practice is a serious commitment to remain open to criticism and to attempt actively, attentively, and sensitively to "hear" the criticism (understand it). A quick impulse to reject criticism must make one wary. (4) Here is my central point. In order to evaluate attempts to speak for others in particular instances, we need to analyze the probable or actual effects of the words on the discursive and material context. One cannot simply look at the location of the speaker or her credentials to speak; nor can one look merely at the propositional content of the speech; one must also look at where the speech goes and what it does there. Looking merely at the content of a set of claims without looking at their effects cannot produce an adequate or even meaningful evaluation of it, and this is partly because the notion of a content separate from effects does not hold up. The content of the claim, or its meaning, emerges in interaction between words and hearers within a very specific historical situation. Given this, we have to pay careful attention to the discursive arrangement in order to understand the full meaning of any given discursive event. For example, in a situation where a well-meaning First world person is speaking for a person or group in the Third world, the very discursive arrangement may reinscribe the "hierarchy of civilizations" view where the U. S. lands squarely at the top. This effect occurs because the speaker is positioned as authoritative and empowered, as the knowledgeable subject, while the group in the Third World is reduced, merely because of the structure of the speaking practice, to an object and victim that must be championed from afar. Though the speaker may be trying to materially improve the situation of some lesser-privileged group, one of the effects of her discourse is to reenforce racist, imperialist conceptions and perhaps also to further silence the lesser-privileged group's own ability to speak and be heard.18 This shows us why it is so important to reconceptualize discourse, as Foucault recommends, as an event, which includes speaker, words, hearers, location, language, and so on. All such evaluations produced in this way will be of necessity indexed. That is, they will obtain for a very specific location and cannot be taken as universal. This simply follows from the fact that the evaluations will be based on the specific elements of historical discursive context, location of speakers and hearers, and so forth. When any of these elements is changed, a new evaluation is called for. Our ability to assess the effects of a given discursive event is limited; our ability to predict these effects is even more difficult. When meaning is plural and deferred, we can never hope to know the totality of effects. Still, we can know some of the effects our speech generates: I can find out, for example, that the people I spoke for are angry that I did so or appreciative. By learning as much as possible about the context of reception I can increase my ability to discern at least some of the possible effects. This mandates incorporating a more dialogic approach to speaking, that would include learning from and about the domains of discourse my words will affect. I want to illustrate the implications of this fourth point by applying it to the examples I gave at the beginning. In the case of Anne Cameron, if the effects of her books are truly disempowering for Native women, they are counterproductive to Cameron's own stated intentions, and she should indeed "move over." In the case of the white male theorist who discussed architecture instead of the politics of postmodernism, the effect of his refusal was that he offered no contribution to an important issue and all of us there lost an opportunity to discuss and explore it. Now let me turn to the example of George Bush. When Bush claimed that Noriega is a corrupt dictator who stands in the way of democracy in Panama, he repeated a claim which has been made almost word for word by the Opposition movement in Panama. Yet the effects of the two statements are vastly different because the meaning of the claim changes radically depending on who states it. When the president of the United States stands before the world passing judgement on a Third World government, and criticizing it on the basis of corruption and a lack of democracy, the immediate effect of this statement, as opposed to the Opposition's, is to reenforce the prominent Anglo view that Latin American corruption is the primary cause of the region's poverty and lack of democracy, that the U.S. is on the side of democracy in the region, and that the U.S. opposes corruption and tyranny. Thus, the effect of a U.S. president's speaking for Latin America in this way is to re-consolidate U.S. imperialism by obscuring its true role in the region in torturing and murdering hundreds and thousands of people who have tried to bring democratic and progressive governments into existence. And this effect will continue until the U.S. government admits its history of international mass murder and radically alters it foreign policy. IV. Conclusion This issue is complicated by the variable way in which the importance of the source, or location of the author, can be understood, a topic alluded to earlier. On one view, the author of a text is its "owner" and "originator" credited with creating its ideas and with being their authoritative interpreter. On another view, the original speaker or writer is no more privileged than any other person who articulates these views, and in fact the "author" cannot be identified in a strict sense because the concept of author is an ideological construction many abstractions removed from the way in which ideas emerge and become material forces.19 Now, does this latter position mean that the source or locatedness of the author is irrelevant? It need not entail this conclusion, though it might in some formulations. We can de-privilege the "original" author and reconceptualize ideas as traversing (almost) freely in a discursive space, available from many locations, and without a clearly identifiable originary track, and yet retain our sense that source remains relevant to effect. Our meta-theory of authorship does not preclude the material reality that in discursive spaces there is a speaker or writer credited as the author of her utterances, or that for example the feminist appropriation of the concept "patriarchy" gets tied to Kate Millett, a white Anglo feminist, or that the term feminism itself has been and is associated with a Western origin. These associations have an effect, an effect of producing distrust on the part of some Third World nationalists, an effect of reinscribing semi-conscious imperialist attitudes on the part of some first world feminists. These are not the only possible effects, and some of the effects may not be pernicious, but all the effects must be taken into account when evaluating the discourse of "patriarchy." The emphasis on effects should not imply, therefore, that an examination of the speaker's location is any less crucial. This latter examination might be called a kind of genealogy. In this sense, a genealogy involves asking how a position or view is mediated and constituted through and within the conjunction and conflict of historical, cultural, economic, psychological, and sexual practices. But it seems to me that the importance of the source of a view, and the importance of doing a genealogy, should be subsumed within an overall analysis of effects, making the central question what the effects are of the view on material and discursive practices through which it traverses and the particular configuration of power relations emergent from these. Source is relevant only to the extent that it has an impact on effect. As Gayatri Spivak likes to say, the invention of the telephone by a European upper class male in no way preempts its being put to the use of an anti-imperialist revolution. In conclusion, I would stress that the practice of speaking for others is often born of a desire for mastery, to privilege oneself as the one who more correctly understands the truth about another's situation or as one who can champion a just cause and thus achieve glory and praise. And the effect of the practice of speaking for others is often, though not always, erasure and a reinscription of sexual, national, and other kinds of hierarchies. I hope that this analysis will contribute toward rather than diminish the important discussion going on today about how to develop strategies for a more equitable, just distribution of the ability to speak and be heard. But this development should not be taken as an absolute dis-authorization of all practices of speaking for. It is not always the case that when others unlike me speak for me I have ended up worse off, or that when we speak for others they end up worse off. Sometimes, as Loyce Stewart has argued, we do need a "messenger" to advocate for our needs. The source of a claim or discursive practice in suspect motives or maneuvers or in privileged social locations, I have argued, though it is always relevant, cannot be sufficient to repudiate it. We must ask further questions about its effects, questions which amount to the following: will it enable the empowerment of oppressed peoples?

**Curtailing surveillance in specific areas will just cause agencies to literally surveil areas outside/around it- mosque surveillance tactics prove**

**Goldman et. al, 12**

(Adam and Matt are editors for the Associated Press. “NYPD Defends Tactics Over Mosque Spying; Records Reveal New Details On Muslim Surveillance.” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/24/nypd-defends-tactics-over\_n\_1298997.html. Date Accessed- 7/13/15. Anshul Nanda)

**NEW YORK -- The New York Police Department targeted Muslim mosques with tactics normally reserved for criminal organizations**, according to newly obtained police documents that showed police collecting the **license plates of worshippers, monitoring them on surveillance cameras and cataloging sermons** through a network of informants.¶ The documents, obtained by The Associated Press, have come to light as the **NYPD fends off criticism of its monitoring of Muslim student groups and its cataloging of mosques and Muslim businesses in nearby Newark, N.J.**The NYPD's spokesman, Paul Browne, forcefully defended the legality of those efforts Thursday, telling reporters that its officers may go wherever the public goes and collect intelligence, even outside city limits.¶ The new documents, prepared for Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly, show how the NYPD's roster of **paid informants monitored conversations and sermons inside mosques. The records offer the first glimpse of what those informants, known informally as "mosque crawlers," gleaned from inside the houses of** worship.¶ For instance, when a Danish newspaper published inflammatory cartoons of Prophet Muhammad in September 2005**, Muslim communities around the world erupted in outrage. Violent mobs took to the streets in the Middle East.** A Somali man even broke into the cartoonist's house in Denmark with an ax.¶ In New York, thousands of miles away, it was a different story. Muslim leaders preached peace and urged people to protest lawfully. Write letters to politicians, they said. Some **advocated boycotting Danish products, burning flags and holding rallies**.¶ All of that was permissible under law and protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution. All was reported to the **NYPD by its mosque crawlers and made its way into police files for Kelly.**¶"Imam Shamsi **Ali brought up the topic of the cartoon, condemning them.** He announced a rally that was to take place on Sunday (02/05/06) near the United Nations. He asked that everyone to attend if possible and reminded everyone to keep their poise if they can make it," one report read.¶ At the Muslim Center of New York in Queens, the report said, "Mohammad Tariq Sherwani led the prayer service and urged those in attendance to participate in a demonstration at the United Nations on Sunday."¶ **When one Muslim leader suggested planning a demonstration**, one of the people involved in the discussion about how to get a permit was, in fact, working for the NYPD.¶ **"It seems horrible to me that the NYPD is treating an entire religious community as potential terrorists**," said civil rights lawyer Jethro Eisenstein, who reviewed some of the documents and is involved in a decades-old class-action lawsuit against the police department for spying on protesters and political dissidents.¶ The **lawsuit is known as the Handschu case, and a court order in that case governs how the NYPD may collect intelligence**.¶ Eisenstein said the documents prove the NYPD has violated those rules.¶ "This is a flat-out violation," Eisenstein said. "This is a smoking gun."¶ Browne, the NYPD spokesman, did not discuss specific investigations Thursday but told reporters that, because of the Handschu case, the NYPD operates under stricter rules than any other department in the country. He said police do not violate those rules.¶ His statements were intended to calm a controversy over a 2007 operation in which the NYPD mapped and photographed all of Newark's mosques and eavesdropped on Muslim businesses. Newark Mayor Cory Booker said he was never told about the surveillance, which he said offended him.¶ Booker and his police director accused the NYPD of misleading them by not revealing exactly what they were doing. Had they known, they said it never would have been permitted. But Browne said Newark police were told before and after the operation and knew exactly what it entailed.¶ Kelly, **the police commissioner, and Mayor Michael Bloomberg have been emphatic that police only follow legitimate leads of criminal activity and** do not **conduct preventive surveillance in ethnic communities**.¶ Former and current law enforcement officials either involved in or with direct knowledge of these programs say they did not follow leads. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the secret programs. But the documents support their claims.¶ The effort highlights one of the most difficult aspects of policing in the age of terrorism. Solving crimes isn't enough; police are expected to identify would-be terrorists and move in before they can attack.¶ There are no universally agreed upon warning signs for terrorism. Terrorists have used Internet cafes, stayed in hostels, worked out at gyms, visited travel agencies, attended student groups and prayed at mosques. So the NYPD monitored those areas. In doing so, they monitored many innocent people as they went about their daily lives.¶ Using plainclothes officers from the squad known as the Demographics Unit, police swept Muslim neighborhoods and catalogued the location of mosques. The ethnic makeup of each congregation was logged as police fanned out across the city and outside their jurisdiction, into suburban Long Island and areas of New Jersey.¶ "African American, Arab, Pakistani," police wrote beneath the photo of one mosque in Newark.¶ Investigators looked at mosques as the center of Muslim life. All their connections had to be known.¶ David Cohen, the **NYPD's top intelligence officer, wanted a source inside every mosque within a 250-mile radius of New York,** current and former officials said. **Though the officials said they never managed to reach that goal, documents show the NYPD successfully placed informants or undercovers -** sometimes both **- into mosques from Westchester County, N.Y.,** to New Jersey.¶ The NYPD used these sources to get a sense of the sentiment of worshippers whenever an event generated headlines. The goal, former officials said, was **to alert police to potential problems before they bubbled up**.¶ Even when it was clear there were no links to terrorism**, the mosque informants gave the NYPD the ability to "take the pulse" of the community,** as Cohen and other managers put it.¶ When New York Yankees pitcher Cory Lidle and his flight instructor were killed on Oct. 11, 2006, when their small plane crashed into a Manhattan high-rise apartment, fighter planes were scrambled. Within hours the FBI and Homeland Security Department said it was an accident. Terrorism was ruled out.¶ Yet for days after the event, the NYPD's mosque crawlers reported to police about what they heard at sermons and among worshippers.¶ (View the PDF documents on Danish cartoons, mosque targeting and summaries of plane crash.)¶ At the Brooklyn Islamic Center, a confidential informant "noted chatter among the regulars expressing relief and thanks to God that the crash was only an accident and not an act of terrorism," one report reads.¶ "The worshippers made remarks to the effect that `it better be an accident; we don't need any more heat,'" an undercover officer reported from the Al-Tawheed Islamic Center in Jersey City, N.J.¶ In some instances, th**e NYPD put cameras on light poles and trained them on mosques, documents show. Because the cameras were in public space, police didn't need a warrant to conduct the surveillance.**¶ **Police also wrote down the license plates of cars in mosque parking lots, documents show. In some instances, police in unmarked cars outfitted with electronic license plate readers would drive down the street and record the plates of everyone parked near the mosque, former officials recalled.**¶ **"They're viewing Muslims like they're crazy.**