# 1AC

#### We Affirm the resolution which states Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China.

## Contention 1 – Status Quo

#### The US and China, as two of the worlds most powerful countries, are already cooperating in many areas, including protecting the environment, developing science and technology, various military operations, and many financial agreements.

#### However, there is one area where US-China engagement is notably absent – medical cooperation. Matthew Brown, director of the US Department of Health and Human Services, and a Senior Advisor at the Office of Global Affairs, explains:

Brown et al. ’13 (Matthew, Bryan Liang, Braden Hale & Thomas Novotny; 8/17/13; Seton Hall University, Senior Advisor at Office of Global Affairs, US Department of Health and Human Services, former Deputy Director at CDC China & Professor Emeritus of Anesthesiology, former Director of the San Diego Center for Patient Safety at the University of California, received his BS from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MD from Columbia University College of Physicians & Surgeons, PhD from the University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy Studies, and JD from Harvard Law School & Associate Adjunct Professor at UCSD, MD & Division of Epidemiology and Biostatistics Professor, Associate Director For Border and Global Health, former UC Berkeley Professor of Epidemiology and Assistant Dean for Public Health Practice; Global Health Policy Institute, “China's Role in Global Health Diplomacy: Designing Expanded U.S. Partnership for Health System Strengthening in Africa,” http://blogs.shu.edu/ghg/files/2014/02/GHGJ\_62\_149-166\_BROWN\_ET\_AL.pdf)

Why would the U.S. government explore expanded public health collaborations with [and] China in Africa? It is important to note that these two nations already have a shared history of public health collaboration. The United States and China have collaborated for more than two decades on infectious diseases (HIV/AIDS, influenza, and emerging infections), cancer, and other non-communicable diseases.37 These collaborations share common goals for improving the practice of public health as well as strengthening public health institutions in detecting and responding to public health problems in the United States and China. Additionally, improving medical infrastructure and health systems are shared global health objectives and stated priorities of African leaders, and such activities may also facilitate economic development and commerce among these partner nations.38-39 [However] Despite common goals, strategic cooperation in health development activities on the continent of Africa between the United States and China remains limited.

#### **With the rise of virulent diseases, such as the Ebola epidemic, medical cooperation between the US and China is more important than ever, especially in African countries that struggle to treat those epidemics on their own.**

#### **According to Jennifer Cooke, senior congressional advisor on US-Africa policy:**

Morrison, Stephen, and Jennifer Cooke. "US and Chinese Engagement in Africa." Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2008, csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy\_files/files/media/csis/pubs/ 080711\_cooke\_us\_chineseengagement\_web.pdf. Accessed 18 Feb. 2017. WC \*Brackets for clarity

China and the United States have both rapidly expanded their public health initiatives in Africa, at a time when international attention on global public health is also expanding. HIV/AIDS, malaria, avian flu, and SARS have generated a greater appreciation for the internationalization of health and the need for international health diplomacy and cooperation. Major government initiatives, along with the expansion of efforts by nongovernmental organizations, multilateral institutions, foundations, and faith-based organizations, offer new opportunities for collaboration to address African public health challenges. Africa’s challenges are many, and there are ample areas for coordinated work. At least 300 million cases of acute malaria are diagnosed annually. Malaria kills over 1 million people each year in Africa and is among the leading causes of death for children under age five. More than 8 million new cases of tuberculosis are detected annually, and **despite the availability of effective treatment, those numbers continue to rise.** Sub-Saharan Africa is home to 85 percent of the world’s HIV/ AIDS cases, and the disease compounds other diseases and other developmental problems. New epidemics such as avian influenza could be devastating. As Africa’s urban populations expand, alcohol, drug abuse, and chronic diseases like hypertension, heart disease, and diabetes are increasing as well. Structural challenges persist, including lack of trained health personnel and health infrastructure, weak interest internationally in tropical disease research, and limited African capacity, for example, in minimizing the influx and proliferation of counterfeit drugs. U.S. contributions to Africa’s health challenges have risen dramatically in recent years, enjoying strong bipartisan support that is likely to endure. By the end of the first five-year phase of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in late 2008, the United States will have expended over $19 billion on global AIDS control, roughly 60 percent in Africa. To date, U.S. efforts have been focused primarily on tackling specific infectious diseases—first and foremost HIV/ AIDS—and targeting select focal countries. In fighting HIV, there is increasing recognition that long-term management will require greater support for building health systems, and PEPFAR’s next five-year phase will almost certainly devote greater resources to the training of skilled personnel. President George W. Bush has also launched a major $1.2-billion, five-year initiative on malaria. In 2007, the United States spent $338 million on malaria efforts in Africa versus $1 million spent in 1997. Compared to HIV, control of malaria is more straightforward and affordable, with respect to the science of the disease as well as prevention and treatment. The challenge is to remain focused over time and to collaborate with partners to ensure maximum coverage. Chinese contributions to Africa are gradually increasing and are an important component of China’s Africa policy overall. China will continue to send medical teams to Africa and increase cooperation with Africa on prevention, treatment, research, and the application of traditional medicines. There are approximately 1,000 Chinese medical workers in 38 countries in Africa; more than half of the doctors are senior physicians and surgeons. Together they have treated an estimated 170 million patients suffering from various diseases. China has helped build numerous hospitals in Africa and has plans in the next three years to build 10 hospitals and 30 malaria clinics in Africa. On training, the Chinese Ministry of Health provides 15 courses each year to African participants in the areas of HIV/AIDS, malaria, hospital management, and health reform. Malaria will remain a prominent focus of China’s health efforts. China’s expanding health engagement and efforts to link it to an international strategy are new and worthy of encouragement. Through one promising initiative, the Ministry of Health has turned to global health experts at Peking University to help review existing Chinese programs, develop a long-term Chinese health strategy for Africa that updates the Chinese approach and ties it more effectively to African health outcomes, and identify opportunities for collaboration with the international community. These experts have recently concluded a summary review of all donor activities in the area of health in Africa. It is expected that reform of health approaches will take several years to formulate and execute. There are [thus] promising areas for public health cooperation among China, the United States, and African countries, although currently there are bureaucratic obstacles to greater dialogue and joint projects. At a minimum, there is need for greater communication to avoid duplication of efforts and identify gaps. African countries should engage China and the United States on bilateral projects, but also on multilateral efforts. Moreover, China could play a more active role in multilateral initiatives, building on its present substantial contributions to the board of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria, and its leadership of the World Health Organization. China and the United States bring complementary strengths to the table: China places an emphasis on infrastructure and health systems, and the United States on treatment of specific diseases. African governments with robust public health strategies in place can push for cooperation in what they identify as priority areas. Collaboration on malaria is a particularly promising area in which to build cooperation, given the priority African governments attach to this disease and rising commitments by both the United States and China. It is also an area that could deliver significant, rapid returns and perhaps help encourage future cooperation in more complex health efforts. Despite China’s interest in malaria, the Chinese and other Asian governments were absent at the 2007 Roll Back Malaria Partnership Board meeting in Addis Ababa. China should be welcomed and encouraged to participate more fully in these and other multilateral global health fora. Cooperation on health will require greater political will—by the United States, China, and African governments—than currently exists. This will require senior leadership that supports in- novation and flexibility in the field, minimizes political obstacles to communication, and favors joint initiatives. A future priority should be strengthening African capacities to address chronic diseases as well. Cooperation should not be limited to government-to-government engagement. Linking non- governmental organizations, research institutes, faith-based organizations, and corporate interests in active partnerships should also be a priority.

#### Thus, the plan that Wes and I propose is that “The United States federal government will substantially increase its health diplomacy with the People’s Republic of China, specifically in regards to Africa.”

#### We would now like to isolate two specific advantages to the plan.

## Advantage 1 – Public Health

#### The African continent is currently being ravaged by diseases, despite the fact that most of them are easily treatable.

Stephen Morrison, Director of the Global Health Policy Center and senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, writes:

Morrison, Stephen, and Jennifer Cooke. "US and Chinese Engagement in Africa." Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2008, csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy\_files/files/media/csis/pubs/ 080711\_cooke\_us\_chineseengagement\_web.pdf. Accessed 18 Feb. 2017. \*Brackets for clarity

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More than 8 million new cases of tuberculosis are detected annually, and **despite the availability of effective treatment, those numbers continue to rise.** Sub-Saharan Africa is home to 85 percent of the world’s HIV/ AIDS cases, and the disease compounds other diseases and other developmental problems. New epidemics such as avian influenza could be devastating. As Africa’s urban populations expand, alcohol, drug abuse, and chronic diseases like hypertension, heart disease, and diabetes are increasing as well. Structural challenges persist, including lack of trained health personnel and health infrastructure, weak interest internationally in tropical disease research, and limited African capacity, for example, in minimizing the influx and proliferation of counterfeit drugs. U.S. contributions to Africa’s health challenges have risen dramatically in recent years, enjoying strong bipartisan support that is likely to endure. 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At a minimum, there is need for greater communication to avoid duplication of efforts and identify gaps. African countries should engage China and the United States on bilateral projects, but also on multilateral efforts. Moreover, China could play a more active role in multilateral initiatives, building on its present substantial contributions to the board of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria, and its leadership of the World Health Organization. China and the United States bring complementary strengths to the table: China places an emphasis on infrastructure and health systems, and the United States on treatment of specific diseases. African governments with robust public health strategies in place can push for cooperation in what they identify as priority areas. Collaboration on malaria is a particularly promising area in which to build cooperation, given the priority African governments attach to this disease and rising commitments by both the United States and China. 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Linking non- governmental organizations, research institutes, faith-based organizations, and corporate interests in active partnerships should also be a priority.

#### What makes these millions of deaths even more tragic is the fact they’re easily preventable. For example, studies have shown that malaria treatments are effective almost 98% of the time[[1]](#footnote-1), however millions of innocent people, especially children, continue to die from it.

#### The plan allows us to combat these problems – it facilitates constructive cooperation between the US and China that will help improve medical practices throughout the world.  Matthew Brown, director of the US Department of Health and Human Services, and a Senior Advisor at the Office of Global Affairs, explains:

(Matthew; Bryan Liang, Professor of Anesthesiology and Director of the San Diego Center for Patient Safety at the University of California San Diego School of Medicine and Medical Director with the Program on Health Policy & Law at the University of California San Diego; Braden Hale, Program Director at the Department of Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program, Naval Health Research Center; Thomas Novotny, Professor of Epidemiology and Biostatistics and Co-Director at the SDSU/UCSD Joint Doctorate in Public Health, “China's Role in Global Health Diplomacy: Designing Expanded U.S. Partnership for Health System Strengthening in Africa,” 8/17/13, [http://blogs.shu.edu/ghg/files/2014/02/GHGJ\_62\_149-166\_BROWN\_ET\_AL.pdf).](http://blogs.shu.edu/ghg/files/2014/02/GHGJ_62_149-166_BROWN_ET_AL.pdf%29/RP)  \*Brackets for clarity

While China and the United States have never specifically collaborated on global public health projects in African nations, using the platform of health diplomacy among governments, a collaboration agreement negotiated with the TEPHINET network could provide a framework to facilitate staff exchanges, support study tours, and share best practices and shared models of public health practice. In addition, each FETP is funded by their respective government, contributing greatly to expanding country ownership with limited funding. Exploratory discussions could be held during a special session of the TEPHINET annual meeting, or as part of a dedicated session on global health at the S&ED. Bringing together the United States and China, which have worked together previously and have experience in strengthening public health institutions, can help amplify the collective impact sought by both superpowers in public health. While there are notable difference between the structure of China and many Africa nations, there are many similarities in approach. Some of the best practices employed in China could serve as models to help African recipient[s] countries improve donor coordination, even if African nations due to differences in governance are not able to replicate the Chinese experience. Even though China is still a developing nation, with huge health disparities between the rural and urban populations, it has emerged as a global player that could help provide assistance to many African nations. By partnering with the United States, the TEPHINET network [it] can also help provide a government framework to share experiences and best practices among countries, [and] to help strengthen responsive health systems in Africa.

#### Furthermore, the plan avoids historical pitfalls by moving global health into the diplomatic arena and enhancing visibility.  This allows us to build on our successes, while learning from, and ultimately avoiding, previous failures. Mathew Brown continues:

Brown et al. 13 – Senior Advisor at the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Global Affairs

(Matthew; Bryan Liang, Professor of Anesthesiology and Director of the San Diego Center for Patient Safety at the University of California San Diego School of Medicine and Medical Director with the Program on Health Policy & Law at the University of California San Diego; Braden Hale, Program Director at the Department of Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program, Naval Health Research Center; Thomas Novotny, Professor of Epidemiology and Biostatistics and Co-Director at the SDSU/UCSD Joint Doctorate in Public Health, “China's Role in Global Health Diplomacy: Designing Expanded U.S. Partnership for Health System Strengthening in Africa,” 8/17/13, [http://blogs.shu.edu/ghg/files/2014/02/GHGJ\_62\_149-166\_BROWN\_ET\_AL.pdf)//RP](http://blogs.shu.edu/ghg/files/2014/02/GHGJ_62_149-166_BROWN_ET_AL.pdf%29/RP)

While PEPFAR continued to expand prevention, care, and treatment for HIV/AIDS, slowing and reversing progress of the epidemic,58 the GHI role did not expand as initially anticipated. Congress appropriated little new funding, and the model that required USAID and CDC to coordinate existing programs and activities through GHI proved difficult to implement. Nearly two years passed before GHI recognized the need for a coordinating Director.59 The lack of new funding, lack of incentives to cross agency boundaries, and leadership vacuum eventually led to a closure of the GHI Office in July 2012.60 The joint announcement, signed by the directors of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC), and GHI, explained that the principles, programs and coordination role supported previously in the GHI office would remain in USAID, CDC, and OGAC. However, the new S/GHD office would move global public health more visibly into the diplomatic arena, building upon the success of PEPFAR and engaging the tools of diplomacy and statecraft at the highest levels of government to raise awareness of issues related to global public health.

## Advantage 2 – US-China Relations

#### Not only does the plan save millions of lives, it also has the ability to ease some of the tensions in the Sino-US relationship. Currently, US-Chinese *competition* in Africa is straining their relationship, however, if the two nations can set their differences aside and cooperate over shared interests such as the plan, this would improve trust, and open the door for more cooperation.

Lloyd Thrall, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, writes:

(Lloyd, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for (Force Readiness).

The explosive growth in Sino-African relations over the past decade has heightened trepidation about China’s role in Africa. Of the more than 5 million Chinese citizens living overseas, approximately 1 million live in Africa, up from only a few thousand ten years ago. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has 20 times the number of peacekeepers in Africa now than it did in 2000, and it is the largest contributor among the permanent United Nations (U.N.) Security Council members. Sino-African trade increased almost twentyfold over the same period, from $10 billion in 2000 to more than $180 billion in 2012, with China supplanting the United States in 2010 as Africa’s largest trading partner. Investment and capital flows have seen a similar expansion, quickly elevating China to a position among Africa’s leading financiers. Such rapid growth, occurring alongside Sino-American tensions in Asia, has fed both simplistic characterizations of China’s role in Africa and fears of renewed geopolitical competition on the continent. A closer look reveals a more complex and less foreboding picture. Sino-African relations are diverse, multifaceted, and evolving. They involve a varied set of Chinese and African actors across 54 African states, so caution should be taken when attempting to generalize across these relationships. U.S., Chinese, and African sources have often reduced Sino-African relations to enduring caricatures and sweeping generalizations that obscure more than they explain. Chinese sources often view Americans as demonizing Chinese behavior in Africa to support containment and *realpolitik*; U.S. sources tend to view China as exploiting African resources with little care for balanced trade or African stability. Both images are incomplete and inaccurate. Africa’s complexity and diversity, rapid change in China’s overseas economic interactions, and a growing sense of Sino-American competition have contributed to such distortions. Several exogenous narratives have also contributed – “peak oil,” colonial and neocolonial exploitation, mercantilism, and containment, to name a few. In truth, China’s emergence in Africa is perhaps the most significant geopolitical and economic event on the continent since the conclusion of the Cold War, and it merits better treatment than such conventional-wisdom approaches. This report explores the economic, political, and security dimensions of Sino-African relations. Its central conclusion is that China’s growing presence in Africa is not a strategic threat to U.S, interests requiring bilateral competition with Beijing. The United States and China share a similar interest in African stability, and Chinese contributions to African development can be positive for both African and American interests. There are areas of natural competition (for market access and diplomatic influence) and areas where American and Chinese interests in Africa contradict, chiefly around democratic governance and adherence to international political norms. However, the issues at stake are generally not zero-sum, and, in any case, are not commensurate with higher levels of political and security competition. Despite this, the climate of strategic distrust between the United States and China threatens to distort and securitize these issues in ways that can damage U.S. ties to both China and African states.

#### The plan serves to improve these strained relations by facilitating bilateral communication that lowers tensions on key issues, and builds trust between the two countries.

According to former Secretary of Defense William Cohen: (William S., American politician and author from AND CSIS Commission on China", Center for Strategic International Studies, March)

To be sure, there are a number of areas of serious divergence between Washington and Beijing. This should surprise no one. The United States has disagreements with even its allies. Two large powers with vastly different histories, cultures, and political systems are bound to have challenges. History has shown, however, that the most effective way of addressing issues is for the U.S. and Chinese governments to engage in quiet diplomacy rather than public recrimination. In the U.S.-China context, there is often little to be gained—and much to be lost in terms of trust and respect—by a polarizing debate. Any differences, moreover, must not necessarily impede Sino-U.S. cooperation when both sides share strong mutual interests. F. Scott Fitzgerald wrote that “the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function.” **Effective policy toward China by the United States, and vice versa, will require this kind of dual-minded intelligence. Moreover, working together on areas of mutual and global interest will help promote strategic trust between China and the United States, facilitating possible cooperation in other areas.** Even limited cooperation on specific areas will help construct additional mechanisms for bilateral communication on issues of irreconcilable disagreement. In fact, many of the toughest challenges in U.S.-China relations in recent years have been the result of unforeseen events, such as the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 and the EP-3 reconnaissance plane collision in April 2001. Building trust and finding workable solutions to tough problems is the premise behind the Obama administration’s foreign policy of smart power, as articulated by Secretary of State Clinton. Smart power is based on, as Secretary Clinton outlined in her confirmation hearing, the fundamental believe that “We must use . . . the full range of tools at our disposal—diplomatic, economic, military, political and cultural—picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation.” As the CSIS Commission on Smart Power noted in November 2007, “Smart Power is neither hard nor soft—it is the skillful combination of both. . . . It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships and institutions at all levels. . . .” As such, smart power necessarily mandates a major investment in a U.S.-China partnership on key issues. The concept enjoys broad support among the Chinese and American people and, by promoting the global good, it reaps concrete results around the world. There should be no expectation that Washington and Beijing will or should agree on all, or even most, questions. But the American and Chinese people should expect their leaders to come together on those vital issues that require their cooperation. U.S.-China partnership, though not inevitable, is indispensable.

#### And, a constructive US-China relationship doesn’t just sound good in theory; it works to prevent a host of existential threats.

Jianmin Wu, former President of China Foreign Affairs University, writes:

(Jianmin, Former President of China Foreign Affairs University; Member, Berggruen Institute's 21st Century Council, "Cooperation on Curbing Nukes and Climate Change Strengthens U.S.-China Link," 6/16, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/wu-jianmin/china-us-nukes-climate-change\_b\_7079932.html)](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/wu-jianmin/china-us-nukes-climate-change_b_7079932.html%29) \*Edited for gendered language and clarity

China-U.S. cooperation is multi-dimensional. It covers three areas: global challenges; bilateral trade, economic, cultural and educational cooperation; and military exchanges and security cooperation. The common challenges facing ~~mankind~~ [humanity] have never been so [as] daunting as they are today — climate change, nuclear weapons proliferation, terrorism, pandemics, natural disasters, drug trafficking, just to name a few. **No country, no matter how powerful it is, is able to meet these challenges alone**. Common challenges bring people together. Mankind is bound to unite for its survival. “When China and the U.S., the world’s two largest economies, cooperate, it makes a difference.” When China and the U.S., the world’s two largest economies, cooperate, it makes a difference. In November 2014, President Xi Jinping and President Obama made a [joint pledge](https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/fact-sheet-us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change-and-clean-energy-c%22%20%5Ct%20%22_hplink) on reducing pollution and carbon gas emissions. As a result, the [upcoming United Nations conference on climate change](http://climate-l.iisd.org/events/unfccc-cop-21/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_hplink) to be held in Paris from Nov. 30th to Dec. 11th this year, looks much more promising. Nuclear weapons proliferation also poses a serious threat to international peace and security. Of all the global challenges it is the most complicated. The North Korean nuclear issue is the other major concern along with Iran. The [Six-Party Talks](http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclear-program/p13593%22%20%5Ct%20%22_hplink) on this issue have so far stalled for six years and at present show no sign of resuming any time soon. Even so, the fact that China and the U.S. have [agreed to pursue the goal of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015-01/19/content_19347486.htm%22%20%5Ct%20%22_hplink) has kept the issue from getting out of control. The year 1950 witnessed [violent confrontation between China and U.S.](http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_us_china.htm%22%20%5Ct%20%22_hplink) in the Korean theater, but 2015 is a long way from 1950. China-U.S. cooperation has been a significant factor in keeping the lid on this conflict. Such cooperation, whether on Iran, North Korea or climate change, is an important building block for the new model of the major countries relationship. The way to conceive of this relationship is as a big house. It has to be built gradually, block by block. The more building blocks laid, the faster that house will be built. As President Xi Jinping has [put it:](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/ytjhzzdrsrcldrfzshyjxghd/t1211023.shtml%22%20%5Ct%20%22_hplink) “A sound China-U.S. cooperation can become a ballast stone of world stability and a booster of world peace.”

#### Thus, because the plan facilitates constructive cooperation that works to alleviate international health crises, save millions of lives, and provide a meaningful platform for diplomacy that ensure a safer, more successful global community, we strongly affirm.

# \*\*2AC Blocks\*\*

# AT T

## AT QPQ

#### 1. We meet – our plan necessitates that both the US and China contribute medical resources and expertise.

#### 2. Counter-Interpretation: Engagement is unconditional, and doesn’t have to be over a point of disagreement.

Johnston and Ross, **5** - professor of political science at Harvard AND professor of political science at Boston College (Alastair and Robert, Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, p. xv)

The volume's comprehensive approach to studying engagement means that the contributors have vastly different research agendas. To encourage a common dialogue among the contributors and to facilitate the generation of a common understanding of engagement with cross-national applications, the contributors have worked within a common definition of engagement. For the purpose of this volume, engagement is defined as follows: The use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status-quo elements of a rising major power's behavior. The goal is to ensure that this growing power is used in ways that are consistent with peaceful change in regional and global order. In this approach, amelioration of the rising power's behavior does not include efforts to hinder the accretion of relative power. This is better understood as "containment". We have neither defined nor limited the methods of amelioration, preferring that individual authors characterize the methods used by the respective countries and/or multilateral institutions. "Non-coercive methods" include such strategies as accommodation of legitimate interests, transformation of preferences, and entanglement in bilateral and multilateral institutional constraints. The contributors clearly differentiate engagement from containment. In contrast to containment, engagement seeks neither to limit, constrain, or delay increases in the target country's power nor prevent the development of influence commensurate with its greater power. Rather, it seeks to "socialize" the rising power by encouraging its satisfaction with the evolving global or regional order. Our definition of engagement **specifically excludes coercive policies**.

#### Unconditional engagement *includes the aff*.

**Litwak 7** — Robert S. Litwak, Director of the Division of International Security Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former director for nonproliferation on the National Security Council staff, 2007 (“Strategies for a Change of Regime — or for Change within a Regime?,” *Regime Change: U.S. Strategy Through the Prism of 9/11*, Published by JHU Press, ISBN 0801886422, p. 116-117)

Under unconditional engagement, a policy change is made with **no explicit expectation of reciprocation** by the target state. This shift can take the form of **a political gesture at the governmental level** to reduce tensions and facilitate additional steps to improve relations — such as the United States's symbolic lifting of some **minor economic sanctions** on Iran in March [end page 116] 2000.43 Alternatively, unconditional engagement can be conducted through nongovernmental actors operating at the societal level to promote change. In a case where the economy is not totally state-controlled, economic contacts can foster the development of autonomous interest groups. The easing of travel restrictions can permit the flow of people and ideas into the target state and promote the positive evolution of the state's civil society. Economic, scientific, cultural, and other activities outside the regime's direct control can become seeds of long-term change. China is the most striking and important example of this phenomenon. The exponen4 tial expansion of China's private sector and its increased links to the outside world at the societal level have been both a reflection of domestic reform and spurs for further measures to promote democratization and the creation of a market economy. Cuba and Iran are both candidates for **unconditional engagement** — where some experts believe such activities would strengthen civil society.44

#### 3. Reasons to prefer

a. Limits: We best limit: qpq’s includes every possible offer and reward which explodes the topic, unconditional engagement includes only one thing.

b. Topic-Literature: The majority of the topic literature is based on unconditional engagement – checks abuse.

c. Brightline: Creates a clear brightline between Aff and Neg ground because we allow only unconditional engagement, whereas what constitutes a qpq is ambiguous.

d. Predictability: Almost every Aff on this years topic is unconditional (just look at the wiki).

e. Neg ground: The Negative have conditionality CP’s and unconditionally DA’s, which includes more ground than their interp.

#### 4. Default to reasonability – they are able to read plenty of arguments against our case and aren’t able to prove any in-round abuse. Our interp is probably better, at worst it’s close, so don’t vote on T.

## AT Disagreement

#### 1. We meet – two warrants:

 a. Africa policy is one of the largest points of disagreement between the US and China – that’s the Thrall evidence.

 b. The plan’s controversial – hence the debate we’re having.

#### 2. Counter-Interpretation: Engagement is non-coercive, and doesn’t have to be over a point of disagreement.

Johnston and Ross, **5** - professor of political science at Harvard AND professor of political science at Boston College (Alastair and Robert, Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, p. xv)

The volume's comprehensive approach to studying engagement means that the contributors have vastly different research agendas. To encourage a common dialogue among the contributors and to facilitate the generation of a common understanding of engagement with cross-national applications, the contributors have worked within a common definition of engagement. For the purpose of this volume, engagement is defined as follows: The use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status-quo elements of a rising major power's behavior. The goal is to ensure that this growing power is used in ways that are consistent with peaceful change in regional and global order. In this approach, amelioration of the rising power's behavior does not include efforts to hinder the accretion of relative power. This is better understood as "containment". We have neither defined nor limited the methods of amelioration, preferring that individual authors characterize the methods used by the respective countries and/or multilateral institutions. "Non-coercive methods" include such strategies as accommodation of legitimate interests, transformation of preferences, and entanglement in bilateral and multilateral institutional constraints. The contributors clearly differentiate engagement from containment. In contrast to containment, engagement seeks neither to limit, constrain, or delay increases in the target country's power nor prevent the development of influence commensurate with its greater power. Rather, it seeks to "socialize" the rising power by encouraging its satisfaction with the evolving global or regional order. Our definition of engagement **specifically excludes coercive policies**.

#### Unconditional engagement *includes the aff*.

**Litwak 7** — Robert S. Litwak, Director of the Division of International Security Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former director for nonproliferation on the National Security Council staff, 2007 (“Strategies for a Change of Regime — or for Change within a Regime?,” *Regime Change: U.S. Strategy Through the Prism of 9/11*, Published by JHU Press, ISBN 0801886422, p. 116-117)

Under unconditional engagement, a policy change is made with **no explicit expectation of reciprocation** by the target state. This shift can take the form of **a political gesture at the governmental level** to reduce tensions and facilitate additional steps to improve relations — such as the United States's symbolic lifting of some **minor economic sanctions** on Iran in March [end page 116] 2000.43 Alternatively, unconditional engagement can be conducted through nongovernmental actors operating at the societal level to promote change. In a case where the economy is not totally state-controlled, economic contacts can foster the development of autonomous interest groups. The easing of travel restrictions can permit the flow of people and ideas into the target state and promote the positive evolution of the state's civil society. Economic, scientific, cultural, and other activities outside the regime's direct control can become seeds of long-term change. China is the most striking and important example of this phenomenon. The exponen4 tial expansion of China's private sector and its increased links to the outside world at the societal level have been both a reflection of domestic reform and spurs for further measures to promote democratization and the creation of a market economy. Cuba and Iran are both candidates for **unconditional engagement** — where some experts believe such activities would strengthen civil society.44

#### 3. Reasons to prefer

a. Limits: We best limit: point of controversy introduces the resolution factorial, tons of plans, literature won’t prevent random combos so it would be less predictable than just incentives.

b. Predictability: We just explained it.

c. Topic-Literature: The majority of the topic literature is based on unconditional engagement, and not over a point of controversy – checks abuse.

c. Brightline: Creates a clear brightline between Aff and Neg ground because we allow only unconditional engagement, whereas what constitutes a point of controversy is ambiguous. If there’s any question about who’s winning the we-meet, then that proves our interpretation is the only one that’s universizable.

d. Topic Education: They kill any meaningful cooperation with China Aff’s.

e. They destroy aff ground – if we’re forced to include conditions, we can’t read relations advantages, which are the core advantage ground– we’d also lose every debate to the add a condition CP and the unconditional CP.

f. China would just say no – there’s no debate.

#### 4. Default to reasonability – they are able to read plenty of arguments against our case and aren’t able to prove any in-round abuse. Our interp is probably better, at worst it’s close, so don’t vote on T.

### AT Substantial

#### If Numerical Interpretation:

#### 1. We meet – two warrants:

####  a. Our Thrall evidence indicates that health cooperation in Africa is one of the largest issues in the US-China relationship.

####  b. We specify in our plan text that the US and China are going to substantially increase their cooperation over health.

#### 2. Counter-Interpretation: Substantially is an adverb – refers to the manner not the quantity

Watson 2

JAMES L. WATSON, SENIOR JUDGE 2002 UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE GENESCO INC., :Plaintiff, :v.Court No. 92-02-00084 UNITED STATES , <http://www.cit.uscourts.gov/slip_op/Slip_op00/00-57.pdf>.

The term “substantially” is used as an adverb preceding a verb, the term means “in a substantial manner: so as to be substantial.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridge. (1968).

#### 3. Counter-Interpretation: Substantial means “of considerable amount” --- not some contrived percentage

Prost 4 - Judge – United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

(“Committee For Fairly Traded Venezuelan Cement v. United States”, 6-18, http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/04opinions/04-1016.html)

The URAA and the SAA neither amend nor refine the language of § 1677(4)(C).  In fact, they merely suggest, without disqualifying other alternatives, a “clearly higher/substantial proportion” approach.  Indeed, the SAA specifically mentions that no “precise mathematical formula” or “‘benchmark’ proportion” is to be used for a dumping concentration analysis.  SAA at 860 (citations omitted); see also Venez. Cement, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1329-30.  Furthermore, as the Court of International Trade noted, the SAA emphasizes that the Commission retains the discretion to determine concentration of imports on a “case-by-case basis.”  SAA at 860.  Finally, the definition of the word “substantial” undercuts the CFTVC’s argument.  The word “substantial” generally means “considerable in amount, value or worth.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1993).  It does not imply a specific number or cut-off.  What may be substantial in one situation may not be in another situation.  The very breadth of the term “substantial” undercuts the CFTVC’s argument that Congress spoke clearly in establishing a standard for the Commission’s regional antidumping and countervailing duty analyses.  It therefore supports the conclusion that the Commission is owed deference in its interpretation of “substantial proportion.”  The Commission clearly embarked on its analysis having been given considerable leeway to interpret a particularly broad term.

#### 3. Reasons to prefer

 a. It’s impossible to quantify how much we increase cooperation – only our interpretation provides a universizable rule for debate.

 b. They over-limit the topic – kills creativity and forces everyone into the same generic arguments.

 c. Their interpretation is arbitrary – there’s no way to determine whether or not something is substantial, if there’s any question as to whether or not we’re winning the we-meet that proves our interpretation is the only one that’s universizable.

 d. Federal courts agree – substantially shouldn't be defined precisely to a numerical value

Curtin 3 - United States Circuit Judge of the Western District of New York

(Gateway Equip. Corp. v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 2d 299, Lexis)

While the court agrees that the meanings of limitation and impairment refer to restriction and reduction, it **does not agree** with the uncited definition of "substantial" as an order of magnitude equivalent to 80 or 90 percent. *Random House Unabridged Dictionary* 1897 (2d ed. 1993) defines "substantial" as "of ample or considerable amount quantity, size," a much less precise definition than offered by the government. It is clear that the CB-4000 can and does transport its load over the public highway in the course of traveling to a job [\*\*33]  site. The question is whether that transportation function is substantially limited by its special design in the type of material it can haul, and whether there are other factors that substantially limit/ impair its use for over-the-road distance hauling.

#### 4. Default to reasonability – they are able to read plenty of arguments against our case and aren’t able to prove any in-round abuse. Our interp is probably better, at worst it’s close, so don’t vote on T.

#### If Qualitative Interpretation:

#### 1. We meet – two warrants:

####  a. Our Thrall evidence indicates that health cooperation in Africa is one of the largest issues in the US-China relationship.

####  b. We specify in our plan text that the US and China are going to substantially increase their cooperation over health.

#### 2. Counter-Interpretation: Substantially is an adverb – refers to the manner not the quantity

**Watson 2**

JAMES L. WATSON, SENIOR JUDGE 2002 UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE GENESCO INC., :Plaintiff, :v.Court No. 92-02-00084 UNITED STATES , <http://www.cit.uscourts.gov/slip_op/Slip_op00/00-57.pdf>.

The term “substantially” is used as an adverb preceding a verb, the term means “in a substantial manner: so as to be substantial.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridge. (1968).

#### 3. Reasons to prefer

 a. It’s impossible to quantify how much we increase cooperation – only our interpretation provides a universizable rule for debate.

 b. They over-limit the topic – kills creativity and forces everyone into the same generic arguments.

 c. Their interpretation is arbitrary – there’s no way to determine whether or not something is substantial, if there’s any question as to whether or not we’re winning the we-meet that proves our interpretation is the only one that’s universizable.

#### 4. Default to reasonability – they are able to read plenty of arguments against our case and aren’t able to prove any in-round abuse. Our interp is probably better, at worst it’s close, so don’t vote on T.

### AT Not Pre-existing

#### **Increase requires preexistence**

Brown ‘3 (Anna J. Brown, US Federal Judge for the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, Elena Mark And Paul Gustafson,

Plaintiffs, v. Valley Insurance Company and Valley Property and Casualty, Defendants, 7/17/03, L/N)

FCRA does not define the term "increase." The plain and ordinary meaning of the verb "to increase" is to make something greater or larger. 4 Merriam-Webster's [\*\*22] Collegiate Dictionary 589 (10th ed. 1998). The "something" that is increased in the statute is the "charge for any insurance." The plain and common meaning of the noun "charge" is "the price demanded for something." Id. at 192. Thus, the statute plainly means an insurer takes adverse action if the insurer makes greater (i.e., larger) the price demanded for insurance. An insurer cannot "make greater" something that did not exist previously. The statutory definition of adverse action, therefore, clearly anticipates an insurer must have made an initial charge or demand for payment before the insurer can increase that charge. In other words, an insurer cannot increase the charge for insurance unless the insurer previously set and demanded payment of the premium for that insured's insurance [\*\*23] coverage at a lower price.

#### **Increase means to make greater and requires pre-existence**

Buckley 6 (Jeremiah, Attorney, Amicus Curiae Brief, Safeco Ins. Co. of America et al v. Charles Burr et al, <http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/06-84/06-84.mer.ami.mica.pdf>)

First, the court said that the ordinary meaning of the word “increase” is “to make something greater,” which it believed should not “be limited to cases in which a company raises the rate that an individual has previously been charged.” 435 F.3d at 1091. Yet the definition offered by the Ninth Circuit compels the opposite conclusion. Because “increase” means “to make something greater,” there must necessarily have been an existing premium, to which Edo’s actual premium may be compared, to determine whether an “increase” occurred. Congress could have provided that “ad-verse action” in the insurance context means charging an amount greater than the optimal premium, but instead chose to define adverse action in terms of an “increase.” That def-initional choice must be respected, not ignored. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392-93 n.10 (1979) (“[a] defin-ition which declares what a term ‘means’ . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated”). Next, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the Insurance Prong includes the words “existing or applied for,” Congress intended that an “increase in any charge” for insurance must “apply to all insurance transactions – from an initial policy of insurance to a renewal of a long-held policy.” 435 F.3d at 1091. This interpretation reads the words “exist-ing or applied for” in isolation. Other types of adverse action described in the Insurance Prong apply only to situations where a consumer had an existing policy of insurance, such as a “cancellation,” “reduction,” or “change” in insurance. Each of these forms of adverse action presupposes an already-existing policy, and under usual canons of statutory construction the term “increase” also should be construed to apply to increases of an already-existing policy. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (“a phrase gathers meaning from the words around it”) (citation omitted).

### AT Pre-existing

#### **Increase doesn’t require pre-existence**

Reinhardt ‘6 (Stephen Reinhardt, US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, circuit judge, Jason Ray Reynolds; Matthew Rausch, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc.; Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees, 1-25-2006, <http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/435/435.F3d.1081.03-35695.04-35279.html>)

Specifically, we must decide whether charging a higher price for initial insurance than the insured would otherwise have been charged because of information in a consumer credit report constitutes an "increase in any charge" within the meaning of FCRA. First, we examine the definitions of "increase" and "charge." Hartford Fire contends that, limited to their ordinary definitions, these words apply only when a consumer has previously been charged for insurance and that charge has thereafter been increased by the insurer. The phrase, "has previously been charged," as used by Hartford, refers not only to a rate that the consumer has previously paid for insurance but also to a rate that the consumer has previously been quoted, even if that rate was increased before the consumer made any payment. Reynolds disagrees, asserting that, under the ordinary definition of the term, an increase in a charge also occurs whenever an insurer charges a higher rate than it would otherwise have charged because of any factor — such as adverse credit information, age, or driving record8 — regardless of whether the customer was previously charged some other rate. According to Reynolds, he was charged an increased rate because of his credit rating when he was compelled to pay a rate higher than the premium rate because he failed to obtain a high insurance score. Thus, he argues, the definitions of "increase" and "charge" encompass the insurance companies' practice. Reynolds is correct. 23 "Increase" means to make something greater. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) ("The action, process, or fact of becoming or making greater; augmentation, growth, enlargement, extension."); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (3d college ed.1988) (defining "increase" as "growth, enlargement, etc[.]"). "Charge" means the price demanded for goods or services. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) ("The price required or demanded for service rendered, or (less usually) for goods supplied."); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (3d college ed. 1988) ("[T]he cost or price of an article, service, etc."). Nothing in the definition of these words implies that the term "increase in any charge for" should be limited to cases in which a company raises the rate that an individual has previously been charged.

# AT DA’s/CP’s

## AT Appeasement DA

#### 1. No link—trying to cooperate with China isn’t appeasement.

Christopher Chivvis, RAND Corporation Senior Political Scientist, 15

[Christopher S., 01-22-2015, RAND Corporation, "The Difference Between Negotiation and Appeasement,"http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/01/the-difference-between-negotiation-and-appeasement.html , accessed 7-5-2016, TNV]

One of the leitmotifs of post-World War II foreign policy debate in America is the dangerous conflation of diplomacy and appeasement. Real appeasement is treacherous, but accusations of appeasement are also costly when they are hurled against any effort to negotiate with adversaries whatsoever, no matter how sensible and potentially beneficial the outcome. In 2015 the United States faces complex and dangerous foreign and security policy challenges in at least three critical regions — Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Opportunities to address these challenges through negotiation with unsavory and even heinous adversaries are apt to arise. A central challenge will be to engage these adversaries without appeasing them. Appeasement involves one-sided concessions to adversaries in hope that simple gestures of goodwill themselves will bring peace. It is born of fear, helplessness, or a superficial desire for a deal at any cost. In contrast, sound diplomacy weighs costs and benefits, based on a hard-nosed evaluation of American interests and values. It makes concessions only in exchange for concrete gains. But sound diplomacy still requires flexibility and willingness to trade, bargain, and make deals, including with adversaries. This is not the same thing as appeasement. The 1938 Munich Conference at which French Prime Minister Edouard Daladier and his British counterpart Neville Chamberlin agreed to accept Hitler's annexation of Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland defined “appeasement” for generations to come. Chamberlin and Daladier hoped that giving Hitler the Sudetenland might sate his aggressive, expansionist desires, and prevent a second world war. But Hitler was maniacal and innately insatiable, so France and Britain got nothing from their concessions and World War II happened anyway. But the historical lesson of the Munich Conference isn't that any show of flexibility, concessions or negotiations, including with dictatorships, is doomed to failure. The fact that Hitler was power mad does not mean that all dictators are, much less that all America's adversaries are today. A willingness to negotiate with adversaries, even heinous ones, is not itself appeasement. Such negotiations are critical to an effective foreign policy. History is full of diplomatic breakthroughs that were once dogged by charges of appeasement. Recent major examples include President Reagan's negotiations with the Soviets to remove intermediate range nuclear missiles from Europe and Richard Holbrooke's negotiations with Slobodan Milosevic, which ended Bosnia's bloody civil war in 1995. In both these cases, diplomacy ultimately achieved national objectives and avoided war. When openness to negotiating with adversaries is equated with appeasement, it works against the national interest and can contribute to the kind of purely military logic that led the great powers to “sleepwalk” into World War I a century ago.

#### 2. Plan bolsters Chinese moderates – avoids competition and escalation.

**Li, East China Normal University IR professor, 2015**

(Xiaoting, “Dealing with the Ambivalent Dragon: Can Engagement Moderate China’s Strategic Competition with America?”, International Interactions, 41.3, Wiley) \*Brackets for clarity

Can US engagement moderate China’s strategic competition with America? This study[s] indicates the answer is a qualified yes. Under unipolarity, a rising state may face both incentives to accommodate the hegemonic dominance and to expand its own strategic leeway against the latter. Consequently, engagement may help the hegemon to promote cooperation over competition in dealing with an ascending power, but it does not necessarily overwhelm the structural incentives for the competition. Against this theoretical backdrop, this study utilizes both qualitative and quantitative research to demonstrate that China’s reaction to American primacy has long been marked by a profound ambivalence. Specifically, the findings suggest that while US engagement has some restraining impact on China’s competitive propensity, Beijing will continue to hedge against American hegemony, as its capabilities grow, by solidifying its diplomatic and strategic association with the developing world. The endurance of competition, however, does not imply that conflict is inevitable. In fact, facing the reality of rising power, realist theory does not uniformly predict catastrophe or recommend containment: To classical realists, the future is always unwritten, and so wise diplomacy matters (Kirshner 2012:65–66).13 Despite China’s impressive development to date, for example, it is far from certain that the PRC will achieve parity with the United States in economic, military, and technological strength for the foreseeable future (Beckley 2011). Many PRC elites seem to realize this too and hence prefer to keep China committed to peaceful development, by working with rather than against America (Bader 2012:122–123; Sutter 2012:149–150). As noted recently by a renowned Singaporean expert, those “doves” still hold considerable sway in opposition to an aggressive, nationalist approach in Chinese foreign policy (Mahbubani 2014). Under the circumstances, sustained US engagement helps to strengthen the moderate Chinese groups and individuals by signaling that American intentions toward China are not inimical and that there is much room for promoting mutual understanding and benefit. Within this context, a belligerent Chinese posture toward America will appear less appealing or defensible in domestic debates. Engagement, in other words, reduces the likelihood of conflict by preventing the formation of a strong consensus among the ruling elites of an emerging power that the hegemon constitutes an unappeasable threat, a consensus that is a foremost necessary condition for balancing or confrontational behavior (Schweller 2004).

#### 3. Engagement fosters peace and need to be continued, prefer our historical warrant to their anti-China speculation.

**Hart, UCSD political science PhD, 2015**

(Melanie, “Assessing American Foreign Policy Toward China’, 9-29, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2015/09/29/122283/assessing-american-foreign-policy-toward-china/)

The United States has pursued an engagement strategy toward China for almost four decades. Regardless of party affiliation, every U.S. president since Nixon has aimed to integrate China into the international system. That decision has been and continues to be one of the greatest American foreign policy successes of the post-World War II era. The U.S. engagement strategy toward China and alliance relationships in the Asia-Pacific region made it possible for Asia-Pacific nations to focus on economic development at home instead of strategic competition abroad. Now, nearly 37 years after U.S.-China normalization, China is an upper-middle-income nation. China’s economic growth is allowing it to expand its military capabilities and foreign policy ambitions. That is a natural expansion. Beijing is increasingly unwilling to sit on the sidelines and watch other nations shape international norms. Today, instead of biding their time, Chinese leaders are experimenting with new ways to use their nation’s growing strengths to shape the international environment in China’s favor. On some issues, those efforts dovetail with U.S. interests, so China’s new assertiveness is opening up new opportunities for cooperation. Where U.S.-China interests are not aligned, however, Chinese actions are reheating old frictions and creating new ones. Those frictions—most notably in the South China Sea—are triggering new debates in the United States about overall foreign policy strategy toward China. Some U.S. observers discount the new opportunities for cooperation and argue that because some challenges in the U.S.-China relationship appear difficult to navigate, the United States should scrap the entire engagement strategy and begin treating China as a strategic rival. Those arguments are misguided. The fundamentals of the U.S.-China relationship are the same today as they were in the 1970s when the United States first reached out to turn this former rival into a strategic partner. Chinese leaders still prioritize domestic economic growth and stability above all other policy goals; they still view the U.S.-China bilateral as China’s most important foreign policy relationship and want that relationship to be peaceful and cooperative. The Chinese military still focuses first and foremost on defending the Chinese Communist Party’s right to govern the Chinese mainland and its territories. These fundamentals have not changed. What has changed in recent years is China’s capabilities and the tools Beijing is using to further its domestic and foreign policy interests. Those changes call for some tactical adjustments on the U.S. side. Those changes do not warrant an abandonment of the engagement strategy that has brought, and can continue to bring, decades of enduring peace and economic growth for all Asia-Pacific nations, including the United States.

#### 4. China war not likely- 5 reasons

**Thompson 14** (“Five Reasons China Won't Be A Big Threat To America's Global Power, 6/6/14, Loren Thomspon: writes about national security, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/06/06/five-reasons-china-wont-be-a-big-threat-to-americas-global-power/#7bf7df91b5cd>, EHS MKS)

China’s rapid economic rise and growing assertiveness in relations with other nations has provoked concern in Washington that America is facing a new rival for global dominance. World Bank estimates suggest China may surpass the purchasing power of the U.S. economy as early as this year, meaning that America will cease being the world’s biggest producer of wealth for the first time since it overtook Britain on the eve of the 1876 centennial. U.S. critics of Beijing frequently ascribe China’s success to mercantilist trade policies, and point to other irritants such as growing military investment and state-directed cyber attacks to depict the Middle Kingdom as a menace on the march. It certainly doesn’t help matters when Chinese military leaders attending international forums describe America as a nation in decline, and attribute the Obama Administration’s restrained response in Ukraine to “erectile dysfunction.” However, there is no need to make the administration’s Pacific pivot the prelude to a new Cold War, because for all its dynamism China looks unlikely to be any more successful in dethroning America from global preeminence than Japan and Russia were. This is partly due to intrinsic economic and cultural advantages America enjoys, and partly to limits on China’s ability to continue advancing. Those limits don’t get much attention in Washington, so I thought I would spend a little time describing the five most important factors constraining China’s power potential. 1. Geographical constraints. Unlike America, which spent much of its history expanding under doctrines such as Manifest Destiny, China’s potential for territorial growth is severely limited by geography. To the west it faces the barren Tibetan plateau and Gobi Desert. To the south the Himalayan mountains present an imposing barrier to the Indian Subcontinent. To the north vast and largely empty grasslands known as the Steppes provide a buffer with Russia. And to the east stretches the world’s largest ocean (there are over 6,000 miles of water between Shanghai and San Francisco). So aside from the hapless Vietnamese who share the southern coastal plain and China’s historical claim to Taiwan, there isn’t much opportunity for wars of conquest on China’s periphery. Ironically, China’s disputes with neighbors over the disposition of minor islands and reefs underscores how little real potential Beijing has for growing its territory the way other powers have. 2. Demographic trends. At 1.3 billion, China has the largest population of any country. However, that population is aging rapidly due to the one-child policy imposed in 1979. The current fertility rate of 1.6 children per woman is well below the level of 2.1 required to maintain a stable population over the long run, and also far below the birthrates seen in other emerging Asian nations. What this means in economic terms, to quote a paper recently published by the International Monetary Fund, is that “within a few years, the working age population will reach a historical peak and then begin a sharp decline.” The vast pool of cheap labor that fueled China’s economic miracle has already begun disappearing, driving up wages and leading some labor-intensive industries to move out. In the years ahead, a growing population of old people will undermine efforts to stimulate internal demand while creating pressure for increased social-welfare spending. 3. Economic dependency. China has followed the same playbook as its Asian neighbors in using trade as a springboard to economic development. According to the CIA’s 2014 World Factbook, exports of goods and services comprise over a quarter of China’s gross domestic product. But even if the low-cost labor that made this possible wasn’t drying up, the reliance of an export-driven economy on foreign markets makes China’s prosperity — per capita GDP is below $10,000 – much more vulnerable than America’s. China has sold over $100 billion more in goods to the U.S. so far this year than it has bought, but that longstanding boost to the Chinese economy won’t persist if the labor cost differential between the two countries keeps narrowing or Washington decides Beijing is a real danger to its interests. China is so dependent on offshore resources, markets and investors to keep its economy growing that it can’t run the risk of really scaring its trading partners. 4. Political culture. Because the Communist Party monopolizes power in China, there is little opportunity for fundamental reform of the political system. Party officials at all levels routinely leverage that monopoly to engage in epic corruption. Bribery, embezzlement, kickbacks and property theft are endemic. The Guardian reports that military posts are sold “for the equivalent of hundreds of thousands of pounds each,” creating a “vicious circle as officers who have paid for their places seek to recoup the cost.” Favoritism towards state-controlled industries and well-connected industrialists results in massive inefficiencies. President Xi Jinping’s crackdown on graft resulted in over 8,000 cases being investigated during just the first three months of this year, suggesting a culture of corruption reminiscent of New York’s Tweed Ring. But Tweed was driven from power through democratic processes, whereas China’s political culture offers no such solution. 5. Military weakness. That brings me to the subject with which most defense analysts would have begun this commentary – Chinese military power. Military.com reports today that the Pentagon is out with its latest ominous assessment of China’s military buildup, which is said to encompass everything from stealthy fighters to maneuvering anti-ship missiles to anti-satellite weapons. Those programs actually exist, but the threat they pose to the U.S. at present is not so clear. For instance, Beijing doesn’t have the reconnaissance network needed to track and target U.S. warships, and if it did the weapons it launched would face the most formidable air defenses in the world. Much has been written about China’s supposedly growing investment in nuclear weapons, but the best public information available suggests that China has about 250 warheads in its strategic arsenal, most of which can’t reach America; the U.S. has 4,600 nuclear warheads available for delivery by missile or plane, and an additional 2,700 in storage. Beijing’s decision to sustain only a modest — some would say minimal — nuclear deterrent seems incompatible with the notion that it seeks to rival U.S. power. Until recently it has not possessed a credible sea-based deterrent force, it still does not have a single operational aircraft carrier, and many of its submarines use diesel-electric propulsion rather than nuclear power. When these less-than-imposing features of the Chinese military posture are combined with widely reported deficiencies in airlift, reconnaissance, logistics and other key capabilities, the picture that emerges is not ominous. China is an emerging regional power that is unlikely to ever match America in the main measures of military power unless dysfunctional political processes in Washington impair our nation’s economy and defenses. In fact, secular trends are already at work within the Chinese economy, society and political culture that will tend to make the Middle Kingdom look less threatening tomorrow, rather than like a global rival of America.

#### 5. Forming strong relations with China leads to peace due to Xi’s unique leadership – take it from an expert.

**Rudd former Australian prime minister, 2015**

(Kevin, “Mutually Assured Misperception’ Between the U.S. and China”, 4-20, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-rudd/us-china-relations-kevin-rudd-report\_b\_7096784.html

Xi’s audacious leadership style sets him apart from the modern Chinese norm. Both in personality and policy, he represents one part continuity and two parts change. Xi is the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng (Deng Xiaoping 邓小平), and possibly since Mao (Mao Zedong 毛泽东). Whereas his predecessors believed in, and by and large practiced, the principle of collective leadership, Xi Jinping is infinitely more primus than he is primus inter pares. As a Party blue blood, he also exudes a self-confidence that comes from someone utterly comfortable with the exercise of political power. Xi is driven by a deep sense of personal integrity, personal destiny and the decisive role that he is to play in bringing about two great historical missions for his country: first, national rejuvenation, thereby restoring China’s place as a respected great power in the councils of the world; and second, saving the Communist Party itself from the cancer of corruption, thereby securing the party’s future as the continuing political vehicle for China’s future as a great power. Xi is both a Chinese nationalist and a Party loyalist. He is deeply and widely read in both international and Chinese history, including an encyclopedic knowledge of the history of the Communist Party itself. His core, animating vision centers on his concept of the “China Dream” (zhongguomeng 中国梦) which in turn has two objectives: to achieve a “moderately well-off China” (xiaokang shehui 小康社会) by 2021 when the Party celebrates its centenary; and “a rich and powerful” (fuqiang 富强) China by 2049 on the centenary of the People’s Republic. Realizing the China Dream, according to Xi, requires a second phase of transformative economic reform. He sees no contradiction in prosecuting deeper market reforms to achieve his national objectives, while implementing new restrictions on individual political freedom. In fact, he sees this as the essence of “the China Model” (zhongguo moshi 中 国模式) in contrast to the liberal democratic capitalism of the West which he describes as totally unsuited to China. For Xi, China must seize the moment of “extended strategic opportunity,” following 10 wasted years when necessary reforms were postponed, and corruption allowed to run rampant. China’s domestic policy needs are now integrally bound up with the country’s foreign policy direction. In Xi’s worldview, an increasingly “rich and powerful” China must now start playing a much bigger role in the world. No longer will China “hide its strength, bide its time, and never take the lead” (taoguang yanghui, juebu dangtou 韬光 养晦 决不当头), Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy mantra for decades. China must now pursue an “activist” (fenfa youwei 奋发有为) foreign policy that maximizes China’s economic and security interests, and one that begins to engage in the longer term reform of the global order. Xi speaks for the first time of China’s “grand strategy” needing to embrace “a new great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics” (you zhongguo tese de xinxing daguo waijiao 有中国特色的新型大国外交), in order to craft a “new type of great power relations” (xinxing daguo guanxi 新型大国关系) with the United States. Xi, in short, is not a status quo politician. He is the exact reverse. And in pursuing his sense of national mission and personal destiny, he is prepared to take calculated risks in a traditionally risk-averse Communist Party culture. Xi Jinping’s sense of personal and national urgency is animated by a formidable, Confucian work ethic, which he also expects of his Party colleagues and policy advisors. He is results-driven. He is frustrated by the interminable processes of the Chinese bureaucracy, and its predisposition for formulaic responses to real policy challenges. He is very much a man in a hurry. For these several reasons, Xi, unlike his predecessor, has the personal authority and policy flexibility to be a potentially dynamic interlocutor with the United States, albeit always within the framework of his nationalist vision for China’s future, and his definitive conclusions concerning the continuing role of China’s one-party state. When, therefore, Xi uses the term “win-win” (shuangying 双赢) to describe his desired relationship with the U.S., it should not be simply discarded as a piece of Chinese propaganda. Xi does see potential value in strategic and political collaboration with the United States. In short, there is still reasonable foreign and security policy space for the U.S. administration to work within in its dealings with Xi Jinping, although it is an open question how long it will be before policy directions are set in stone, and the window of opportunity begins to close. I argue that Xi is capable of bold policy moves, even including the possibility of grand strategic bargains on intractable questions such as the denuclearization and peaceful re-unification of the Korean Peninsula. It is up to America to use this space as creatively as it can while it still lasts.

#### 6. Appeasement doesn’t lead to U.S. lack of credibility- still seen as a superpower

**Kurth 12** (James, Senior Fellow at Center for the Study of America and the West, “Confronting a Powerful China with Western Characteristics”, <http://www.fpri.org/article/2012/01/confronting-a-powerful-china-with-western-characteristics/>) KR

However, regional appeasement does not inevitably entail global appeasement, i.e. appeasement in other arenas. When Britain gave up its strategic position in the Western Hemisphere to the United States, it did not then give up its strategic position in the rest of the world. It continued to remain the leading maritime power in all of the oceans and seas of the Eastern Hemisphere for the next thirty years. This suggests that were the United States to relinquish its dominant position in the three littoral seas or even in the Western Pacific, it still could retain its dominant position elsewhere. This could be true not only in the obvious case of the Eastern Pacific (where the United States would have strategic advantages comparable to those that China has in the Western Pacific), but in other oceans and seas around the world. The most important of these—and a strategic counterpoint to the three littoral seas—is the Indian Ocean.13 In this regard, the traditional naval concept of a “distant blockade” might become useful. A “near blockade” seeks to prevent an adversary from using his littoral waters for his naval and commercial purposes. This requires that the blockading power have a great naval superiority over the adversary. In contrast, a distant blockade allows the adversary the use of his littoral waters, but denies him the use of the waters beyond. If the adversary is largely self-sufficient (as was the Soviet Union and its alliance system in many respects) a capability to impose a distant blockade upon him will not be a major factor in his strategic calculations. However, if the adversary relies a great deal upon seaborne commerce, its SLOCs (sea lanes of commerce or, in the conventional notation, sea lines of communication) will be a major strategic factor. Traditional, imperial China was supremely self-sufficient. In this respect, it was thoroughly Chinese. However, contemporary China is very dependent upon seaborne commerce, upon both its enormous exports of industrial products and its enormous imports of the raw materials that are necessary for the continuing functioning of its economy (and the continuing stability of its social system). In this sense, contemporary China certainly has Western characteristics. This vital seaborne commerce passes, of course, through the three littoral seas. But much of it, including the necessary raw materials and especially the necessary oil, also passes through the Indian Ocean. If China acquires a dominant position—and denial capability—in the three littoral seas or even in the Western Pacific, the United States can retain a dominant position—and denial capability—in the Indian Ocean and in other seas beyond, through which passes China's vital exports and imports. In short, if China acquires a dominant position in the Western Pacific, it will only be the beginning of a grand and protracted bargaining process, engaging both China and the United States and involving both the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean and both the regional and the global arenas. In the end, there might be constructed an explicit and effective system of mutual deterrence, based upon such concepts as red-lines, salient thresholds, and tit-for-tat actions and reactions.

#### 7. As we’ve seen, the Negative’s impact scenario’s are highly unrealistic and almost guaranteed not to happen in the real world. However, pandemic diseases, such as those that the plan works to prevent, present a real existential threat. This isn’t just speculation, it’s scientifically proven.

Dovey 16 (Dana: MA in Journalism and Media Communications, science and technology writer for Medical Daily; “The End Is Near: Report Predicts We're More At Risk Of Death From Climate Change, Pandemic, Than A Car Crash”; Medical Daily; May 2, 2016; <http://www.medicaldaily.com/end-near-climate-change-pandemic-human-extinction-car-crash-384443>; DT)

The media has hinted at the possibility of a huge catastrophic incident such as a disease pandemic wiping out the majority, if not all, of the Earth’s population. Now, however, scientists have laid the rumors to rest, crunched the numbers, and shown this tragic end to be a real possibility. The annual Global Catastrophic Risk from the U.K.-based Global Challenges Foundation uses factors such as climate change and political relations to compute the risk of a “human extinction event,” or any catastrophic event that kills at least 10 percent of the world’s population. This year’s report found that the average American is five times more likely to die in a human extinction event than a car crash, and identified climate change and international disease outbreaks as some of the most likely end-of-world disasters. Humanity is a major part of the Earth’s ecosystem and when the planet’s health deteriorates, our health suffers as well. Rising temperatures caused by climate change have led to a notable increase in human health problems. For example, many researchers note that unseasonably warm temperatures have contributed to the spread of mosquito-transmitted diseases, such as Chikungunya and Zika virus, outside of its normal range. In addition, warmer and longer summers have also caused spikes in tick populations and widened their habitat. These rising temperatures may even play a role in the increasing incidence of Lyme disease. Other extreme human health threats caused by climate change include high levels of air pollution. This problem has been linked to both increased instances of stroke and respiratory diseases Luckily, The Stern Review, a U.K. government report on the economics of climate change, estimated that there is a 0.1 percent risk of human extinction every year, but when that is added up over a century, that risk jumps to a 9.5 percent chance of human extinction within the next century, The Atlantic reported. In addition to climate change, pandemics also pose a major threat to human life, and we have already begun to see just how quickly some diseases can spread. In 2014 the world saw the largest Ebola outbreak in history, The Center for Disease Control and Prevention reported. As of April 13, 2016 there were a total of 15,261 lab-confirmed deaths and 28,652 suspected deaths. Antibiotic resistance has also made once-treatable diseases now untreatable and the planet has seen a number of “superbug” outbreaks throughout the U.S. alone. One report predicted that by 2050 antibiotic resistance will likely kill more people than cancer. According to The Associated Press, many of the patients sick with life-threatening superbugs caught the bugs through contaminated medical equipment. Luckily, The Global Catastrophic Risk report urges that these numbers are not exactly set in stone and many of these risk factors, such as climate change and the threat of nuclear warfare, could be mitigated.

#### Thus we see that, even if the Negative could prove that the plan creates a slight risk of Japanese proliferation, this is going to be far outweighed by the very real chance of extinction-level pandemics that the plan helps us combat.

#### 8. The Negative’s theory of international relations doesn’t hold up in the real world – their predictions rest on many false assumptions and flawed methodologies.

#### **Bernstein et al. 2k**(Steven – Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, Richard Ned Lebow – James O. Freedman Presidential Professor of Government, Emeritus at Darthmouth University and Professor of War Studies, King's College London, Janice Gross Stein – member of the Order of Canada and the Royal Society of Canada, University Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, director of the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto and Associate Chair and Belzberg Professor of Conflict Management and Negotiation, and Steven Weber – professor at the School of Information and the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, holds an M.D. and a Ph.D in political science from Stanford University, “God Gave Physics the Easy Problems: Adapting Social Science to an Unpredictable World,” in the European Journal of International Relations, Volume 6, Number 43, http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/6/1/43.short)

Many of the scholars responsible for the behavioral revolution in social science were European refugees who sought to use the tools of social science to analyze the causes of war, prejudice, civil unrest and poverty. Their commitment to social science flowed from an even deeper commitment — to use disciplined methodologies to generate knowledge that would help prevent the horrors of war and fascism and improve the world around them. They and their American collaborators were not interested in theory for its own sake, but principally for the capacity it might provide to analyze and address world problems. This vision has been largely lost. From the vantage point of the 21st century, it is sadly apparent that the ~~founding fathers~~ of the behavioral revolution failed to transmit as clearly the value commitments that motivated their ‘scientific’ study of international relations. For many of their students and grand-students, *the ‘scientific means’ has become more an end in itself*, and the ‘science’ of the social, a jeu d’esprit, *like chess.* In the worst instances, researchers choose problems to investigate because the problems are thought to be tractable, not because they are important. They evaluate solutions in terms of the elegance of the logic rather than actual evidence. Meanwhile, on the other extreme, those who do study policy problems frequently do so in isolation from those working seriously with theory. Both communities are thus impoverished. The founders of the scientific study of international relations would bemoan the separation of theory from evidence and of logic from data.1 Most of all, the founders would reject the separation of theory from policy and its relative failure to address practical problems of the political world. A deep irony is embedded in the history of the scientific study of international relations. Recent generations of *scholars separated policy from theory to* gain an intellectual distance from decision-making, in the belief that this would *enhance the ‘scientific’ quality of their work*. But five decades of well-funded efforts to develop theories of international relations have produced *precious little in the way of useful, high confidence results*. Theories abound, but *few meet the most relaxed ‘scientific’ tests of validity*. Even the most robust generalizations or laws we can state — war is more likely between neighboring states, weaker states are less likely to attack stronger states — are close to trivial, have important exceptions, and for the most part stand outside any consistent body of theory. A generation ago, we might have excused our performance on the grounds that we were a young science still in the process of defining problems, developing analytical tools and collecting data. This excuse is neither credible nor sufficient; there is no reason to suppose that another 50 years of well-funded research would result in anything resembling a valid theory in the Popperian sense. We suggest that the nature, goals and criteria for judging social science theory should be rethought, if theory is to be more helpful in understanding the real world. We begin by justifying our pessimism, both conceptually and empirically, and argue that the quest for predictive theory rests on a mistaken analogy between physical and social phenomena. Evolutionary biology is a more productive analogy for social science. We explore the value of this analogy in its ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ versions, and examine the implications of both for theory and research in international relations.2 We develop the case for forward ‘tracking’ of international relations on the basis of local and general knowledge as an alternative to backward-looking attempts to build deductive, nomothetic theory. We then apply this strategy to some emerging trends in international relations. Newtonian Physics: A Misleading Model Physical and chemical laws make two kinds of predictions. Some phenomena — the trajectories of individual planets — can be predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty. Only a few variables need to be taken into account and they can be measured with precision. Other mechanical problems, like the break of balls on a pool table, while subject to deterministic laws, are inherently unpredictable because of their complexity. Small differences in the lay of the table, the nap of the felt, the curvature of each ball and where they make contact, amplify the variance of each collision and lead to what appears as a near random distribution of balls. Most predictions in science are probabilistic, like the freezing point of liquids, the expansion rate of gases and all chemical reactions. Point predictions appear possible only because of the large numbers of units involved in interactions. In the case of nuclear decay or the expansion of gases, we are talking about trillions of atoms and molecules. In international relations, even more than in other domains of social science, *it is often impossible to assign metrics to what we think are relevant variables* (Coleman, 1964: especially Chapter 2). *The concepts of polarity, relative power and the balance of power* are among the most widely used independent variables, but *there are no commonly accepted definitions or measures for them*. Yet without consensus on definition and measurement, almost every statement or hypothesis will have too much wiggle room to be ‘tested’ decisively against evidence. What we take to be dependent variables fare little better. Unresolved controversies rage over the definition and evaluation of deterrence outcomes, and about the criteria for democratic governance and their application to specific countries at different points in their history. Differences in coding for even a few cases have significant implications for tests of theories of deterrence or of the democratic peace (Lebow and Stein, 1990; Chan, 1997). The lack of consensus about terms and their measurement is not merely the result of intellectual anarchy or sloppiness — although the latter cannot entirely be dismissed. Fundamentally, it has more to do with the arbitrary nature of the concepts themselves. Key terms in physics, like mass, temperature and velocity, refer to aspects of the physical universe that we cannot directly observe. However, they are embedded in theories with deductive implications that have been verified through empirical research. Propositions containing these terms are legitimate assertions about reality because their truth-value can be assessed. Social science theories are for the most part built on ‘idealizations’, that is, on concepts that cannot be anchored to observable phenomena through rules of correspondence. Most of these terms (e.g. rational actor, balance of power) are not descriptions of reality but implicit ‘theories’ about actors and contexts that do not exist (Hempel, 1952; Rudner, 1966; Gunnell, 1975; Moe, 1979; Searle, 1995: 68-72). The inevitable differences in interpretation of these concepts lead to different predictions in some contexts, and these outcomes may eventually produce widely varying futures (Taylor, 1985: 55). If problems of definition, measurement and coding could be resolved, we would still find it difficult, if not impossible, to construct large enough samples of comparable cases to permit statistical analysis. It is now almost generally accepted that in the analysis of the causes of wars, the variation across time and the complexity of the interaction among putative causes make the likelihood of a general theory extraordinarily low. Multivariate theories run into the problem of negative degrees of freedom, yet international relations rarely generates data sets in the high double digits. Where larger samples do exist, they often group together cases that differ from one another in theoretically important ways.3 Complexity in the form of multiple causation and equifinality can also make simple statistical comparisons misleading. But it is hard to elaborate more sophisticated statistical tests until one has a deeper baseline understanding of the nature of the phenomenon under investigation, as well as the categories and variables that make up candidate causes (Geddes, 1990: 131-50; Lustick, 1996: 505-18; Jervis, 1997). Wars — to continue with the same example — are similar to chemical and nuclear reactions in that they have underlying and immediate causes. Even when all the underlying conditions are present, these processes generally require a catalyst to begin. Chain reactions are triggered by the decay of atomic nuclei. Some of the neutrons they emit strike other nuclei prompting them to fission and emit more neutrons, which strike still more nuclei. Physicists can calculate how many kilograms of Uranium 235 or Plutonium at given pressures are necessary to produce a chain reaction. They can take it for granted that if a ‘critical mass’ is achieved, a chain reaction will follow. This is because trillions of atoms are present, and at any given moment enough of them will decay to provide the neutrons needed to start the reaction. In a large enough sample, catalysts will be present in a statistical sense. Wars involve relatively few actors. Unlike the weak force responsible for nuclear decay, their catalysts are probably not inherent properties of the units. Catalysts may or may not be present, and their potentially random distribution relative to underlying causes makes it difficult to predict when or if an appropriate catalyst will occur. If in the course of time underlying conditions change, reducing basic incentives for one or more parties to use force, catalysts that would have triggered war will no longer do so. This uncertain and evolving relationship between underlying and immediate causes makes point prediction extraordinarily difficult. It also makes more general statements about the causation of war problematic, since we have no way of knowing what wars would have occurred in the presence of appropriate catalysts. It is probably impossible to define the universe of would-be wars or to construct a representative sample of them. Statistical inference requires knowledge about the state of independence of cases, but in a practical sense that knowledge is often impossible to obtain in the analysis of international relations. *Molecules do not learn from experience. People do*, or think they do. Relationships among cases exist in the minds of decision-makers, which makes it very hard to access that information reliably and for more than just a very small number of cases. We know that expectations and behavior are influenced by experience, one’s own and others. The deterrence strategies pursued by the United States throughout much of the Cold War were one kind of response to the failure of appeasement to prevent World War II. Appeasement was at least in part a reaction to the belief of British leaders that the deterrent policies pursued by the continental powers earlier in the century had helped to provoke World War I. Neither appeasement nor deterrence can be explained without understanding the context in which they were formulated; that context is ultimately a set of mental constructs. We have descriptive terms like ‘chain reaction’ or ‘contagion effect’ to describe these patterns, and hazard analysis among other techniques in statistics to measure their strength. But neither explains how and why these patterns emerge and persist. The broader point is that the *relationship between human beings and their environment is not nearly so reactive as with inanimate objects*. Social relations are not clock-like because the values and behavioral repertories of actors are not fixed; people have memories, learn from experience and undergo shifts in the vocabulary they use to construct reality. Law-like relationships — even if they existed — could not explain the most interesting social outcomes, since these are precisely the outcomes about which actors have the most incentive to learn and adapt their behavior. Any regularities would be ‘soft’; they would be the outcome of processes that are embedded in history and have a short half-life. They would decay quickly because of the memories, creative searching and learning by political leaders. Ironically, the ‘findings’ of social science contribute to this decay (Weber, 1969; Almond and Genco, 1977: 496-522; Gunnell, 1982: Ch. 2; Ball, 1987: Ch. 4; Kratochwil, 1989; Rorty, 1989; Hollis, 1994: Ch. 9). Beyond these conceptual and empirical difficulties lies a familiar but fundamental difference of purpose. Boyle’s Law, half-lives, or any other scientific principle based on probability, says nothing about the behavior of single units such as molecules. For many theoretical and practical purposes this is adequate. But social science ultimately aspires — or should aspire — to provide insight into practical world problems that are generally part of a small or very small n. In international relations, the dynamics and outcomes of single cases are often much more important than any statistical regularities. Overcoming Physics Envy The conception of causality on which deductive-nomological models are based, in classical physics as well as social science, requires empirical invariance under specified boundary conditions. The standard form of such a statement is this — given A, B and C, if X then (not) Y.4 This kind of bounded invariance can be found in closed systems. Open systems can be influenced by external stimuli, and their structure and causal mechanisms evolve as a result. Rules that describe the functioning of an open system at time T do not necessarily do so at T + 1 or T + 2. The boundary conditions may have changed, rendering the statement irrelevant. Another axiomatic condition may have been added, and the outcome subject to multiple conjunctural causation. There is no way to know this a priori from the causal statement itself. *Nor will complete knowledge* (if it were possible) *about the system at time T necessarily allow us to project its future course of development.*In a practical sense, *all social systems* (and many physical and biological systems) *are open. Empirical invariance does not exist in such systems*, and seemingly probabilistic invariances may be causally unrelated (Harre and Secord, 1973; Bhaskar, 1979; Collier, 1994; Patomaki, 1996; Jervis, 1997). As physicists readily admit, prediction in open systems, especially non-linear ones, is difficult, and often impossible.

#### 9. No alternative to engagement – US has no support for balancing.

Friedberg, PhD Harvard, 15

(Aaron L, Prof of Politics and international affairs @Princeton, The Debate Over US China

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Elsewhere in the world, although concern over China is growing, there is no appetite for a full-blown rivalry. Aside from bigger defence budgets and less trade and investment, a shift toward containment would provoke fears of war. All parties would suffer in such a conflict, but China’s Asian neighbours have reason to fear that they would suffer more than most. Even if American strategists concluded that it was necessary, the democratic countries that are its principal strategic partners in Asia are simply not ready to abandon engagement and sign on to a policy of containment. (107)

#### 10. Containment makes nuclear war inevitable.

Glaser 15 (Glaser, John. International Security at George Mason University. “The Ugly Truth About Avoiding War With China”. The National Interest. December 28, 2015. <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-ugly-truth-about-avoiding-war-china-14740?page=show>)

While ISIS is the threat that keeps Washington policymakers up at night, it’s the rise of China that has international relations theorists in a panic. Graham Allison argues persuasively that China’s rise portends a classic Thucydides Trap. His research shows that in twelve of the last sixteen cases over the past five hundred years, when a rising power challenged an established one, the result was war. John Mearsheimer, somewhat more bluntly, warns that “China cannot rise peacefully.” It’s an impending great power clash that makes the threat from ISIS look like child’s play. But China threatens the United States only insofar as America insists on being the dominant power in China’s backyard, a policy that actually contributes very little to U.S. security. If we abandon our strategy of primacy, the risk of a clash will shrink away. If we try to contain China’s rise, on the other hand, these predictions of doom may prove right. The current approach to China boils down to a kind of measured containment. It manifests in essentially in three ways: 1) maintaining and strengthening U.S. “treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand,” which “are the fulcrum for our strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific”; 2) increasing overall U.S. military presence in the region to develop “a geographically dispersed, politically sustainable force posture in the region”; and 3) further integrating U.S. economic engagement in the region in a way that marginalizes, and in some cases excludes, China. But containment is problematic: it carries the dubious presumption that China’s most likely reaction to U.S. expansion in the region is to become a docile power, eager to give up its regional ambitions. In reality, Washington’s determination to maintain dominance in East Asia is much more likely to generate an intense security dilemma. To understand why, we have to try to see the world through China’s strategic lens. According to Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China sees America as “the most intrusive outside actor in China’s internal affairs, the guarantor of the status quo in Taiwan, the largest naval presence in the East China and South China seas, [and] the formal or informal military ally of many of China’s neighbors.” The Chinese view the United States as “a revisionist power that seeks to curtail China's political influence and harm China's interests.” China’s feelings of encirclement are not unwarranted. America’s presence along China’s maritime periphery is highly militarized and provocative, with the U.S. Pacific Fleet conducting countless exercises and training events with dozens of countries in the region. Washington’s massive military presence on the Korean Peninsula, and just across the East China Sea on the southern tip of the Japanese archipelago, are perceived as substantive threats to Chinese security. America’s position as the largest naval presence in the East and South China Seas also stokes fear in China, particularly because roughly 40 percent of Chinese oil imports come by sea and pass through sea-lanes that are subject to interdiction by the United States. Currently, China’s “obvious orientation,” writes Lyle Goldstein “is defensive,” although “those tendencies could change if Beijing perceives that its strategic environment has substantially worsened.” So, what today might constitute a defensive Chinese foreign policy could in the future transform into a more aggressive stance if increased U.S. military presence in the region convinces Beijing that it is under threat. Fortunately, the United States can relinquish its outsized hegemonic role in East Asia without damaging its core interests. Nothing in China’s foreign policy indicates any intention to preemptively or preventively use force against America’s or its allies’ sovereign territory. Despite its naval buildup, China has not credibly threatened to cut off sea lines of communication or disrupt trade routes. The United States is arguably the most secure great power in history. With weak and pliant neighbors to its north and south, vast oceans to its east and west and a superior nuclear deterrent, it is remarkably insulated from external threats. Maintaining military predominance in East Asia simply doesn’t add much to our unusually secure position. But primacy does impose real costs. Promising to defend a host of China’s neighboring rivals, and maintaining tens of thousands of forward deployed troops and more than half of U.S. naval power in Asia entail enormous budgetary expenditures that could be kept in productive sectors of the economy. There are also the latent costs of being entrapped into unnecessary wars. Conflict over the sovereignty of Taiwan or uninhabited islands in the South China Sea risks entangling the United States in a regional war that serves the interests of other countries, not its own. Primacy could conceivably be justified if the United States derived commensurate benefits. That does not appear to be the case. As Robert Jervis has written, “the pursuit of primacy was what great power politics was all about in the past,” but in a world of nuclear weapons, with “low security threats and great common interests among the developed countries,” the game is not “worth the candle.” Charles Glaser similarly argues, “Unipolarity is much overrated.” It is not necessary to protect core national interests and in fact causes the U.S. to “lose track of how secure it is and consequently pursue policies that are designed to increase its security but turn out to be too costly and/or to have a high probability of backfiring.” Nor does U.S. dominance reap much in the way of tangible economic rewards. Daniel Drezner contends, “The economic benefits from military predominance alone seem, at a minimum, to have been exaggerated. . . . There is little evidence that military primacy yields appreciable geoeconomic gains” and therefore “an overreliance on military preponderance is badly misguided.”

#### 11. Containment advocates make flawed assumptions about China – effective containment isn’t politically feasible

Friedberg, PhD Harvard, 15

(Aaron L, Prof of Politics and international affairs @Princeton, The Debate Over US China

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In contrast to the unduly optimistic assessments of Beijing’s interests and intentions that underlie most proposed strategies for dealing with China, the assumptions underpinning a policy of pure containment are unnecessarily bleak. While it may eventually become far more tense and polarised than it is today, the relationship between the United States and China remains mixed, containing important areas of actual or potential cooperation, as well as intensifying competition. Abandoning attempts at engagement would create the self-fulfilling prophecy that critics of balancing have long and generally wrongly warned against; it would be tantamount, as Otto von Bismarck put it in opposing proposals for preventive war, to ‘committing suicide for fear of death’. Even if they wanted to shift towards a policy of pure containment, barring some major discontinuity, American leaders would find it extremely difficult to do so. Current budgetary constraints are neither permanent nor insurmountable; the United States can certainly afford to fund a far more vigorous military competition with China than the one it is conducting today. Without an obvious breakdown in relations, however, forging a political consensus to support the required increase in expenditures would likely prove impossible. The fact that powerful and influential groups and individuals in American society remain deeply committed to preserving the best possible relations with China and opposed to any measures that, in their view, might damage them, will make the task of mobilising support even more difficult. (106-7)

## AT Conditions CP

**1. Attaching conditions to the plan makes cooperation less effective, and actually undermines the Negative’s goal of [improving human rights]. China doesn’t respond well to US pressure, instead, if we want to improve conditions in China**

**responds much better to Threats have a negative impact on accommodation of political freedom. Cooperation, however, leads to more concessions.**

Drury and Li, Both Professors of Political Science, 2006

[A. Cooper Drury and Yitan Li. 10/1/2006.”US Economic Sanction Threats Against China: Failing to Leverage Better Human Rights.” [http://fpa.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/4/307.full. Accessed 6/23/16](http://fpa.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/4/307.full.%20Accessed%206/23/16). KS]

The data are estimated as a three-equation SUR model as represented by Figure 1.26 The results appear in Table 1 below.27 The first equation represents the Chinese level of domestic political repression. The r2 (.591) is quite strong, suggesting that the model is reasonably accurate in its estimation of repression. Only our control variables for past unrest and accommodations and the date control variable reach statistical significance. The results do not support a connection between U.S. threats and Chinese repression. Instead, Beijing seems to make its decisions to repress based on the domestic situation in China, not what Washington says or does. The second equation represents the level of accommodations provided by Beijing. Unlike the level of repression, Beijing's release of prisoners and lessoning of political restrictions is significantly influenced by U.S. threatening actions and rhetoric. This impact, however, is not in the hypothesized direction (recall threats appear as negative values while cooperative behavior has positive values)—threatened actions and rhetoric from Washington do not increase Chinese accommodations; they are associated with a decrease in such actions. Thus, the more cooperative and less threatening America is, the higher the level of accommodation in China. Contrary to their intended effects, Beijing resists the American threats. The controls for repression and unrest act as expected. The date control variable is significant and has an inverse relationship with accommodations. This is probably a result of their being fewer accommodations to offer over time as the restrictions from Tiananmen Square are eventually lifted. The control variable indicating the period in which President Clinton explicitly linked human rights to MFN renewal is both significant and positive. This result suggests that Beijing took this threat seriously and reacted by releasing more prisoners or granting more rights. These accommodations were not in reaction to a direct threat—those actually led to fewer accommodations. Instead, Beijing seems to have felt that it should provide some concessions to limit the potential that Clinton was serious and would support one of the Congressional initiatives to condition MFN renewal.

#### 2. Trying to get China to agree to conditional engagement won’t work – China will just end up

Dueck 15 - Associate Professor in George Mason University's School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs Colin, The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today, page number unavailable, Google Books

The next category of concern, including major authoritarian powers that pursue a mixture of rivalry and cooperation with America, includes China and Russia. These governments continue to view the United States under Obama as a strategic threat to their stature and integrity, but they pursue[s] some cooperation with Washington in areas such as trade and arms control while simultaneously pursuing geopolitical competition with the United States. Their common interests with Washington are more extensive, and their hostility toward the United States less profound, than is the case with Iran or North Korea. Nevertheless the governments of China and Russia, like most governments overseas, are largely indifferent to Obama's personal charms. They are interested in whether he concedes to their interests and priorities, not in his personal background as such, or in any vision he might have for a more liberal international order. In cases where Obama gives Moscow or Beijing most of what they want, as he did, for instance, in the 2009—2010 New START negotiations with Russia, then naturally they are happy to accept the concession, and even to offer a modest quid pro quo. But in cases where he offers accommodating or hopeful gestures, yet runs up against the perceived vital national interests of either power, then they simply decline to offer any reciprocal and proportionate accommodation. Neither power, for example, has any intention of surrendering its nuclear arsenal, no matter what Obama says or does in 'elation to his goal of nuclear zero. Nor has either power offered genuinely full cooperation with regard to Iranian or North Korean nuclear proliferation. Chinese and Russian leaders are not especially impressed by Obama. If anything, they are encouraged by the implication of long-term US strategic withdrawal under his leadership, because it leaves them stronger within their own neighborhoods. In this case, as in many others, American strategic disengagement is not interpreted as transformational benevolence, but as a sign of weakness.

#### 3. There’s no reason we have to negate the Affirmative’s plan in favor of the counter-plan – their counter-plan is the exact same thing as the plan, it just adds a condition. There’s thus no reason we can’t add a condition the the Affirmative’s plan, and still vote for that plan.

#### 4. Perm do the plan, then ask China to improve their human rights conditions.

### AT HR CP

#### 5. Getting China to agree to protect human rights sounds great but won’t actually accomplish anything.

Posner 14 - professor at the University of Chicago Law School

Eric, The case against human rights, The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/news/2014/dec/04/-sp-case-against-human-rights

We live in an age in which most of the major human rights treaties – there are nine “core” treaties – have been ratified by the vast majority of countries. Yet it seems that the human rights agenda has fallen on hard times. In much of the Islamic world, women lack equality, religious dissenters are persecuted and political freedoms are curtailed. The Chinese model of development, which combines political repression and economic liberalism, has attracted numerous admirers in the developing world. Political authoritarianism has gained ground in Russia, Turkey, Hungary and Venezuela. Backlashes against LGBT rights have taken place in countries as diverse as Russia and Nigeria. The traditional champions of human rights – Europe and the United States – have floundered. Europe has turned inward as it has struggled with a sovereign debt crisis, xenophobia towards its Muslim communities and disillusionment with Brussels. The United States, which used torture in the years after 9/11 and continues to kill civilians with drone strikes, has lost much of its moral authority. Even age-old scourges such as slavery continue to exist. A recent report estimates that nearly 30 million people are forced against their will to work. It wasn’t supposed to be like this.¶ At a time when human rights violations remain widespread, the discourse of human rights continues to flourish. The use of “human rights” in English-language books has increased 200-fold since 1940, and is used today 100 times more often than terms such as “constitutional rights” and “natural rights”. Although people have always criticised governments, it is only in recent decades that they have begun to do so in the distinctive idiom of human rights. The United States and Europe have recently condemned human rights violations in Syria, Russia, China and Iran. Western countries often make foreign aid conditional on human rights and have even launched military interventions based on human rights violations. Many people argue that the incorporation of the idea of human rights into international law is one of the great moral achievements of human history. Because human rights law gives rights to all people regardless of nationality, it deprives governments of their traditional riposte when foreigners criticise them for abusing their citizens – namely “sovereignty” (which is law-speak for “none of your business”). Thus, international human rights law provides people with invaluable protections against the power of the state.¶ And yet it is hard to avoid the conclusion that governments continue to violate human rights with impunity. Why, for example, do more than 150 countries (out of 193 countries that belong to the UN) engage in torture? Why has the number of authoritarian countries increased in the last several years? Why do women remain a subordinate class in nearly all countries of the world? Why do children continue to work in mines and factories in so many countries?¶ The truth is that human rights law has failed to accomplish its objectives. There is little evidence that human rights treaties, on the whole, have improved the wellbeing of people. The reason is that human rights were never as universal as people hoped, and the belief that they could be forced upon countries as a matter of international law was shot through with misguided assumptions from the very beginning. The human rights movement shares something in common with the hubris of development economics, which in previous decades tried (and failed) to alleviate poverty by imposing top-down solutions on developing countries. But where development economists have reformed their approach, the human rights movement has yet to acknowledge its failures. It is time for a reckoning.¶ Although the modern notion of human rights emerged during the 18th century, it was on December 10, 1948, that the story began in earnest, with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the UN general assembly. The declaration arose from the ashes of the second world war and aimed to launch a new, brighter era of international relations. It provided a long list of rights, most of which are the familiar “political” rights that are set down in the US constitution, or that have been constructed by American courts over the years. The declaration was not dictated by the United States, however, and showed the influence of other traditions of legal thought in its inclusion of “social” rights, such as the right to work.¶ The weaknesses that would go on to undermine human rights law were there from the start. The universal declaration was not a treaty in the formal sense: no one at the time believed that it created legally binding obligations. It was not ratified by nations but approved by the general assembly, and the UN charter did not give the general assembly the power to make international law. Moreover, the rights were described in vague, aspirational terms, which could be interpreted in multiple ways, and national governments – even the liberal democracies – were wary of binding legal obligations. The US did not commit itself to eliminating racial segregation, and Britain and France did not commit themselves to liberating the subject populations in their colonies. Several authoritarian states – including the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Saudi Arabia – refused to vote in favour of the universal declaration and instead abstained. The words in the universal declaration may have been stirring, but no one believed at the time that they portended a major change in the way international relations would be conducted; nor did they capture the imagination of voters, politicians, intellectuals or anyone else who might have exerted political pressure on governments.¶ Part of the problem was that a disagreement opened up early on between the US and the Soviet Union. The Americans argued that human rights consisted of political rights – the rights to vote, to speak freely, not to be arbitrarily detained, to practise a religion of one’s choice, and so on. These rights were, not coincidentally, the rights set out in the US constitution. The Soviets argued that human rights consisted of social or economic rights – the rights to work, to healthcare, and to education. As was so often the case during the cold war, the conflict was zero-sum. Either you supported political rights (that is, liberal democracy) or you supported economic rights (that is, socialism). The result was that negotiations to convert the universal declaration into a binding treaty were split into two tracks. It would take another 18 years for the United Nations to adopt a political rights treaty and an economic rights treaty. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights finally took effect in 1976.¶ As the historian Samuel Moyn has argued in his book The Last Utopia, it was not until the late 1970s that human rights became a major force in international relations. President Jimmy Carter’s emphasis on human rights seems to have been a reaction to Vietnam and the gruesome realpolitik of the Nixon era, but Carter himself was unable to maintain a consistent line. Allies such as Iran and Saudi Arabia were just too important for American security, and seen as a crucial counterweight to Soviet influence. Still, something changed with Carter. His five successors – Republicans and Democrats alike – have invoked the term “human rights” far more frequently than any president before him. It is not that presidents have become more idealistic. Rather, it is that they have increasingly used the language of rights to express their idealistic goals (or to conceal their strategic goals).¶ Despite the horrifying genocide in Rwanda in 1994, and the civil war in Yugoslavia, the 1990s were the high-water mark for the idea of human rights. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, economic and social rights lost their stigmatising association with communism and entered the constitutional law of many western countries, with the result that all major issues of public policy came to be seen as shaped by human rights. Human rights played an increasingly important role in the European Union and members insisted that countries hoping to join the EU to obtain economic benefits should be required to respect human rights as well. NGOs devoted to advancing human rights also grew during this period, and many countries that emerged from under the Soviet yoke adopted western constitutional systems. Even Russia itself made halting movements in that direction.¶ Then came September 11, 2001 and the “war on terror”. America’s recourse to torture was a significant challenge to the international human rights regime. The United States was a traditional leader in human rights and one of the few countries that has used its power to advance human rights in other nations. Moreover, the prohibition on torture is at the core of the human rights regime; if that right is less than absolute, then surely the other rights are as well.¶ The rise of China has also undermined the power of human rights. In recent years, China has worked assiduously behind the scenes to weaken international human rights institutions and publicly rejected international criticism of the political repression of its citizens. It has offered diplomatic and economic support to human rights violators, such as Sudan, that western countries have tried to isolate. Along with Russia, it has used its veto in the UN security council to limit western efforts to advance human rights through economic pressure and military intervention. And it has joined with numerous other countries – major emerging powers such as Vietnam, and Islamic countries that fear western secularisation – to deny many of the core values that human rights are supposed to protect.¶ Each of the six major human rights treaties has been ratified by more than 150 countries, yet many of them remain hostile to human rights. This raises the nagging question of how much human rights law has actually influenced the behaviour of governments. There are undoubtedly examples where countries enter into human rights treaties and change their behaviour. The political scientist Beth Simmons, for instance, has described the observable impact in Japan and Colombia of the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. The puzzle is how to reconcile this with the many examples of blatant human rights violations. Saudi Arabia ratified the treaty banning discrimination against women in 2007, and yet by law subordinates women to men in all areas of life. Child labour exists in countries that have ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Uzbekistan, Tanzania and India, for example. Powerful western countries, including the US, do business with grave human rights abusers.¶ In a very rough sense, the world is a freer place than it was 50 years ago, but is it freer because of the human rights treaties or because of other events, such as economic growth or the collapse of communism?¶ The central problem with human rights law is that it is hopelessly ambiguous. The ambiguity, which allows governments to rationalise almost anything they do, is not a result of sloppy draftsmanship but of the deliberate choice to overload the treaties with hundreds of poorly defined obligations. In most countries people formally have as many as 400 international human rights – rights to work and leisure, to freedom of expression and religious worship, to nondiscrimination, to privacy, to pretty much anything you might think is worth protecting. The sheer quantity and variety of rights, which protect virtually all human interests, can provide no guidance to governments. Given that all governments have limited budgets, protecting one human right might prevent a government from protecting another.¶ Take the right not to be tortured, for example. In most countries torture is not a matter of official policy. As in Brazil, local police often use torture because they believe that it is an effective way to maintain order or to solve crimes. If the national government decided to wipe out torture, it would need to create honest, well-paid investigatory units to monitor the police. The government would also need to fire its police forces and increase the salaries of the replacements. It would probably need to overhaul the judiciary as well, possibly the entire political system. Such a government might reasonably argue that it should use its limited resources in a way more likely to help people – building schools and medical clinics, for example. If this argument is reasonable, then it is a problem for human rights law, which does not recognise any such excuse for failing to prevent torture.¶ Or consider, as another example, the right to freedom of expression. From a global perspective, the right to freedom of expression is hotly contested. The US takes this right particularly seriously, though it makes numerous exceptions for fraud, defamation, and obscenity. In Europe, most governments believe that the right to freedom of expression does not extend to hate speech. In many Islamic countries, any kind of defamation of Islam is not protected by freedom of speech. Human rights law blandly acknowledges that the right to freedom of expression may be limited by considerations of public order and morals. But a government trying to comply with the international human right to freedom of expression is given no specific guidance whatsoever.¶ Thus, the existence of a huge number of vaguely defined rights ends up giving governments enormous discretion. If a government advances one group of rights, while neglecting others, how does one tell whether it complies with the treaties the best it can or cynically evades them?

#### 6. US human rights promotion fails—hypocrisy and conflicting messaging

Bequelin 13 - East Asia Director at Amnesty International, based in Hong Kong. A former Visiting Scholar at The China Center, Yale Law School, and previously at Human Rights Watch, he obtained his Ph.D. in History from the School of Advanced Studies in Social Sciences (EHESS), Paris, in 2001, and is a graduate in Chinese from the School of Oriental Languages and Civilizations

Nicholas, Can the U.S. Help Advance Human Rights in China?, The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/can-the-us-help-advance-human-rights-in-china/276841/

First, what is most important is for the United States to set the best possible example. The past few years have been problematic in this respect, with issues ranging from the legality of the Iraq war to Abu Ghraib to the C.I.A. renditions.¶ Second, the U.S. government needs to be consistent in the way it raises its concerns on human rights, and not be shy to use vocal diplomacy when private diplomacy yields no result. Too often, the U.S. is sending conflicting messages, one day stressing its attachment to universal human rights norms, and the next stating that the U.S. and China "agree to disagree" on a range of issues, including human rights. This undermines the universality of human rights.¶ Third, the U.S. must mainstream human rights perspectives across the full spectrum of its engagement with China. The compartmentalization of human rights as a minor rubric of diplomacy is bound to fail, because the Chinese side knows human rights have no bearings on other aspects of the bilateral relationship. The business environment for U.S. companies operating in China is directly linked to issues intimately connected to human rights, such as the elastic character of China's state secrecy laws or the introduction of provisions in the criminal law that allows for secret detention by the police.¶ Fourth, the U.S. must forge partnerships and coordinate more effectively with other rights-respecting countries in their effort to press China on specific issues and cases. There has been very little said by any head of state about the fact that China is the only country in the world that holds a Nobel Peace Laureate in prison (while his wife is imprisoned at her home outside of any legal procedure.)¶ Finally, the U.S. must be ready to take steps when the situation demands it. For instance, given China's absolute refusal to engage on any issue related to the situation in Tibetan areas, the U.S. must be ready to upgrade its contacts with the Dalai Lama, and encourage other countries to do so.¶ The United States does more to raise human rights issues with China than any other country, but it often conveys the implicit message that it does so out of moral convictions, not out of well-understood national interest and concern for human rights globally, and that greatly diminishes the effectiveness of such statements.

#### 7. China will laugh off the human rights conditions – it sees the US as hypocritical.

Guangcheng & McMillan-Scott 13 - \*Chinese human rights activist, \*\*Vice-President of the European Parliament for Democracy & Human Rights and Transatlantic Relations

Chen, Edward, China: The West Needs to Promote Both Trade and Human Rights, Huffington Post, http://new.www.huffingtonpost.com/chen-guangcheng/china-trade-human-rights\_b\_3443081.html

Western governments must also guard against hypocrisy by addressing their own human rights problems. The recent revelations over U.S. online surveillance, as well as longstanding issues such as Guantanamo Bay and drone strikes, all give ammunition to the Chinese regime, which now publishes its own highly critical annual human rights reports on the United States. The failure of Western countries to condemn the human rights abuses of close allies such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain also gives rise to accusations of double standards. Such hypocrisy must be addressed if the West is to be truly credible in its efforts to promote human rights abroad.

## AT Sanctions CP

#### 1. Perm do both – there’s no mutual exclusivity.

#### 2. Economic sanctions on China causes retaliation and hurts the global community.

Hall 2015-Kevin G; Chief Economics Correspondent-"As summit looms, a question of sanctions against China"-www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/economy/article36265359.html- September 23, 2015-**@SCHEIN**

WASHINGTON–As it prepares for a visit Friday by Chinese leader Xi Jinping, the Obama administration is weighing how to punish China for cyberattacks against U.S. government and private-sector computers and networks while not provoking retaliation that could harm U.S. companies. President Barack Obama is signaling that sanctions are one option. “We are preparing a number of measures that will indicate to the Chinese that this is not just a matter of us being mildly upset,” he said earlier this month. But imposing sanctions on the world’s second largest economy is neither easy nor without risk. And the consideration of sanctions has taken a different course than actions against another big power, Russia, which saw protracted consultation with U.S. industry. Broad action against the Chinese government risks sparking retaliation, with economic effects that could spill over into global trade and perhaps be felt in trade-driven Pacific Coast states such as California and Washington.

## AT Japan DA

#### **1. Japan won’t oppose Sino-U.S. cooperation – it’s working to improve its own relations with China.**

Blanchard, Ben. "China, Japan more upbeat on ties but challenges remain." Reuters. N.p., 30 Apr. 2016. Web. 25 June 2016. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-japan-idUSKCN0XR02H>.

China and Japan both expressed a willingness to improve strained relations on Saturday after a rare meeting between their two foreign ministers in Beijing, though China said Japan should stop pushing the notion that China is a threat. China, the world's second-largest economy, and Japan, the third-largest, have a difficult political history, with ties strained by the legacy of Japan's World War Two aggression and conflicting claims over a group of uninhabited East China Sea islets. Relations have been thawing recently, with meetings between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, but Beijing remains deeply suspicious of Japan, particularly of moves by Abe to allow the military the right to fight overseas for the first time since the war. Meeting at a state guest house, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida ties had fallen to a low ebb. "We have recently seen the Japanese side repeatedly expressing its hope of improving the bilateral relationship. You have also shown your willingness to take the first step. If you come with sincerity, we welcome you," Wang said. "As the Chinese saying goes, we should make a judgment based on not only what people say but also what they do," he added, at the start of the first bilateral visit by a Japanese foreign minister to China in more than four years. "Facing up to history, abiding by promises and cooperation rather than confrontation should be the basis of China-Japan relations." Kishida, speaking later to Japanese reporters, said there had been a "frank exchange of views" in what he called an extremely significant visit. "At this meeting we confirmed the importance of Sino-Japanese relations and agreed that both sides would strive for further improvement in ties," he said, according to Japan's NHK broadcaster. China's Foreign Ministry said Wang made suggestions for how to improve relations, using forceful language that underscores the suspicion in Beijing about Tokyo. Japan "should have a more positive and healthy attitude toward the growth of China, and stop spreading or echoing all kinds of 'China threat' or 'China economic recession' theories", the ministry said in a statement. (Additional reporting by Linda Sieg in Tokyo; Editing by Kim Coghill)

#### 2. Their discussion of nuclear proliferation, while sounding feasible in theory, turns out to be nothing more than fear-mongering when we look to real world. Comprehensive research has proven that Japanese proliferation is not even a possibility.

**Gregory Kulacki, China Project Manager in the UCS Global Security Program, writes:**

(Gregory, China Project Manager in the UCS Global Security Program, “Japan Calls for United States to End Hair-Trigger Alert,” April 2015, Union of Concerned Scientists)

During 12 trips to Japan over the past six years, the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) conducted extensive interviews with elected and unelected members of the Japanese government. Those inter-views leave little doubt that U.S. concerns about the possibility of a nuclear-armed Japan are unwarranted. Except for a few outliers, Japanese **officials do not see possessing nuclear weapons as a solution to their national security problems** (Lewis 2014). This report—the third in a series on Japan and the U.S. nuclear posture—explores the findings from our interviews, as well as the history of the U.S.-Japanese security commitment. Contrary to what many people believe, this **history shows that the United States does not provide a “nuclear umbrella” for Japan**. More-over, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy—including taking U.S. nu-clear weapons off hair-trigger alert—**is supported by an** overwhelming majority **of the Japanese public and their elected officials.** The Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Japan Japan has a complicated relationship with nuclear weapons. The Japanese are the only people ever to suffer a nuclear attack. The survivors still testify to the world about the horrifying humanitarian conse-quences, and an overwhelming majority of Japanese remain determined to sustain their nation’s commit-ment to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again. According to a recent Pew survey, nearly half of Japan’s people consider nuclear weapons the world’s **greatest danger**—a far higher percentage than in any of the other 43 nations polled (Pew 2014). Another recent survey shows that 82 percent of the Japanese public and most of Japan’s elected officials support their nation’s role as an **international advocate for nuclear disarmament** (Asahi Shimbun 2014)

#### 3. Their disadvantage ignores how China’s role as an international actor is evolving. China’s rise means that constructive US-China engagement actually bolsters the US-Japan alliance, meaning even if you buy that Japanese proliferation is a threat, the Affirmative actually decreases the chances of that happening.

Tanaka 2015 - senior fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange and chairman of the Institute for International Strategy at the Japan Research Institute, Ltd., previously served as Japan’s deputy minister for foreign affairs
Hitoshi, “The next step for the US-Japan alliance,” Aug 4, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/08/04/the-next-step-for-the-us-japan-alliance/>

This evolution in US-Japan alliance relations has taken place as the regional balance of power shifts. Emerging economies such as China, India, and ASEAN countries are rising; Asia’s middle class is growing; and US defence spending shifting toward a more sustainable, ‘lean-but-mean’ posture. Thus as the Abe administration struggles over the next couple of months to pass legislation to expand Japan’s security role, structural shifts in East Asia are making it clear that the next step for Japan and the US must be to transform the alliance into a more multifaceted partnership. Japan must strengthen regional trust. The 70th anniversary of World War II offers an opportunity to affirm Japan’s peaceful postwar identity and to mend ties with South Korea and China. In his anticipated August statement, Abe must unequivocally face up to Japan’s historical wartime transgressions without dropping any of the key elements of the Murayama Statement. At the same time, Abe should set out Japan’s defence policy in a forward-looking way — clearly stating that it is aimed solely at defending Japan and contributing to the peaceful enhancement of the regional security environment — to dispel any misperceptions in China and South Korea that the revised US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines or Japan’s new security legislation to allow limited forms of collective self-defence represent a return to a more aggressive regional posture. A change in the US mindset is needed so it may truly act as a resident power in East Asia. Current projections are that Asia will be home to two-thirds of the global middle class by 2030 and will account for more than half of global GDP by 2050. As the regional order evolves to reflect these shifts, it is critical that the US become more intimately and directly involved in the order-building process. This requires the US to move away from its tendency to act as an external balancer and toward a more engaged day-to-day involvement and leadership role in the region across political, security and economic dimensions. One channel for the US to project such political leadership would be to spearhead the establishment of a four-party China-Japan-ROK-US confidence-building mechanism. Such a mechanism would be well positioned to foster reassurance diplomacy regarding the evolving role of the SDF and the US-Japan alliance, and to promote agreements on military-to-military hotlines and crisis management procedures to reduce the risk of accidental collision and to mitigate damage in the event of a crisis. The US and Japan should strengthen trilateral security cooperation with partners such as South Korea, Australia, India, and the ASEAN nations. In particular, deeper US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation, including contingency planning, is urgent given the uncertain situation on the Korean Peninsula. Trilateral cooperation directed toward North Korea should take into account the need to engage China and Russia, make preparations to steer the situation toward a soft-landing unification, and utilise Track 2 diplomacy to inject fresh ideas from academia to ensure the long-term stability of the Korean Peninsula. The forward deployment of US troops throughout East Asia needs to be re-examined regularly — through intensive consultation with alliance partners — to ensure it is politically sustainable and able to meet contemporary challenges. While the US forward deployment is a critical regional public good, it must be re-considered whether maintaining US forces in such a high concentration in one area of the region, as they currently are in Okinawa in the face of strident local opposition, is the best strategy over the long term to fulfil US-Japan alliance goals. Advances in new military technologies and the changing nature of regional security challenges make it increasingly desirable to establish a broader and more dynamic forward deployment posture where US soldiers are more evenly distributed and rotated across the region — a trend that is already underway with increased cooperation with partners such as Australia, India, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam. At the same time, as the SDF continues to expand its roles and functions to engage in limited collective self-defence, there will be greater potential for joint US-Japan basing arrangements, which should be utilised as an opportunity to deepen US-Japan security cooperation. Finally, Japan and the US would be wise to complement their security cooperation with more vigorous efforts to constructively engage with China in key areas, including on multilateral financial institutions, mega-regional trade agreements, and energy and the environment.

#### 4. While some of the Negative’s authors may think that US-China engagement angers Japan, this claim doesn’t hold up when we test it in the real world. The US and China have recently been increasing their cooperation on a wide range of economic, environmental, and even medical issues, and Japan hasn’t seemed to care at all, which is pretty

#### 5. As we’ve seen, the Negative’s impact scenario’s are highly unrealistic and almost guaranteed not to happen in the real world. However, pandemic diseases, such as those that the plan works to prevent, present a real existential threat. This isn’t just speculation, it’s scientifically proven.

Dovey 16 (Dana: MA in Journalism and Media Communications, science and technology writer for Medical Daily; “The End Is Near: Report Predicts We're More At Risk Of Death From Climate Change, Pandemic, Than A Car Crash”; Medical Daily; May 2, 2016; <http://www.medicaldaily.com/end-near-climate-change-pandemic-human-extinction-car-crash-384443>; DT)

The media has hinted at the possibility of a huge catastrophic incident such as a disease pandemic wiping out the majority, if not all, of the Earth’s population. Now, however, scientists have laid the rumors to rest, crunched the numbers, and shown this tragic end to be a real possibility. The annual Global Catastrophic Risk from the U.K.-based Global Challenges Foundation uses factors such as climate change and political relations to compute the risk of a “human extinction event,” or any catastrophic event that kills at least 10 percent of the world’s population. This year’s report found that the average American is five times more likely to die in a human extinction event than a car crash, and identified climate change and international disease outbreaks as some of the most likely end-of-world disasters. Humanity is a major part of the Earth’s ecosystem and when the planet’s health deteriorates, our health suffers as well. Rising temperatures caused by climate change have led to a notable increase in human health problems. For example, many researchers note that unseasonably warm temperatures have contributed to the spread of mosquito-transmitted diseases, such as Chikungunya and Zika virus, outside of its normal range. In addition, warmer and longer summers have also caused spikes in tick populations and widened their habitat. These rising temperatures may even play a role in the increasing incidence of Lyme disease. Other extreme human health threats caused by climate change include high levels of air pollution. This problem has been linked to both increased instances of stroke and respiratory diseases Luckily, The Stern Review, a U.K. government report on the economics of climate change, estimated that there is a 0.1 percent risk of human extinction every year, but when that is added up over a century, that risk jumps to a 9.5 percent chance of human extinction within the next century, The Atlantic reported. In addition to climate change, pandemics also pose a major threat to human life, and we have already begun to see just how quickly some diseases can spread. In 2014 the world saw the largest Ebola outbreak in history, The Center for Disease Control and Prevention reported. As of April 13, 2016 there were a total of 15,261 lab-confirmed deaths and 28,652 suspected deaths. Antibiotic resistance has also made once-treatable diseases now untreatable and the planet has seen a number of “superbug” outbreaks throughout the U.S. alone. One report predicted that by 2050 antibiotic resistance will likely kill more people than cancer. According to The Associated Press, many of the patients sick with life-threatening superbugs caught the bugs through contaminated medical equipment. Luckily, The Global Catastrophic Risk report urges that these numbers are not exactly set in stone and many of these risk factors, such as climate change and the threat of nuclear warfare, could be mitigated.

#### Thus we see that, even if the Negative could prove that the plan creates a slight risk of Japanese proliferation, this is going to be far outweighed by the very real chance of extinction-level pandemics that the plan helps us combat.

## Consult Japan CP

#### 1. The counter-plan contributes to a U.S.-Japan alliance structure that focuses on containment and ultimately increases the risk of war.

Jean-Pierre Lehmann, Professor of International Relations, writes:

(2015 - Emeritus Professor at IMD Business School in Switzerland, contributor to Forbes, currently Visiting Professor at Hong Kong University and at NIIT University)
Jean-Pierre, “China, Japan And The US -- A Complex Combustible Triangle,” Apr 4, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/jplehmann/2015/04/05/china-japan-and-the-us-a-complex-combustible-triangle/#5987d7e01a53>

With the turn of the century circumstances changed dramatically. In the early 1990s the Japanese economy tanked as it entered its lost decades; the dream of overtaking the US in GDP evaporated. Whereas the Japanese prided themselves (rightly) on their electronic industry, when companies such as Toshiba, Hitachi, NEC, Fujitsu, etc, could rival GE, Westinghouse, Texas Instruments, etc, this was in manufacturing. No Japanese company could rival Microsoft, because it does not exist. While the IT revolution was taking place, the Japanese were out to lunch. Kenbei became unreal. And then, most important, was the rapid rise of China. Whereas contempt for America was quite recent and ultimately ephemeral, contempt for China was deeply entrenched in the Japanese psyche for over a century; ever since their victory in the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War. Chinese, in Japanese popular perceptions, were dirty, backward, lazy, etc. I was based in Tokyo in the 1980s and can confirm that the alleged “Chinese challenge” was not taken seriously – a bit, as I would tell my Japanese interlocutors, like the failure of Europeans and Americans to take seriously the “Japanese challenge” in the 1960s and 70s when the label “Made in Japan” was seen to be synonymous with cheap and shoddy. Both reactions reflected myopic racial prejudice. The rise of China as a great power is one of the most defining transformative realities of the 21st century. The paradigm throughout the second half of the 20th century was that of Japan as the leading nation of Asia, allied to the US. China’s economic and increasingly geopolitical rise is upsetting that pattern. This is uncomfortable for the US; it is extremely uncomfortable for Japan. After all, the US and China were never engaged in war against each other. Japan was at war with both China and the US. Having mistakenly chosen Nazi Germany as a seemingly strong ally to confront the US in the 1930s, after defeat Tokyo chose Washington. This has served Japan extremely well for over half-a-century. Far from kenbei, current Japanese policy is to side up to the US as much as possible. Thus Tokyo has opted not to join the AIIB as founder member. In the meantime it is actively pursuing negotiations with Washington to conclude the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) – which officially includes 12 “partners”, but has basically come down to a US-Japan trade deal – which excludes China. It is presented as part of Washington’s “pivot” to Asia strategy aimed at containing China. (See illustration below) This Washington-Tokyo two-some to contain China is a highly dangerous potentially combustible policy. While Washington, as I have argued in a previous blog, should be seeking to engage Beijing strategically, constructively and intelligently – whereas its policy to oppose the AIIB and to influence its friends to do like-wise was un-strategic, unconstructive and unintelligent – it should also be encouraging Tokyo to face up to the new realities – and in so doing to face up to the past crimes committed against China. Unlike Germany and its European neighbors, China is not at peace with its neighbors. Germany’s peace with its neighbors has ensured Western Europe has been at peace for seventy years. For peace to endure in Asia Pacific in the future, Japan must make genuine peace with its neighbors. Just as Shigeru Yoshida recognized after World War II that Japan had to face the new realities and build a solid relationship with its erstwhile great enemy. The new 21st century realities demand that Tokyo build a solid relationship with China. Statesmanship of the Shigeru Yoshida kind is needed. Unfortunately it does not look as if Taro Aso is in a position to fill his grandfather’s shoes.

#### 2. The counter-plan hurts US-China relations, which are much more precarious than US-Japan relations.

Chanlett- Avery, Rinehart ’16 [Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Ian Rinehart, Analyst in Asian Affairs, 2/9/16, “The U.S.- Japan Alliance” Congressional Research Service.]

Chinese officials regularly raise complaints when the United States and Japan move to strengthen alliance capabilities, calling the alliance a “relic of the Cold War” and accusing Japan of “remilitarizing.” China has appeared to give concessions in its dealings with North Korea based on a fear that Japan will use North Korean provocations as an “excuse” to upgrade its military posture. Reportedly, U.S. diplomats and defense officials have quietly warned Beijing that Pyongyang’s repeated missile and nuclear tests provide ample justification for improving U.S. and allied BMD capabilities in the region. At the same time, defense planners in the United States and Japan are concerned about the quantitative and qualitative increases in Chinese military acquisitions, particularly cruise and ballistic missiles. China already has the ability to severely degrade U.S. and Japanese combat strength through conventional missile attacks on facilities in Japan, and the Chinese military fields anti-ship ballistic missiles that may be capable of destroying an aircraft carrier at sea.

#### 3. There is no reason to negate the Affirmative’s plan in favor of the counter-plan, their counter-plan and our plan effectively accomplish the same thing.

#### 4. Permutation – do both the plan, and the counter-plan.

## AT Chinese Politics DA

#### 1. Positive engagement with the U.S. actually increases Xi’s credibility, particularly among nationalists.

Li, Cheng, and Lucy Xu. "Chinese Enthusiasm and American Cynicism Over the “New Type of Great Power Relations.'" Brookings. N.p., 14 Dec. 2014. Web. 3 July 2016. <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/12/ 05-chinese-pessimism-american-cynicism-great-power-li-xu>. Li is the Director, John L. Thornton China Center and a Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy.

As China-watchers were quick to realize, President Obama did not even once mention the “New Type of Great Power Relations” on his recent trip to Beijing. It has been widely noted that President Xi Jinping, however, repeatedly promoted the framework first at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in July, and then at the summit with Obama in mid-November. After the summit, China’s official news agency reported that Xi and Obama “pledged to push forward a new type of major-country relations,” and that “[Obama] is willing to… lift the new type of major-country relationship between China and the U.S. to a higher level.” Xinhua implied that Obama not only accepts, but also actively supports, the “New Type” concept. In fact, the Obama administration has been cautiously staying away from it. Why is China so keen on a “New Type of Great Power Relations” and on creating perceptions of endorsement by Obama? And why is the U.S. reluctant to adopt it? What are the reasons behind such contrasting views –– Chinese enthusiasm and American cynicism –– towards this seemingly benign concept? When Xi Jinping defined the “New Type of Great Power Relations” in his meeting with Obama at Sunnylands last year, he described it in three points: 1) no conflict or confrontation, through emphasizing dialogue and treating each other’s strategic intentions objectively; 2) mutual respect, including for each other’s core interests and major concerns; and 3) mutually beneficial cooperation, by abandoning the zero-sum game mentality and advancing areas of mutual interest. Embedded in the “New Type of Great Power Relations” is a nation’s hope for an international environment more conducive to its development. From the rise and fall of its many dynasties to its forced opening up to the West in the wake of the Opium Wars, China has always seen itself as a civilization deeply entangled and affected by history. Recognizing the historically recurring clashes between an existing great power and an emerging power, China looks to the “New Type” framework to avoid historical determinism and to seek a less-disruptive rise in an increasingly integrated world. At the same time, China wants to be viewed as an equal. By using the term “Great Power” to primarily, if not solely, refer to China and the United States, China aims to elevate itself to a level playing field. Obtaining U.S. support of the concept would imply Uncle Sam’s recognition of China’s strength and power. This is what China’s official media sought to show when it suggested Obama’s support of the concept: parity and respect between the two countries. Furthermore, Chinese leaders believe that the “New Type of Great Power Relations” enables the two powers to establish a new code of conduct in line with China’s interests. By emphasizing the respect of “core interests” as an element of the concept, China pushes its territorial claims to the forefront. This is China’s attempt at more clearly demarking where the United States and other neighboring countries need to toe the line. American adoption of the term would imply that the United States recognizes China’s “core interests.” This mutual respect of each other’s national interests is at the core of China’s aspirations. The Chinese media avidly reporting on Obama and Xi’s joint endorsement of the concept suggests that there are also domestic reasons driving the “New Type of Great Power Relations.” Although the Chinese concept is an inherently U.S.-geared proposal, the domestic goals of such a concept should not be overlooked. From a Chinese perspective, the United States is the only superpower in today’s world that has the capacity to contain China’s rise. By strengthening China’s view of itself as a recognized and respected power, Xi Jinping is able to foster stronger nationalistic pride under CCP leadership and gain political capital to consolidate his own power at home.

#### 2. Economic reforms won’t happen for more than a year; the plan will be totally forgotten by then – prefer the most recent ev.

Dr. Makhan Saikia, 6-24-16, (Senior Editor and OpEd, CULT OF XI: THE SECOND COMING OF MAO?, the pioneer, http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/edit/cult-of-xi-the-second-coming-of-mao.html)

Admittedly, many optimists still feel that Xi believes the time for bold economic reforms has not come yet in China. To him, first the party must clean up from deep-rooted corruption, else people may lose complete faith on it. Once his anti-graft campaign brings back the true image of the ‘people’s party’, he is likely to initiate economic reforms without disturbing the party system. It has been predicted that he will unleash the much-awaited economic reforms only after the party Congress due late next year when many of his loyalists will be brought in crucial posts in the party. Besides, Xi’s decisive leadership style, backed by unmatched political power within the party and his relentless effort for refashioning a vigorous Chinese foreign policy have all together launched the country into a new realm of global dynamism which was not even visible during the peak of Deng.

#### 3. Xi’s reforms are nowhere close to passing – he’s getting destroyed.

Huang 15 (Keira Lu Huang, 8-20-2015, "A strange editorial in China's state-run newspaper is spelling trouble for Xi Jinping," Business Insider, [http://www.businessinsider.com/a-strange-editorial-in-chinas-state-run-newspaper-is-spelling-trouble-for-xi-jinping-2015-8 7/6/16](http://www.businessinsider.com/a-strange-editorial-in-chinas-state-run-newspaper-is-spelling-trouble-for-xi-jinping-2015-8%207/6/16) MK)

In unusually strong language, the article said the reforms were at a critical stage and had encountered immense difficulties, affecting the interests of various groups. "The in-depth reform touches the basic issue of reconfiguring the lifeblood of this enormous economy and is aimed at making it healthier," the article said. "The scale of the resistance is beyond what could have been imagined." The commentary was attributed to "Guoping", an apparent pen name used by state media to comment on major state and Communist Party issues. It appeared in state media including the websites of CCTV and Guangming Daily. Observers said the commentary suggested the reforms had not achieved the desired results and were opposed by various factions. Xu Yaotong, a political science professor at the Chinese Academy of Governance, said the publication came amid concerns the anti-corruption campaign, which had targeted several top military officials and politicians, was waning and that other reforms had attracted opposition. "The tone [of the commentary] reads furious," Xu said. "I feel that the central leadership has started to worry, based on the message indicated in the Guoping article." He said the resistance could be from any of three powerful groups: retired leaders who wanted to exert influence, cadres whose power had been weakened and civil servants unhappy with austerity rules. The publication comes after a series of People's Daily articles this month criticizing retired cadres for continuing to exert influence behind the scenes. It also follows the end of the annual agenda-setting gathering of the party elite in the Hebei seaside resort of Beidaihe. Beijing-based political commentator Zhang Lifan said the commentary signaled that "things are not going well". "Obviously they did not reach any consensus at the political activities in Beidaihe. Different groups are pursuing their own ways," he said. "This is a test of the leadership's ability to execute its mission." Zhang said the goal of having the market play a decisive role in the "allocation of resources" was one case of a target that was still a long way off. "The reform has to address politics and the economy at the same time. If the political system does not change, then inertia in the bureaucracy will just send the reform around in circles," he said. Renmin University political science professor Zhang Ming said the reform push had not only failed to deliver results, it might have gone backwards. "There's resistance not just to the reforms, there's other resistance too," he said.

#### **4. Engagement will build political capital – take it from a foreign policy expert.**

Rudd, Kevin. "U.S.-China: The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under Xi Jinping." Asia Society. N.p., Apr. 2015. Web. 2 July 2016. <http://asiasociety.org/files/USChina21\_English\_1509.pdf>. Kevin Rudd is the former Prime Minister of Australia

 It is “constructive” about those areas of difficulty in the bilateral, regional and global relationship that the U.S. and China can engage on, therefore producing tangible results over time, and gradually building political capital, diplomatic ballast and incremental strategic trust which over the longer-term can be drawn upon to deal with the more intractable disagreements described above; and Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 5 • Building on both these realist and constructive pillars, this report also advocates for an overriding common strategic purpose for the relationship: to sustain, strengthen and, where necessary, reform the existing regional and global rules-based order, against those forces seeking to erode the order altogether, to the detriment of the U.S., China and the broader international community.[…] Third, for both powers, a coherent strategic framework would also inject additional positive ingredients: a common determination to manage significant differences effectively in order to avoid unnecessary confrontation; a common commitment to collaborate in difficult policy areas with a view to resolving them; and a common sense of purpose to build political capital and strategic trust over time.

#### **5. There are too many contradictions in Xi’s policies to predict what he will do in the long term.**

Naughton, Barry. "Is There a “Xi Model” of Economic Reform? Acceleration of Economic Reform since Fall 2014." Hoover Institution. N.p., 19 Mar. 2015. Web. 3 July 2016. <http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/ research/docs/clm46bn.pdf>. Barry Naughton is an economist who specializes in China's transitional economy. Naughton teaches at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies of the University of California.

Xi Jinping’s policy agenda continues to be marked by abundant contradictory components. Ideological repression, great power aspirations, and great leader propaganda coexist with an ongoing campaign against corruption and significant measures of economic reform. Some pundits argue that these contradictory elements can be explained by one or another simple formula: Xi is “really” a reformer, or really a leftist, or really just a dictator. These overly simple approaches should be ignored. Those who advance them are merely inventing plausible stories to reconcile apparent contradictions. Although all these simple characterizations of Xi Jinping may contain elements of truth, no simple formula comes anywhere close to explaining the disparate, shifting, and sometimes massively contradictory elements of Xi’s agenda. It is enough right now if we can clearly describe the elements of the Xi agenda, and perhaps assess the relative weight and possible trajectory of some of these elements. In fact, within the jumble of disparate policy elements in the Xi agenda, in the latter part of 2014 there was a substantial shift in relative importance. The importance of economic reforms increased palpably as, for the first time, Xi began to put considerable political muscle behind specific strands of the economic reform agenda.

## AT Korea DA

#### 1. US-China coop is the only way to solve proliferation.

Xiyu 15. (Yang Xiyu is Senior Research Fellow at China Institute of International Studies. North Korean Nuclear Issue in China-U.S. Relations. July 10, 2015. <http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2015-07/10/content_8062011.htm>)

Cooperation and Disagreement on North Korean Nuclear Issue Between China and the United States As for their policies toward the North Korean nuclear issue, both China and the United States have demanded the complete denuclearization of North Korea, and they share the same position and policy goal of a nuclear-weapons-free Korean Peninsula. Moreover, since the Six-Party Talks were initiated by China, both countries have stated that the talks are the only feasible approach to the settlement of the issue, so they have made close communication and coordination with each other under and beyond the framework. Given that both China and the United States play unique roles in the efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of North Korea’s nuclear issue through dialogue, the issue has become a vital subject of their presidential meetings, the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue, as well as other diplomatic conferences and negotiations at all levels. Due to the impact of North Korea’s second nuclear test, the Cheonan incident, Yeonpyeong Island shelling and other crises, the issue has hit the gridlock. Against this backdrop, both heads of state, after meeting with each other in January 2011, made a joint statement reconfirming their further cooperation on the nuclear issue and reiterating their deep concerns over the uranium enrichment plan announced by North Korea. They called for early resumption of the Six-Party Talks through necessary measures, so as to address the issue and related ones.[17] The coordination and cooperation between China and the United States on the North Korean nuclear issue prevent it from spinning out of control, avoid nuclear nonproliferation and the outbreak of conflicts, and promise a peaceful settlement of the complicated security issue through the Six-Party Talks. If we make a comparison between China’s policies on the nuclear issue with that adopted by the three U.S. presidents, it is not hard to see that the two nations have differences not only in the consistency and stability of their policies, but also in substantive content. First, China has maintained consistency and stability on the issue throughout the past decade while the United States has adopted different policies since the Clinton administration. These changes in policy have not only hindered a smooth settlement of the issue, but also cooperation on it. Second, China has always called for increasing mutual trust, narrowing disagreement with the United States through dialogue, and gradually creating conditions for a nuclear-free peninsula through political, security, economic and diplomatic approaches; in comparison, the United States is over-dependent on imposing pressure and sanctions on North Korea, seeking to force it to give up its nuclear program unconditionally. Since the nuclear issue broke out again in October 2002, both the Republican Bush administration and the Democratic Obama administration have refused official talks with North Korea. Each time when the United States senses that it lacks measures to impose pressure on North Korea, it asks China to join the “sanction club” by taking advantage of China’s resources. Their different intentions and thinking, characterized by China’s call for dialogue and the United States’ preference for imposing pressure, have led to growing mutual suspicion between the two countries. Third, China’s advocacy of denuclearization of North Korea is part of its efforts to secure a peninsula that is free of nuclear weapons and its recognition that North Korea has the same right to peaceful use of nuclear energy as other sovereign states. However, since the Bush administration, the United States has called on North Korea to abandon its entire nuclear program, including the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This disagreement has not yet been solved. Nonetheless, the common interests and agreement between China and the United States on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula have fundamental and strategic significance. This common ground is the basis of their long-term cooperation on the issue as well as a vital field for cooperation in their joint efforts to establish a new model of China-U.S. relations. China and the United States Should Enhance Cooperation and Narrow Differences Since the end of the Cold War, it seems that the Korean Peninsula has been trapped in a “periodic” loop of a crisis every four years. When the first North Korean nuclear crisis broke out in 1994, the United States and North Korea were on the brink of war. The 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework helped ease the crisis and improved their relations, but four years later in 1998, North Korea’s test launch of a long-range ballistic missile triggered a second crisis, leaving the two countries in confrontation again. Thanks to hard but substantial negotiations, their relationship was turned around, characterized by their first high-level exchange visits: In October 2000, Jo Myong-rok, Vice Marshal of the Korean People’s Army, visited Washington as a special envoy, during which the two sides signed the U.S.-DPRK Joint Communiqué in order to establish a new model for the relationship between the two countries in the 21st century. After that, Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, paid a visit to Pyongyang and attended political meetings with Kim Jong-il.[18] Given the transfer of power in the United States, the issue of North Korea’s uranium enrichment touched off a third crisis four years later at the end of 2002, but thanks to China’s active mediation and efforts, the parties concerned initiated the Six-Party Talks. In September 2005, they signed the historic September 19 Joint Statement, which not only resolved the crisis, but also put the nuclear issue back on the right track of multilateral dialogue and negotiations. However, these efforts failed to end the “crisis loop”. In 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test regardless of strong opposition from the international community, leading to the fourth crisis. Although the Six-Party Talks mechanism brought the parties concerned back onboard to resolve the crisis and facilitate the launch of substantive “disablement”, worryingly, the “crisis loop” still exists and the cycle has been shortened to a more frequent level: Three years after the fourth crisis in 2006, another crisis broke out on the Korean Peninsula; merely one year later in 2010, the Cheonan incident and Yeonpyeong Island shelling ignited military confrontation. Three years after Yeonpyeong Island shelling, the headquarters of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) suddenly made an announcement, saying, “The army groups on the front, ground forces, the navy, air and anti-air units, strategic rocket units of the KPA, the Worker-Peasant Red Guards and the Young Red Guards have launched an all-out action according to the operational plan finally signed by the dear respected Supreme Commander Kim Jong Un.” North Korean authorities also called on the staff in foreign embassies in Pyongyang and all civilians in Seoul to evacuate. This announcement intensified the tensions between North and South Korea to the brink of war. Why cannot North Korea end the “loop of crisis” more than two decades since the end of the Cold War? Though the causes of crises differ, the “loop of crisis” has persisted for a profound reason, namely two continuing abnormal situations. First, the Korean Peninsula is still at war. The Korean Armistice Agreement signed in July 1953 was only a ceasefire agreement, prescribing that the warring factions should sign a peace agreement through negotiations so as to end the state of war. However, the parties concerned failed to reach a consensus to replace Korean Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty in the 1954 Geneva Conference or the Geneva Four-Party Talks from 1997 to 1999. Therefore, the north and south of the Korean Peninsula remain in a virtual state of war from a legal perspective, and clashes between them frequently have occurred at the “provisional Military Demarcation Line”, as well as in waters off the controversial Five West Sea Islands. Moreover, as the military ally of the ROK, the United States stations large military forces there, indicating that the United States and North Korea are still at war. This is the fundamental reason why the Korean Peninsula can hardly sustain long-term peace. Given that, the September 19 Joint Statement, as an outcome of the Six-Party Talks, emphatically pointed out, “The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.”[19] Second, the Korean Peninsula is still in a cold war. Although the worldwide Cold War has long ended, the one on the peninsula has been exacerbated. North Korea on one side and the U.S.-ROK alliance on the other are implementing similar deterrent strategies so that a mutual deterrence structure has emerged. That is to say, the present peace and “no war” are based on “mutual deterrence” and even a “balance of threat” that assures mutual destruction. This security structure, reminiscent of the Cold War, constitutes the reason why North Korea insists on the development of nuclear weapons. The above two abnormal situations are the root causes of the peninsula’s constant state of crisis and the lack of peace and stability. If they remain unchanged, the North Korean nuclear issue will not be solved and the peninsula will not be able to escape the vicious circle of periodic crises. Thus, any attempts to promote the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue must take into consideration these two root causes. As mentioned above, China and the United States have common goals and interests in the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while their respective foreign policies are different due to their distinctive judgments on the root causes of the issue and their responses accordingly. As a matter of fact, the North Korean nuclear issue covers more than nuclear proliferation and nuclear threat; it is a product of the long-term military confrontation between North Korea and the U.S.-ROK alliance, as well as an outcome of serious imbalance in the security structure of the peninsula since the end of the Cold War. For North Korea, the issue is basically about survival and security. This complicated security issue shaped by the long-standing state of war in the form of a cold war cannot be addressed simply by carrying out the model of “denuclearization in exchange for compensation”, nor through isolation, sanctions or military strikes. Instead, the relevant parties should agree on a package of plans in accordance with the September 19 Joint Statement in order to build a new security relationship on the peninsula, realize the normalization of relations between the two sides, and establish a peace and cooperation mechanism in Northeast Asia. Only through these efforts can the North Korean nuclear issue be solved and can the peninsula become a nuclear-free area with long-term stability. Therefore, the point of departure of effective cooperation between China and the United States on the issue is how to carry out a package of plans to comprehensively resolve it and build a permanent peace regime according to the “commitment for commitment, action for action” principle[20] included in the September 19 Joint Statement. These attempts will also provide basis for China and the United States to narrow their differences and play more positive roles in achieving a peaceful settlement of the issue. In fact, the framework of the Six-Party Talks serves as a practical and effective platform for both countries to expand cooperation and narrow differences on the North Korean nuclear issue.

#### 2. No risk of tensions escalating.

Mullen and Novak 15 (Jethro and Kathy, CNN correspondents citing Jamie Metzl, “North Korea ratchets up tensions after trading fire with South” <http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/21/asia/koreas-tensions/>)

The question now is whether the situation will escalate further. North Korea has used similarly alarming language in previous periods of high tension In 2013, the country announced it had entered "a state of war" with South Korea. That situation didn't result in military action, although North Korea did temporarily shut down the two countries' joint industrial zone, which lies on its side of the border. During that period, North Korea kept up a barrage of bombastic threats against the United States, South Korea and Japan. But at the same time, it continued accepting tourists and hosting international athletes in Pyongyang for a marathon. South Korea said Friday that it was limiting the number of its citizens entering the joint industrial zone, but the complex was still operating. There are currently 83 South Koreans in Pyongyang attending a youth soccer event, including players and coaches, according to the South Korean Unification Ministry. Jamie Metzl, an Asia expert for the Atlantic Council in New York, said he thought it was unlikely that the current crisis would escalate further. "North Korea has more to gain from conflict theater than from a conflict that would quickly expose its fundamental weakness," he said, suggesting leaders in Pyongyang might be trying to "make trouble because they feel ignored by the international community and feel they have something to gain negotiating their way out of a mini-crisis."

#### 3. Even if war occurs, nuclear escalation is unlikely.

Wall 13 — Mike Wall, Freelance Journalist — Internally citing Union of Concerned Scientist reports about North Korean nuclear probability and capabilities, 2013 (“North Korea Nuclear Strike on US Unlikely,” *Space.com*, April 5th, accessible online at <http://www.space.com/20527-north-korea-nuclear-threat-united-states.html>, accessed on 6-22-15)

There's little reason to believe that North Korea can actually make good on its recent threats to turn major American cities into "seas of fire," experts say. Angered by United Nations sanctions and joint U.S./South Korean military exercises, Pyongyang has been ramping up its bellicose rhetoric over the past few weeks, threatening to launch nuclear strikes on Washington, D.C. and other parts of the American mainland. But the available evidence suggests that North Korea's missiles cannot deliver nuclear warheads to such distant targets, analysts say. Further, the regime likely has just a handful of nuclear weapons, which it may not want to put atop missiles of questionable reliability. "If I were in South Korea and this were ratcheting up, if I were in Japan — you might worry about chemical weapons or something like that that they could put on the front of [a missile]," said physicist and missile-technology expert David Wright, co-director of the Union of Concerned Scientists' Global Security Program. "But once you get farther away than that, I think it's really a bluff." [Images: North Korea's Rocket Program] Rising tensions Tension has been escalating on the Korean peninsula since December, when North Korea launched a satellite into orbit for the first time. Many officials in the United States and allied nations viewed the launch, which used a rocket called the Unha-3, as a thinly disguised test of ballistic missile technology. Two months later, North Korea conducted its third-ever nuclear-weapons test. Both the launch and the test violated UN Security Council resolutions, so further economic sanctions were imposed on the already isolated communist nation. North Korean officials reacted angrily to the sanctions, and the ongoing American/South Korean military exercises have further stoked their ire. The result has been a stream of threats, with Pyongyang announcing Wednesday (April 3) that it had authorized a potential nuclear attack against the United States. North Korean leaders have also stated that the nation is now in a state of war with South Korea. In addition, Pyongyang has moved a missile to its east coast, South Korean officials say, and barred South Korean workers from an industrial complex run jointly by the two nations. While such talk and activity fit into a longstanding pattern of North Korean bluster and brinkmanship, the United States is responding with some countermeasures. The Pentagon announced Wednesday (April 3), for example, that it will deploy a missile-interception system to the U.S. Pacific territory of Guam in the coming weeks, two years ahead of the original schedule. The United States will also beef up its missile defense sites in Alaska and California over the next few years, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said last month.

#### 4. Thumper – China will continue to move away from N Ko. even if we don’t do the plan.

Pollack 3/28 (Jonathan, Senior fellow for East Asia Studies at the Brookings Institution, 3/28/16, “China and North Korea: The long goodbye?” The Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/03/28-china-north-korea-sanctions-pollack) jf

China’s estrangement from North Korea continues to fester and deepen. Following protracted negotiations in the aftermath of Pyongyang’s fourth nuclear test and subsequent satellite launch, the U.N. Security Council has imposed far more severe restrictions on North Korean trade, finance, and maritime activities. The resolution—which passed on March 2 and for which China was a key drafter—portends a much edgier and uncertain relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang.¶ Though there are ambiguities and loopholes in the criteria and enforcement provisions governing the resolution (UNSCR 2270), the new sanctions have much sharper teeth than previous resolutions—and China has unequivocally pledged to uphold the letter and spirit of the council’s decision. Even before the resolution passed, South Korean and Chinese media reported that financial transactions in the city of Dandong (where most border trade takes place between China and North Korea) had been sharply curtailed. ¶ By mid-March, Beijing was notifying local authorities on the procedures for implementing the sanctions, which will inhibit North Korean exports of coal, iron, and other minerals—the largest source of Pyongyang’s foreign exchange earnings with the outside world. At the same time, Chinese authorities were sharply limiting access of North Korean ships to ports across northeastern China, and according to some reports have barred the entry of North Korean freighters into specific ports.¶ So, after China’s radio silence following the fourth nuclear test, Beijing has now decided to make Pyongyang feel the pain. The Chinese also plan to consult more closely with the United States and South Korea, with President Xi Jinping planning to meet President Obama on the sidelines of this week’s Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. President Xi will likely meet separately with South Korean President Park Geun-hye, as well.¶ For the first time, China has begun to fully acknowledge that North Korean actions pose a direct threat to vital Chinese security interests.¶, and that Beijing is no longer prepared to rationalize or ignore the threat. Beijing has also concluded that its inaction was damaging personal and political relations between President Xi and President Park. But the driving factor is that China is no longer prepared to tolerate the cavalier, near-contemptuous attitude of Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s impetuous young leader, toward his principal source of economic support.¶ China insists that it desires normal, nominally co-equal relations with both Koreas. But Beijing’s ties with Seoul and Pyongyang are already highly imbalanced. China and South Korea have extensive economic and political relations; China and North Korea, in contrast, are increasingly alienated—which (despite shared revolutionary origins and China’s major sacrifices in the Korean War) represents an increasing liability to Chinese interests.

#### 5. Risk of the impact is incredibly low, N. Ko won’t use nukes.

Kim 5/7 (Sam, reporter for Bloomberg News, 5/7/16, “North Korea's Kim Says He Won't Use Nukes Unless Attacked” Bloomberg News, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-08/north-korea-s-kim-says-he-won-t-use-nuclear-arms-unless-attacked) jf

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said he will only use nuclear weapons if his country comes under a nuke attack, and called for improving relations with other nations as a “nuclear power.” Kim said at the first Workers’ Party congress in 36 years that North Korea should try to send more satellites into space, according to the Korean Central News Agency. The comment reaffirms his intention to develop long-range rockets that the U.S. says can be converted into inter-continental ballistic missiles.¶ Kim’s comments at the biggest political event under his rule confirm North Korea remains unwilling to abandon its nuclear-arms development or reform its centralized economy anytime soon. After its fourth nuclear test, conducted in January, the country has reiterated its demand that the U.S. treat it as a nuclear power in future negotiations.¶ “As a responsible nuclear weapons state, our republic will not use a nuclear¶ weapon unless its sovereignty is encroached upon by any aggressive hostile¶ forces with nukes,” Kim said at the congress in Pyongyang, KCNA reported. North Korea will cooperate with efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons for the eventual goal of “global denuclearization,” he said, according to KCNA.

1. http://malariajournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/%2010.1186/1475-2875-7-55 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)