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## Part 1 – The Debate Space

#### Welcome to policy debate, where each year we’re assigned a relevant political topic to analyze and research. We then discuss it, debating whether or not a hypothetical plan will make the world a better place. Through this process, we gain education about a variety of issues that allow us go out into society and do our part to make it better. But something is missing from this narrative, a question that has never been answered – why are we pursuing a better world in the first place?

#### Political thought, since its conception, has been dogmatically bound to the idea of a “good” society at the end of the road – we endlessly pursue ways to solve society’s problems, never realizing that that very pursuit *is* the problem.

McGowan, Todd. Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis. Lincoln, U of Nebraska P, 2013. WC

The great challenge that psychoanalysis poses for emancipatory politics — and for politics as such — is its absolute rejection of the good or the good society. In the opening of the Politics, Aristotle describes the good as the basic aim of political activity, and this aim has remained constant in the intervening 2,500 years.7 Aristotle [he] never attempts to prove this constitutive remark in his treatise but simply takes it as an unassailable postulate of political thinking. For subsequent political thinkers, the question does not concern Aristotle’s claim about the good but in what the good consists. There is unanimity about the political pursuit of the good not just among political theorists but among almost everyone who thinks about politics at all. From the perspective of psychoanalysis, however, there is no good at all. The good society is unattainable not just as a result of the competing desires of the individuals within the society. The theory that aligns social conflict with the coexistence of competing individual desires fails to go far enough in envisioning the antagonistic nature of the social order. No matter how divergent individual desires are, one could always imagine reconciling them with each other through some sort of compromise. A thinker such as John Rawls can imagine a just society despite positing a society divided by innumerable competing desires on the level of the individual. Justice here would consist in the idea of fairness — using one’s imagination to envision society through what Rawls labels a “veil of ignorance” that allows one to make decisions about justice without taking into account one’s individual interests or desires or social position.8 This would facilitate a good society in which any inequality would be socially justified, and it would thus reconcile competing individual desires with each other. But the barrier to the good society runs deeper than this. It derives from the very idea of the good, which Freud sees as fundamentally at odds with itself. The good itself, not our failures to achieve it, is the problem. This is the fundamental political insight that psychoanalysis brings to the table. It is at once the challenge that it poses to emancipatory politics and the basis for its implicit project for emancipation. As we get closer to the ideal of a good society, we simultaneously approach the emptiness concealed within the ideal. The notion of the good does not emerge simply from moral reasoning and speculation about the proper arrangement of society. We develop this notion only through the experience of its prohibition. That is to say, the prohibition of the good doesn’t form an obstacle to a preexisting ideal but constitutes the ideal as such. The good has no existence outside of the barriers that we erect around realizing it. As Jacques Lacan points out in one of his most important political statements, “The step taken by Freud at the level of the pleasure principle is to show us that there is no Sovereign Good — that the Sovereign Good, which is das Ding, which is the mother, is also the object of incest, is a forbidden good, and that there is no other good. Such is the foundation of the moral law as turned on its head by Freud.”9 The foundational link between the good and prohibition renders its pursuit completely contradictory. Every step toward the good occasions a corresponding step away from it. The closer we come, the more we undermine the social stability that we hoped to achieve. This occurs not just among the many utopian socialist projects that have failed but across all types of social structures. For psychoanalysis, the good is not just an unrealizable ideal but a deception incapable of orienting a coherent and sustainable politics. This critique threatens to undermine the very idea of a political project because political theorists write in order to help bring about change, which means moving society in the direction of the good (even if they admit that the ideal itself is not realizable). Conservative theorists seem immune to this critique, but they envision a return to the good or the creation of a social stability that they associate implicitly with the good.10 Political theorists of all stripes write to change the world and assist its progression (or its return to a better state), whereas psychoanalysis interprets the world and uncovers the repetition at work where it seems to be progressing.

#### **The reason we can never solve society’s problems is because we have never factored in the psychological force that created those problems – the death drive. The death drive is based on an unconscious enjoyment that can only be sustained through perpetual loss. Without addressing the death drive, any action is doomed to failure from the moment it’s conceived.**

McGowan 2 (Todd. Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis. Lincoln, U of Nebraska P, 2013.) WC

The death drive is neither (contra Marcuse) aggressiveness nor an impulse to return to an inorganic state (as Freud’s metaphor in Beyond the Pleasure Principle might imply) but an impetus to return to an originary traumatic and constitutive loss. The death drive emerges with subjectivity itself as the subject enters into the social order and becomes a social and speaking being by sacrificing a part of itself. This sacrifice is an act of creation that produces an object that exists only insofar as it is lost. This loss of what the subject doesn’t have institutes the death drive, which produces enjoyment through the repetition of the initial loss. Subjects engage in acts of self-sacrifice and self-sabotage because the loss enacted reproduces the subject’s lost object and enables the subject to enjoy this object. Once it is obtained, the object ceases to be the object. As a result, the subject must continually repeat the sacrificial acts that produce the object, despite the damage that such acts do to the subject’s self-interest. From the perspective of the death drive, we turn to violence not in order to gain power but in order to produce loss, which is our only source of enjoyment. Without the lost object, life becomes bereft of any satisfaction. The repetition of sacrifice, however, creates a life worth living, a life in which one can enjoy oneself through the lost object. The repetition involved with the death drive is not simply repetition of any particular experience. The repetition compulsion leads the subject to repeat specifically the experiences that have traumatized it and disturbed its stable functioning. The better things are going for the subject, the more likely that the death drive will derail the subject’s activity. According to the theory implied by the death drive, any movement toward the good — any progress — will tend to produce a reaction that will undermine it. This occurs both on the level of the individual and on the level of society. In psychoanalytic treatment, it takes the form of a negative therapeutic reaction, an effort to sustain one’s disorder in the face of the imminence of the cure. We can also think of individuals who continue to choose romantic relationships that fail according to a precise pattern. Politically, it means that progress triggers the very forms of oppression that it hopes to combat and thereby incessantly undermines itself. There is a backlash written into every progressive program from the outset. The death drive creates an essentially masochistic structure within the psyche. It provides the organizing principle for the subject and orients the subject relative to its enjoyment, and this enjoyment remains always linked to trauma. This structure renders difficult all attempts to prompt subjects to act in their own self-interest or for their own good. The death drive leads subjects to act contrary to their own interests, to sabotage the projects that would lead to their good.

#### **Failure to recognize the death drive locks us in to cycles of failure ultimately culminating in extinction – fundamentally rethinking our politics is the only way to break the cycle.**

McGowan 3 (Todd. Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis. Lincoln, U of Nebraska P, 2013.) WC

Unlike Herbert Marcuse, Norman O. Brown, another celebrated proponent of psychoanalytically informed political thought, attempts to construct a psychoanalytic political project that focuses on the death drive. He does not simply see it as the unfortunate result of the repression of eros but as a powerful category on its own. In Life against Death Brown conceives of the death drive as a self-annihilating impulse that emerges out of the human incapacity to accept death and loss. As he puts it, “The death instinct is the core of the human neurosis. It begins with the human infant’s incapacity to accept separation from the mother, that separation which confers individual life on all living organisms and which in all living organisms at the same time leads to death.”23 For Brown, we pursue death and destruction, paradoxically, because we cannot accept death. If we possessed the ability to accept our own death, according to Brown’s view, we would avoid falling into the death drive and would thereby rid ourselves of human violence and destructiveness. Like Marcuse, Brown’s societal ideal involves the unleashing of the sexual drives and the minimizing or elimination of the death drive. He even raises the stakes, contending that unless we manage to realize this ideal, the human species, under the sway of the death drive, will die out like the dinosaurs. Despite making more allowances for the death drive (and for death itself) than Marcuse, Brown nonetheless cannot avoid a similar error: the belief that the death drive is a force that subjects can overcome. For Freud, in contrast, it is the force that revenges itself on every overcoming, the rep- etition that no utopia can fully leave behind. An authentic recognition of the death drive and its primacy would demand that we rethink the idea of progress altogether.

#### The judge should thus vote to deconstruct the pursuit of the good within debate. This is a prerequisite to everything else, without radically challenging the way that we approach progress any action is doomed to perpetual failure, ultimately resulting in extinction.

#### The ballot is, by nature, an endorsement of one team’s performance as superior to the other’s, meaning that if we can win our methodology is net-better than theirs, you should vote Aff to endorse it.

## Part 2 – Methodology

#### We propose a psychoanalytic examination of the death drive; rejecting traditional, progress-based epistemologies in exchange for radical inaction. Instead of projecting better future worlds through a barrage of hypothetical policies, we challenge the psychological structures that replicate suffering within the status quo.

#### The alt is key — examining the structures of desire and enjoyment is the only way to break out of the cycles of failure and channel the death drive away from catastrophe.

McGowan 4 (Todd. Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis. Lincoln, U of Nebraska P, 2013.) WC

There is no path leading from the death drive to utopia. The death drive undermines every attempt to construct a utopia; it is the enemy of the good society. It is thus not surprising that political thought from Plato onward has largely ignored this psychic force of repetition and negation. But this does not mean that psychoanalytic thought concerning the death drive has only a negative value for political theorizing. It is possible to conceive of a positive politics of the death drive. The previous chapters have attempted to lay out the political implications of the death drive, and, on this basis, we can sketch what a society founded on a recognition of the death drive might look like. Such a recognition would not involve a radical transformation of society: in one sense, it would leave everything as it is. In contemporary social arrangements, the death drive subverts progress with repetition and leads to the widespread sacrifice of self-interest for the enjoyment of the sacrifice itself. This structure is impervious to change and to all attempts at amelioration. But in another sense, the recognition of the death drive would change everything. Recognizing the centrality of the death drive would not eliminate the proclivity to sacrifice for the sake of enjoyment, but it would change our relationship to this sacrifice. Rather than being done for the sake of an ultimate enjoyment to be achieved in the future, it would be done for its own sake. The fundamental problem with the effort to escape the death drive and pursue the good is that it leaves us unable to locate where our enjoyment lies. By positing a future where we will attain the ultimate enjoyment (either through the purchase of the perfect commodity or through a transcendent romantic union or through the attainment of some heavenly paradise), we replace the partial enjoyment of the death drive with the image of a complete enjoyment to come. There is no question of fully enjoying our submission to the death drive. We will always remain alienated from our mode of enjoying. As Adrian Johnston rightly points out, “Transgressively ‘overcoming’ the impediments of the drives doesn’t enable one to simply enjoy enjoyment.”1 But we can transform our relationship to the impediments that block the full realization of our drive. We can see the impediments as the internal product of the death drive rather than as an external limit. The enjoyment that the death drive provides, in contrast to the form of enjoyment proffered by capitalism, religion, and utopian politics, is at once infinite and limited. This oxymoronic form of enjoyment operates in the way that the concept does in Hegel’s Logic. The concept attains its infinitude not through endless progress toward a point that always remains beyond and out of reach but through including the beyond as a beyond within itself. As Hegel puts it, “The universality of the concept is the achieved beyond, whereas that bad infinity remains afflicted with a beyond which is unattainable but remains a mere progression to infinity.”2 That is to say, the concept transforms an external limit into an internal one and thereby becomes both infinite and limited. The infinitude of the concept is nothing but the concept’s own self-limitation. The enjoyment that the death drive produces also achieves its infinitude through self-limitation. It revolves around a lost object that exists only insofar as it is lost, and it relates to this object as the vehicle for the infinite unfurling of its movement. The lost object operates as the self-limitation of the death drive through which the drive produces an infinite enjoyment. Rather than acting as a mark of the drive’s finitude, the limitation that the lost object introduces provides access to infinity. A society founded on a recognition of the death drive would be one that viewed its limitations as the source of its infinite enjoyment rather than an obstacle to that enjoyment. To take the clearest and most traumatic example in recent history, the recognition of the death drive in 1930s Germany would have conceived the figure of the Jew not as the barrier to the ultimate enjoyment that must therefore be eliminated but as the internal limit through which German society attained its enjoyment. As numerous theorists have said, the appeal of Nazism lay in its ability to mobilize the enjoyment of the average German through pointing out a threat to that enjoyment. The average German under Nazism could enjoy the figure of the Jew as it appeared in the form of an obstacle, but it is possible to recognize the obstacle not as an external limit but as an internal one. In this way, the figure of the Jew would become merely a figure for the average German rather than a position embodied by actual Jews. Closer to home, one would recognize the terrorist as a figure representing the internal limit of global capitalist society. Far from serving as an obstacle to the ultimate enjoyment in that society, the terrorist provides a barrier where none otherwise exists and thereby serves as the vehicle through which capitalist society attains its enjoyment. The absence of explicit limitations within contemporary global capitalism necessitates such a figure: if terrorists did not exist, global capitalist society would have to invent them. But recognizing the terrorist as the internal limit of global capitalist society would mean the end of terrorism. This recognition would transform the global landscape and deprive would-be terrorists of the libidinal space within which to act. Though some people may continue to blow up buildings, they would cease to be terrorists in the way that we now understand the term. A self-limiting society would still have real battles to fight. There would remain a need for this society to defend itself against external threats and against the cruelty of the natural universe. Perhaps it would require nuclear weapons in space to defend against comets or meteors that would threaten to wipe out human life on the planet. But it would cease positing the ultimate enjoyment in vanquishing an external threat or surpassing a natural limit. The external limit would no longer stand in for a repressed internal one. Such a society would instead enjoy its own internal limitations and merely address external limits as they came up. Psychoanalytic theory never preaches, and it cannot help us to construct a better society. But it can help us to subtract the illusion of the good from our own society. By depriving us of this illusion, it has the ability to transform our thinking about politics. With the assistance of psychoanalytic thought, we might reconceive politics in a direction completely opposed to that articulated by Aristotle, to whichZizalluded in the introduction. In the Politics, Aristotle asserts: “Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good; for everyone always acts in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good.”3 Though later political thinkers have obviously departed from Aristotle concerning the question of the content of the good society, few have thought of politics in terms opposed to the good. This is what psychoanalytic thought introduces. If we act on the basis of enjoyment rather than the good, this does not mean that we can simply construct a society that privileges enjoyment in an overt way. An open society with no restrictions on sexual activity, drug use, food consumption, or play in general would not be a more enjoyable one than our own. That is the sure path to impoverishing our ability to enjoy, as the aftermath of the 1960s has made painfully clear. One must arrive at enjoyment indirectly. A society centered around the death drive would not be a better society, nor would it entail less suffering. Rather than continually sacrificing for the sake of the good, we would sacrifice the good for the sake of enjoyment. A society centered around the death drive would allow us to recognize that we enjoy the lost object only insofar as it remains lost.

#### **This card is based on the idea of external and internal limits. When we try to get from where we are now to an imaginary better future, we will see an “Other” standing in our way – the external limit to our enjoyment. For the Nazi’s, this limit was the Jews, for Trump, it’s immigrants. The alt allows us to re-orient ourselves to this limit. By abandoning the pursuit of a better future, we accept the “Other” as the internal, self-imposed limit to our enjoyment, thus making it merely a figure, rather than embodied by an actual group.**

#### **The alt is the only way to abandon the pursuit of a better world – we are a negation of power, a kritik of the underlying assumptions of policy action, as opposed to the traditional positive action that is used in pursuit of a fictional “good society”.**

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Political theorists of all stripes write to change the world and assist its progression (or its return to a bet- ter state), whereas psychoanalysis interprets the world and uncovers the repetition at work where it seems to be progressing. For this reason, Julia Kristeva theorizes the political project inherent in psychoanalysis as [is] one of permanent revolt. Rather than forming a positive program, psychoanalysis, like modernist literature, exists simply as a negation of identity and power. In The Sense and Non-sense of Revolt, she argues, “psychoanalysis, on the one hand, and a certain literature, on the other, perhaps constitute possible instances of revolt culture.”11 From Kristeva’s point of view, psychoanalysis is completely political insofar as it demands revolt, but this revolt can never become revolution. Psychoanalytic revolt is destined to remain revolt against some existing power structure toward which it will continue to provide resistance. Kristeva views psychoanalytic thought as [is] a hiccup in the hegemony of scientific rationality and progress. Any attempt to create a positive psychoanalytic politics would obviate its role as a key part of revolt culture.

## Part 3 – Not Solvency

#### Our alt doesn’t solve, it doesn’t create to a better world, it doesn’t eliminate the problems of the status quo. It instead operates as a pre-requisite to change. We aren’t complacent with oppression, but rather a challenge to the psychological structure that produces oppression to begin with.

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Underlying a position like Mitchell’s (which almost all political theorists who turn to psychoanalysis embrace) is the idea that the political usefulness of psychoanalysis stems, ironically, from its lack of a political commitment. That is to say, psychoanalysis aims to discover the unconscious truth of the subject and the society in which the subject exists, not to change this truth. It is thus at the most basic level a descriptive rather than a prescriptive art. Even the psychoanalytic cure itself does not portend radical change for the subject who accomplishes it. This subject simply recognizes, in Jacques Lacan’s words, “I am that.” The cure is more a recognition of who one is rather than a transformation of one’s subjectivity. Though psychoanalysis does view this recognition as the most radical kind of revolution, the revolution changes how the subject relates to its activity, not the activity itself. In this sense, psychoanalysis has no political axe to grind, which allows it to devote its energies to the project of interpretation and understanding. The understanding it produces can then form the basis for the different sorts of leftist political contestation that may appropriate it.

### Subpoint A – Death Drive

#### **The alt is the only real option – the death drive is inherent within our psyche, making our methodology the only way to challenge problems within the status quo.**

Mills, Jon. "Reflections on the Death Drive." Process Psychology.com, 2006, www.processpsychology.com/new-articles2/Freud%20on%20Todestrieb.pdf. Accessed 25 Nov. 2016. Dr. Mills is a board **certified clinical** psychologist and **psychoanalyst**, and a certified member in good standing with the Canadian Register of Health Service Providers in Psychology. **He holds six university and post-graduate degrees including two doctorates, as well as post-doctoral training and international scholarly recognition.** With **twenty years of clinical experience**, he specializes in the assessment and treatment of many psychological disorders upon which **he is widely published. He is founding President of the Section on Psychoanalytic** and Psychodynamic **Psychology of the Canadian Psychological Association, Editor of two international book series, author and/or editor of over one-hundred publications including twelve books**, and teaches as Core Faculty and clinical supervisior at the Adler School of Graduate Studies in Toronto. He is the only psychologist in Canada with double board certification in clinical psychology & psychoanalysis. WC

What could be more banal than death, than the inevitable, something predictable, utterly certain? It is banal by virtue of the fact that it is unimaginatively routine—eternal. Death cannot be waved or amended, what Heidegger (1927) avows “stands before us—something impending” (p. 294), something imminent—our thrownness—to be postponed, even denied. For Freud, death is much more than that which stands before us, rather it resides within us, an impulsion toward annihilation. But before the will to murder exists an insidious self-implosion, namely, suicidal desire. Here the banality of death is not just something that happens to us, it is us—our inner being, only to be experienced in novel fashions, repetitiously, circuitously, ad nauseam. Recall that Freud had aspirations to become a philosopher before deciding on medicine, was tutored by Franz 1 Brentano in university, and told Fliess that “Through the detour of being a physician . . . I most secretly nourish the hope of reaching my original goal, philosophy” (p. 159). See Letter to Fliess, January 1, 1896. 2 Death-work for Freud (1933) was ultimately in the service of restoring or reinstating a previous state of undifferentiated internal being, a drive “which sought to do away with life once more and to re-establish [an] inorganic state” (p. 107). Freud did not argue that death was the only aim of life, only that it maintained a dialectical tension in juxtaposition to a life principle under the ancient command of Eros, yet the two forces of mind remained ontologically inseparable. In this relational age, the death drive appears to be a drowning man. Even many classical analysts have difficulty accepting this central postulate in Freud’s theoretical corpus. From my account, these attitudes appear to be either based on unfamiliarity with what Freud actually said in his texts, are opposed due to theoretical incompatibilities, or are the result of reactionary defenses. It is incumbent on any critic to know exactly what one is criticizing, and that means having to delve into the nuances of what Freud truly had to say, not to mention what he implied or the logical inferences that can be inferred. Freud’s seminal work on the primacy of death particularly highlights his ability to think as a philosophical scientist using the discipline of logical rigor wed to clinical observation. Regardless of what opinion 1 contemporary psychoanalysts have toward Freud’s conception of the death drive, it becomes worthwhile for historical, clinical, and philosophical reasons to engage Freud’s thoughts on the matter. As a result, this essay is largely an exegetical reflection on Freud’s introduction of the destructive principle to psychoanalytic theory and is therefore not intended to address all the controversy, dissension, or detractors who have debunked his contributions largely on evolutionary grounds. If psychoanalysis is destined to prosper and advance, it must be open to revisiting controversial ideas that gave it radical prominence to begin with.

#### **All other theories fail, they cannot fully account for the psychological structures that operate as the root cause of any given problem.**

Mills, Jon. "Reflections on the Death Drive." Process Psychology.com, 2006, www.processpsychology.com/new-articles2/Freud%20on%20Todestrieb.pdf. Accessed 25 Nov. 2016. Dr. Mills is a board certified clinical psychologist and psychoanalyst, and a certified member in good standing with the Canadian Register of Health Service Providers in Psychology. He holds six university and post-graduate degrees including two doctorates, as well as post-doctoral training and international scholarly recognition. With twenty years of clinical experience, he specializes in the assessment and treatment of many psychological disorders upon which he is widely published. He is founding President of the Section on Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Psychology of the Canadian Psychological Association, Editor of two international book series, author and/or editor of over one-hundred publications including twelve books, and teaches as Core Faculty and clinical supervisior at the Adler School of Graduate Studies in Toronto. He is the only psychologist in Canada with double board certification in clinical psychology & psychoanalysis. WC

Freud’s thesis on the death drive is one of the most original theories in the history of ideas that potentially provides a viable explanation to the conundrums that beset the problems of human civilization, subjective suffering, collective aggressivity, and self-destructiveness. Contemporary psychoanalytic theorists tend to view the death drive as fanciful nonsense, an artifact of imagination, but I wish to argue otherwise. Freud accounts for an internally derived motivation, impulse, or activity that is impelled toward a determinate teleology of destruction that may be directed toward self and others, the details of which are multifaceted and contingent upon the unique contexts that influence psychic structure and unconsciously mediated behavior. Although Freud largely believed that his ideas on the death drive were “left to future investigation” (1933, p. 107), he was committed to the notion that mind seeks “a return to an earlier state” (1940, p. 149), a notion that is verifiable through clinical observation. Despite the psyche’s inherently evolutionary nature, death becomes the fulcrum of psychic progression and decay.

### Subpoint B – The Unconscious

#### **The second net-benefit to the alt is its interaction with unconscious knowledge. All other forms of political thought assume our conscious knowledge is the extent of our psyche, however, psychoanalysis reveals that it’s only the tip of the iceberg. Instead, it’s our unconscious – the realm of our psyche formed by our suppressed desires and drives – that acts as the basis for all of our actions. Only through the alt can we bracket off our conscious knowledge and examine the underlying structures of the unconscious that would otherwise doom any action to serial policy failure.**

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But knowledge and desire are at odds: the subject doesn’t want to know what it desires or how it enjoys. Its knowledge remains necessarily incomplete, and the gap within knowledge is the trigger for the subject’s desire and the point at which it enjoys. The unconscious emerges out of the subject’s incapacity for knowing its own enjoyment. Conscious knowledge is not simply unable to arrive at the knowledge of enjoyment[‘s] and its traumatic origin; it actively functions as a barrier to this knowledge. Conscious knowledge thwarts access to the unconscious, and, as a result, the conscious effort to know continually defeats itself. Psychoanalysis attempts to fill this fundamental lacuna in the project of knowledge by demanding that the subject abandon the project in its traditional manifestation. It constructs a space that brackets conscious knowledge in order that the subject might discover the unconscious. The fundamental rule of psychoanalysis — one must reveal not what one knows but the words that come to mind — aims at bringing to light what the subject doesn’t want to know. A gap exists between what the subject knows and what it says. In the act of speaking, the subject says more than it consciously knows, and this excess is the unconscious — a knowledge that the subject has without knowing it. The paradox of this knowledge is that one can access it only when not seeking it and that once one has it, one has lost it.

## Part 4 – Framing

### A - Interpretation

#### The judge should vote for the best methodology – the burden of the negative is thus to provide a competitive counter-methodology to the Aff, and whichever side wins that their methodology is superior gets the ballot.

### B – Reasons to Prefer

#### 1. Critical Thinking: By refusing to advocate a traditional action we force both sides to think about their arguments – not just read from their blocks.

#### 2. Debaters should have to justify their version of debate.

#### 3. We’re the most inclusive – debaters can read arguments that interest them – allows things like activism, and topic-education. This is key for meaningful debates.

#### 3. We control the internal link to fairness because we maximize neg ground – they can read literally anything they want as long as they can justify it. That outweighs, even if we aren’t predictable or limiting, the ground we give them allows them to engage, just in a less traditional way.

#### 4. We control the internal link to education because we:

####  a. Force critical thinking, that’s more educational than just reading blocks at each other.

####  b. Challenge the traditional mindset that guarantees serial policy failure, without our Aff the education we gain is bad.

#### And, default to our interp – a risk that the debate space is flawed means that our kritik is key.

#### And, our theory doesn’t link to the K, we’re not trying to create a better world, but merely enable our alt to be evaluated.

## Underview

#### Experimental data and empirical evidence prove that psychoanalysis is both falsifiable and valid.

Petocz, professor at the University of Western Sydney, 15

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A reservoir of experimental data pertinent to Freud’s work currently exists **and**, as we have shown in detail, **offers support for a respectable number of his major ideas and theories** … **However, a sizeable proportion of those** observers **who are presumably concerned with evaluating the standing of psychoanalysis** have simply refused to acknowledge the existence, or accept the credibility, of such findings. (Fisher & Greenberg, 1996, pp. 284-285) After a hundred years of controversy, **we can now put to rest the criticism of psychoanalysis that its most fundamental assertion- the importance of unconscious processes—is mistaken or without empirical foundation.** The data are incontrovertible: consciousness is the tip of the psychic iceberg that Freud imagined it to be. (Western, 1999, p. 1097) **There is a cornucopia of empirical evidence in the cognitive neurosciences, attachment field, infant-observation research, developmental psychology, clinical psychopathology, and the therapeutic process that are corroborations, validations, extensions, revisions and emendations of Freud’: contributions.** (Mills, ZIIJ7, p. 540)

#### Clinical studies also support psychoanalysis; Mahrer, Robinson, Dufresne, and most other critics are hacks – they have pre-existing biases against psychoanalysis without really understanding the theory.

Mills, Jon. "Reflections on the Death Drive." Process Psychology.com, 2006, www.processpsychology.com/new-articles2/Freud%20on%20Todestrieb.pdf. Accessed 25 Nov. 2016. Dr. Mills is a board certified clinical psychologist and psychoanalyst, and a certified member in good standing with the Canadian Register of Health Service Providers in Psychology. He holds six university and post-graduate degrees including two doctorates, as well as post-doctoral training and international scholarly recognition. With twenty years of clinical experience, he specializes in the assessment and treatment of many psychological disorders upon which he is widely published. He is founding President of the Section on Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Psychology of the Canadian Psychological Association, Editor of two international book series, author and/or editor of over one-hundred publications including twelve books, and teaches as Core Faculty and clinical supervisior at the Adler School of Graduate Studies in Toronto. He is the only psychologist in Canada with double board certification in clinical psychology & psychoanalysis. WC

Freud’s thesis on the death drive is one of the most original theories in the history of ideas that potentially provides a viable explanation to the conundrums that beset the problems of human civilization, subjective suffering, collective aggressivity, and self-destructiveness. Contemporary psychoanalytic theorists tend to view the death drive as fanciful nonsense, an artifact of imagination, but I wish to argue otherwise. Freud accounts for an internally derived motivation, impulse, or activity that is impelled toward a determinate teleology of destruction that may be directed toward self and others, the details of which are multifaceted and contingent upon the unique contexts that influence psychic structure and unconsciously mediated behavior. Although Freud largely believed that his ideas on the death drive were “left to future investigation” (1933, p. 107), he was committed to the notion that mind seeks “a return to an earlier state” (1940, p. 149), a notion that is verifiable through clinical observation. Despite the psyche’s inherently evolutionary nature, death becomes the fulcrum of psychic progression and decay. What could be more banal than death, than the inevitable, something predictable, utterly certain? It is banal by virtue of the fact that it is unimaginatively routine—eternal. Death cannot be waved or amended, what Heidegger (1927) avows “stands before us—something impending” (p. 294), something imminent—our thrownness—to be postponed, even denied. For Freud, death is much more than that which stands before us, rather it resides within us, an impulsion toward annihilation. But before the will to murder exists an insidious self-implosion, namely, suicidal desire. Here the banality of death is not just something that happens to us, it is us—our inner being, only to be experienced in novel fashions, repetitiously, circuitously, ad nauseam. Death-work for Freud (1933) was ultimately in the service of restoring or reinstating a previous state of undifferentiated internal being, a drive “which sought to do away with life once more and to re-establish [an] inorganic state” (p. 107). Freud did not argue that death was the only aim of life, only that it maintained a dialectical tension in juxtaposition to a life principle under the ancient command of Eros, yet the two forces of mind remained ontologically inseparable. In this relational age, the death drive appears to be a drowning man. Even many classical analysts have difficulty accepting this central postulate in Freud’s theoretical corpus. From my account, these attitudes appear to be either based on unfamiliarity with what Freud actually said in his texts, are opposed due to theoretical incompatibilities, or are the result of reactionary defenses. It is incumbent on any critic to know exactly what one is criticizing, and that means having to delve into the nuances of what Freud truly had to say, not to mention what he implied or the logical inferences that can be inferred. Freud’s seminal work on the primacy of death particularly highlights his ability to think as a philosophical scientist using the discipline of logical rigor wed to clinical observation. Regardless of what opinion 1 contemporary psychoanalysts have toward Freud’s conception of the death drive, it becomes worthwhile for historical, clinical, and philosophical reasons to engage Freud’s thoughts on the matter. As a result, this essay is largely an exegetical reflection on Freud’s introduction of the destructive principle to psychoanalytic theory and is therefore not intended to address all the controversy, dissension, or detractors who have debunked his contributions largely on evolutionary grounds. If psychoanalysis is destined to prosper and advance, it must be open to revisiting controversial ideas that gave it radical prominence to begin with.

#### Prefer this card because:

####  1. Jon Mills has 6 degrees including 2 PhD’s, as well as post-doctoral training, international scholarly recognition, more than 30 years of clinical experience, has published 12 books and over 100 other publications, is the editor of two international book series, a professor, and the founding president of the Section on Psychoanalysis in the Canadian Psychological Association.

####  2. It’s specific to the theory of the death drive – hold any indicts to the same threshold. Generic a2 psychoanalysis cards are based on specific instances that aren’t representative – like saying all medicine is a hoax because Dr. Oz is. Psychoanalysis is a diverse field; we only defend the theory of the death drive.

And, we don’t defend Freud’s problematic rhetoric – it was a product of his historical situation, not inherent in his philosophical works. The theory of psychoanalysis can thus be separated from Freud’s rhetoric, meaning you evaluate the kritik based on what we say, not on something that someone said hundreds of years ago.

McGowan 8 (Todd. Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis. Lincoln, U of Nebraska P, 2013.) WC

The problem with this appropriation is the point at which it arrests the descriptive process of psychoanalytic interpretation. Psychoanalysis does not merely describe the structure of one culture or socioeconomic formation (such as patriarchy or capitalism); it instead insists on a fundamental validity across cultural and socioeconomic boundaries. It also insists on this validity across different historical epochs. It is, in short, a universal theory concern- ing the relationship between the individual subject and society.6 Of course, Freud discovered psychoanalysis in a particular historical situation that shaped how he presented his insights and even the ideas he could formulate. But one can separate the particular elements (like the Oedipus complex or the labeling of homosexuality as a perversion) from the universal ones (like the antagonistic nature of society or the fact of castration as the requirement for entrance into society). The challenge for the psychoanalytic theorist is discovering the universality in Freud’s discoveries, but it is this universality that presents an obstacle for any political project. If the antagonism between the subject and the social order is irreducible, then the stumbling block is not just capitalism or patriarchy but human society itself.

# \*\*\*Blocks\*\*\*

## Overview

Debate is based on the pursuit of a “good society” but the death drive necessarily undermines this project. The link story operates in two ways.

 1. The death drive creates an enjoyment that can only be sustained through perpetual loss – that’s the second McGowan card. While we may think we want something, like a child on Christmas, it is ultimately the pursuit itself that generates enjoyment. Once the object is obtained, it ceases to provide pleasure, meaning that the drive continues in an endless cycle. Furthermore, we can never be satisfied by “having”, we need to continually lose in order to return to the original, constitutive loss that accompanies our entrance into the social order. This means that we will always unknowingly undermine our own pursuit of the good in order to experience the pleasure produced from loss – this manifests itself in serial policy failure, this turns the Neg and proves the alt is key.

 2. Politics invariably wants to get from where we are now to a better society, however, there is always some obstacle to this ultimate enjoyment – in 30’s Germany it was the Jews, for Trump it’s immigrants, for cops it is Black people. These “otherized” figures act as the external limit to our enjoyment. This necessitates the elimination of the other, ultimately guaranteeing extinction – that’s the fourth piece of McGowan ev.

The alt is psychoanalysis – we reject the positive politics that promises a better future in favor of negative politics – an examination of the structures of enjoyment. The Methodology contention shows us what this will look like – instead of trying to stop sacrifice through a barrage of policies, we keep everything as it is, in order to change our fundamental relationship to that sacrifice. For example, the Nazi’s would have stopped seeing Jews as the external limit to their enjoyment because they would no longer be trying to achieve enjoyment, they would instead view the figure occupied by the Jew an internal, self-imposed limit, and it would thus no longer occupied by actual Jews. This directs the death drive away from society, and instead focuses it on the death drive itself – thereby targeting the root cause of all problems.

## 2AC

### Part 1

They read generic responses to the K, but never answered any specific 1AC arguments, which is going to be damning.

Extend the first two McGowan cards – debate is locked into the pursuit of a better society without ever questioning why. This project inevitably fails because it ignores the death drive – an unconscious structure within our psyches that creates pleasure through repeated loss – without basing our politics on the recognition of the drive, it undermines any progress that we make.

[Line-by-line]

 These two cards went cold-conceded, which means:

It’s try or die for the Aff, traditional politics inevitably fails, meaning a risk that we break out of the cycle is sufficient to affirm.

Extend the third McGowan card – the only way to break the cycle is to radically re-thinking our politics through psychoanalysis.

[Line-by-line]

 This ev creates a solvency-deficit to their methodology, only by orienting our actions around the recognition of the death drive are we able to avoid serial policy failure. Because their advocacies are not based on the recognition of the drive, we are the only ones that access a risk of solvency.

### Part 2

Extend our advocacy – only through a psychoanalytic examination of the death drive can we break free of traditional logic that causes cycles of failure.

Extend McGowan 4 – our inaction is key because it changes our relationship to progress. Instead of trying to pursue a better world, only to have the death drive undermine our attempts, we do nothing; give the death drive nothing to undermine. This is the only way to break the cycle and turn the death drive away from society, instead focusing it on itself.

Our alt isn’t complicit with the problems of the status quo, instead it is the only way to stop recreating them by challenging their root cause.

Next, extend the analysis about external and internal limits; when we try to get from where we are now to a better future, there will always be an “Other” standing in our way, acting as the external limit to our enjoyment, like the Jews in Nazi Germany. The alt allows us to re-orient ourselves to the other because we stop pursuing a better future, which allows us to accept the “Other” as an internal, self-imposed limit to our enjoyment, thus making it merely a figure, rather than embodied by an actual group.

[Line-by-line]

 They never answered this analysis, which is going to have two implications:

 1. It creates another solvency deficit to voting Neg.

 2. It’s an independent reason to reject the Neg because they perpetuate the logic that causes things like genocide and oppression.

### Part 3

Extend McGowan 6 – the K isn’t about solving political problems – that’s why it’s key. By taking a step back and evaluating our underlying psychology, we are able to gain an understanding of those structures that allows future political action to be more effective.

This takes out all of their solvency-indicts, because we aren’t trying to solve anything (hell, our ev indicates that trying to solve problems actually re-creates them as well as causing things like genocide). Instead, we operate as a pre-requisite; only through psychoanalysis can we break out of the cycles of failure.

Next, extend sub-point A, specifically Mills 2 – the death drive is the root cause of all other impacts, which creates another solvency-deficit to their method.

Next, extend sub-point B, our psyche is divided into the realms of the conscious and unconscious. Psychoanalysis proves that our unconscious, created from suppressed desires and drives, is what truly informs our actions – because the Neg only interacts with the realm of the conscious, their project inevitably fails. Only through the alt can we bracket off the conscious, and interact with our unconscious. This is anther solvency deficit, as well as a solvency turn to the Neg.

# \*\*Shells\*\*

## AT Framework

#### 1. Cross-apply the case extensions I just explained – they have 4 implications on the framework flow:

####  a. The first three McGowan cards turn framework because the Neg is locked into a policy-making mindset that inevitably fails.

####  b. The conscious and unconscious arg (that’s the 7th McGowan card) is a solvency deficit because to their interp because they preclude interaction with the unconscious, and thus can’t truly solve.

####  c. McGowan 4 (in Contention 2), proves that the mindset of their framework perpetuates oppression and genocide because they force us into projecting better future world, that’s a pre-fiat reason to reject them.

####  d. The first two pieces of Mills evidence create a solvency deficit because any theory that doesn't fully account for the death drive inevitably fails.

#### 2. Turn their education impacts – it ignores how **the death drive shapes the way we interact with information by creating a fear of true knowledge so as to sustain the fantasy of progress. Their framework is thus doomed to failure, creating an illusion of understanding that only serves to perpetuate our ignorance.**

McGowan, Todd. Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis. Lincoln, U of Nebraska P, 2013. WC

This link between knowledge and progress is the controlling idea of the Enlightenment. In his essay “What Is Enlightenment?” Kant emphasizes that Enlightenment requires a situation where one is free to gain knowledge, where one has “freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters.”27 In the act of gaining knowledge through reasoning, subjects facilitate progress as they put this knowledge into use by restructuring society. Knowledge, for Kant and for all Enlightenment thinkers, has an inherently progressive leaning. It frees us from the tyranny of the past and from the drudgery of repetition. Progress is only possible because we have the ability to know the past and to learn from it.28 The Enlightenment’s belief in progress derives from its conception of the human subject as a subject of knowledge, a subject who fundamentally wants to know. For psychoanalysis, the link between knowledge and progress dooms the possibility of progress. Rather than desiring to know, the subject desires not to know and organizes its existence around the avoidance of knowledge. In “Le séminaire XXI” Lacan states this straightforwardly: “There has been no desire for knowledge but . . . a horror of knowing.”29 The knowledge that we avoid is knowledge of the unconscious because this knowledge confronts us with the power of the death drive and the inescapability of repetition. What we don’t know — our particular form of stupidity — allows us to move forward, to view the future with hopefulness. Without this fundamental refusal to know, the subject simply could not continue.30

#### 3. Using legal methods only serves to legitimate the dominant order and preclude any actual challenges to oppressive power structures.

Crenshaw, Kimberle Williams. "Race, Reform, And Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law". Harvard Law Review 101.7 (1988): 1331. Web. 14 Oct. 2016.

The concept of hegemony allows Critical scholars to explain the continued legitimacy of American society by revealing how legal [law] consciousness induces people to accept or consent to their own oppression. Legal historian Robert Gordon, for example, declares that one should look not only at the undeniably numerous, specific ways in which the legal system functions to screw poor people . . . but rather at all the ways in which the system seems at first glance basically uncontroversial, neutral, acceptable. This is Antonio Gramsci's notion of "hegemony," i.e., that the most effective kind of domination takes place when both the dominant and dominated classes believe that the existing order, with perhaps some marginal changes, is satisfactory, or at least represents the most that anyone could expect, because things pretty much have to be the way they are. 76 According to Gordon, Gramsci directs our attention to the many thoughts and beliefs that people have adopted that limit their ability "even to imagine that life could be different and better."77 Although society's structures of thought have [has] been constructed by elites out of a universe of possibilities, people reify these structures and clothe them with the illusion of necessity.78 Law is an essential feature in the illusion of necessity because it embodies and reinforces ideological assumptions about human relations that people accept as natural or even immutable. People act out their lives, mediate conflicts, and even perceive themselves with reference to the law. By accepting the bounds of law and ordering their lives according to its categories and relations, people think that they are confirming reality - the way things must be. Yet by accepting the view of the world implicit in the law, people are also bound by its conceptual limitations. Thus conflict and antagonism are contained: the legitimacy of the entire order is never seriously questioned. Relating this idea to the limitations of antidiscrimination law, Alan Freeman argues that the legal reforms that grew out of the civil rights movement were severely limited by the ideological constraints embedded within the law 79 and dictated by "needs basic to the preservation of the class structure."80 These ideological pillars supporting the class structure were simultaneously repositories of racial domination and obstacles to the fundamental reordering of society. For example, Freeman argues that formal equality, combined with the fact that American law does not formally recognize any difference based on wealth, precluded most remedies which would have required the redistribution of wealth.81 Yet economic exploitation and poverty have been central features of racial domination - poverty is its long-term result. A legal strategy that does not include redistribution of wealth cannot remedy one of the most significant aspects of racial domination. Similarly, the myths of "vested rights" and "equality of opportunity" were necessary to protect the legitimacy of the dominant order and thus constituted insuperable barriers to the quest for significant redistri- butive reform.82 Freeman's central argument is that the severe limi- tations of legal reform were dictated by the legitimating role of legal discourse. If law functions to reinforce a world view that things should be the way they are, then law cannot provide an effective means to challenge the present order. […] According to Tushnet, the danger that arises from being swept into legal rights discourse is that people lose sight of their real objectives. Their visions and thoughts of the possible become trapped within the ideological limitations of the law. Tushnet suggests that, "[i]f we treated experiences of solidarity and individuality as directly relevant to our political discussions, instead of passing them through the filter of the language of rights, we would be in a better position to address the political issues on the appropriate level."87 Peter Gabel suggests that the belief in rights and in the state serves a hegemonic function through willed delusion:88

#### 4. Their interp leads to a politics of superficiality – we role-play as a vast range of conflicting actors, hoping to gain real-world education but instead lock ourselves into cycles of simulation that erode any actual identity or connection to reality. The impact is Ted Cruz, an emotionless sacrifice of ethics at the altar of our aleatory scripts.

Antonio, Robert J. “Nietzsche's Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History.” American Journal of Sociology, vol. 101, no. 1, 1995, pp. 1–43. [www.jstor.org/stable/2782505](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2782505). WC

The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrications to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, [and] decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by ~~paralyzing~~ overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? 12 The important passages on actor and role in The Gay Science were added to the second edition in 1887 and, thus, reflect Nietzsche's mature thought. 14 Nietzsche's Antisociology A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely astring to throttle all culture. ... Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning~~, cringing,~~ arrogant, all according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great ~~man~~ of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severelya god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

#### 5. Mummification DA – their demand for our Aff to conform to a predictable, limited model of debate kills competition and embalms education, creating a fantasy that excludes any challenge to their comfortable version of reality. Only through the embrace of unpredictable chaos can we be free to self-actualize.

Grimm 77 (Ruediger Hermann, art historian and Goethe scholar, *Nietzsche's Theory of Knowledge*, ed. M. Montinari, W. Miiller-Lauter & H. Wenzel, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pg. 30-33, Gender modified

Western logic and metaphysics have been traditionally founded upon a handful of principles which were regarded as being self-evidently true, and therefore neither requiring nor admitting of any further proof40• One of these principles we have already dealt with at some length, the notion that truth must be unchanging. Rather than further belabor the whole question of truth, we shall now turn to Nietzsche's analysis of why it is that truth should be regarded as necessarily unchanging in the first place. Nietzsche's view of reality (the will to power) is such that all that exists is an ever-changing chaos of power-quanta, continually struggling with one another for hegemony. Nothing remains the same from one instant to the next. Consequently there are no stable objects, no "identical cases," no facts, and no order. Whatever order we see in the world, we ourselves have projected into it. By itself, the world has no order : there is no intrinsically stable "world order," no "nature." Yet metaphysics, logic, and language indeed, our whole conceptual scheme is grounded in the assumption that there is such a stable order. Why? . • . die Annahme des seienden ist nothig, um denken und schliessen zu konnen : die Logik handhabt our Formeln fiir Gleichbleibendes deshalb ware diese Annahme noch ohne Beweiskraft fiir die Reali tat : ,,das Seiende" gehort zu unserer Optik48• This can perhaps be best clarified by anticipating our discussion of Nietzsche's perspectivism. Even if reality is a chaos of power-quanta, about which any statement is already an interpretation and "falsification," we nevertheless must assume some sort of order and continuity in order to function at all. But the assumption of order and continuity even if it is a necessary assumption is certainly not any sort of proof. We ourselves, as will to power, gain control over our environment by "interpreting" it, by simplifying and adapting it to our requirements. Life itself is an ongoing process of interpretation, a process of imposing a superficial order upon a chaotic reality. In Wahrheit ist Interpretation ein Mittel selbst, um Herr iiber etwas zu werden. (Der organische Prozess setzt fortwahrendes /nterpretieren voraus42• Thus we create for ourselves a world in which we can live and function and further enhance and increase our will to power. Even our perceptual apparatus is not geared to gleaning "truth" from the objects of our experience. Rather, it arranges, structures, and interprets these objects so that we can gain control over them and utilize them for our own ends. The "truth" about things is something we ourselves have projected onto them purely for the purpose of furthering our own power. Thus Nietzsche can say Wahrheit ist die Art von Irrthum, ohne welche eine bestimmte Art von lebendigen Wesen nicht leben konnte. Der Werth fiir das Leben entscheidet zuletzt43. Thus the "truth" about reality is simply a variety of error, a convenient fiction which is nevertheless necessary for our maintenance. In the last analysis it is not a question of "truth" at all, but rather, a matter of which "fiction," which interpretation of reality best enables me to survive and increase my power. In an absolute sense, the traditional standard of unchanging truth is no more true or false than Nietzsche's own. But on the basis of Nietzsche's criterion for truth we can make a vital distinction. All statements about the truth or falsity of our experiential world are functions of the will to power, and in this sense, all equally true (or false). The difference lies in the degree to which any particular interpretation increases or decreases our power. The notion that truth is unchanging is the interpretation of a comparatively weak will to power, which demands that the world be simple, reliable, predictable, i. e. "true." Constant change, ambiguity, contradiction, paradox, etc. are much more difficult to cope with, and require a comparatively high degree of will to power to be organized (i. e. interpreted) into a manageable environment. The ambiguous and contradictory the unknown is frightening and threatening. Therefore we have constructed for ourselves a model of reality which is eminently "knowable," and consequently subject to our control. Pain and suffering have traditionally been held to stem from "ignorance" about the way the world "really" is : the more predictable and reliable the world is, the less our chances are of suffering through error, of being unpleasantly surprised. However, " darin driickt sich eine gedriickte Seele aus, voller MIBtrauen und schlimmer Erfahrung . . . 44." The demand that reality and truth be stable, reliable, predictable, and conveniently at our disposal is a symptom of weakness. The glossing over of the chaotic, contradictory, changing aspect of reality is the sign of a will to power which must reduce the conflict and competition in the world to a minimum. Yet resistance and competition are the very factors which enable any particular power-constellation to express itself and grow in power. As we saw earlier, the will to power can only express itself by meeting resistance, and any interpretation of reality which attempts to minimize these factors is profoundly anti-life (since life is will to power). Furthermore, a person embodying a strong and vigorous will to power will "interpret" the "threatening" aspect of the world the chaos, ambiguity, contradiction, danger, etc. as stimuli, which continually offer [them] a high degree of resistance which [they] must meet and overcome if [they are] to survive and grow. Rather than negate change and make the world predictable, a "strong" person would, according to Nietzsche, welcome the threat and challenge of a constantly changing world. Referring to those who require a world as changeless as possible in order to survive, Nietzsche says . . . (eine umgekehrte Art Mensch wiirde diesen Wechsel zum Reiz rechnen) Eine mit Kraft iiberladene und spielende Art W esen wiirde gerade die Aff ekte, die Unvernunft und den Wechsel in eudamonistischem Sinne gutheissen, sammt ihren Consequenzen, Gefahr, Contrast, Zu-Grunde-gehn usw-45. A large part of the intellectual energy of the West has been spent in trying to discover "facts," "laws of nature," etc., all of which are conceived to be "truths" and which, therefore, do not change. For Nietzsche, this conceptualization of our experience is tantamount to a "mummification" : when an experience is conceptualized, it is wrenched from the everchanging stream of becoming which is the world. By turning our experiences into facts, concepts, truths, statistics, etc. we "kill" [truths] them, rob them of their immediacy and vitality and embalm them, thus transforming them into the convenient bits of knowledge which furnish our comfortable, predictable, smug existences46• Der Mensch sucht ,,die Wahrheit" : eine Welt, die nicht sich widerspricht, nicht tiiuscht, nicht wechselt, eine wahre Welt, eine Welt, in der man nicht leidet : Widerspruch, Tauschung, Wechsel Ursachen des Leidens l47 For Nietzsche, this whole tendency to negate change which is so intimately connected with the presupposition that "truth" always means "unchanging, eternal truth," is a symptom of decadence, a symptom of the weakening and disruption of the will to power. This outlook says, in effect, "This far shall you go, and this much shall you learn, but no more than this . . . . " In the absence of any fixed and ultimate standard for truth, of course, this outlook is no more true or false than Nietzsche's own. Yet it is not a question here of rightness or wrongness, but a question of power. More specifically, it is a matter of vital power. "Der Werth fur das Leben entscheidet zuletzt48." Nietzsche's conclusion is that this static world interpretation has a negative, depressing effect on a person's vital energies (will to power). It constricts growth, it sets limits and hampers the self-assertion of the will to power. The strong individual, whom Nietzsche so much admires, flourishes only in an environment of change, ambiguity, contradiction, and danger. The chaotic and threatening aspect of the world is a stimulus for such individuals, demanding that they constantly grow and increase their power, or perish49• It demands that they constantly exceed their previous limits, realize their creative potential and surpass it, become more than they were. In the absence of any stability in the world, the strong individual who can flourish in such an environment is radically free from any constraint, radically free to create. It need scarcely be said that this world-interpretation is immeasurably more conducive to the growth and enhancement of the will to power than the static worldview. And the increase of will to power is Nietzsche's only criterion : Alles Geschehen, alle Bewegung, alles Werden als ein Feststellen von Gradund Kraftverhaltnissen, als ein Kampf . . .0 0

#### 6. Presume Aff on framework because:

 **A. A risk that the debate space is flawed means that our kritik is key, which outweighs because it’s better to have meaningful debate rounds where you actually learn something than easy debate rounds that have no real world benefits.**

 **B. They get the structural advantage of the block.**

 **C. Aff choice: We speaks first, means they would get to moot the 1AC and take all our offense, so err aff.**

#### 7. Fiat amounts to a demand for hypothetical government action that, rather than helping promote change, creates a perverse enjoyment of oppression that paradoxically maintains the status quo.

**Lundberg 12** --- ‎Professor and Communication Strategies Consultant (Christian, Lacan in Public, Published by The University of Alabama Press, Project Muse)

On Resistance: The Dangers of Enjoying One’s Demands The demands of student revolutionaries and antiglobalization protestors provide a set of opportunities for interrogating hysteria as a political practice. For the antiglobalization protestors cited earlier, demands to be added to a list of dangerous globophobes uncannily condense a dynamic inherent to all demands for recognition. But the demands of the Mexico Solidarity Network and the Seattle Independent Media project demand more than recognition: they also demand danger as a specific mode of representation. “Danger” functions as a sign of something more than inclusion, a way of reaffirming the protestors’ imaginary agency over processes of globalization. If danger represents an assertion of agency, and the assertion of agency is proportional to the deferral of desire to the master upon whom the demand is placed, then demands to be recognized as dangerous are doubly hysterical. Such demands are also demands for a certain kind of love, namely, the state might extend its love by recognizing the dangerousness of the one who makes the demand. At the level the demand’s rhetorical function, dangerousness is metonymically connected with the idea that average citizens can effect change in the prevailing order, or that they might be recognized as agents who, in the instance of the list of globalophobic leaders, can command the Mexican state to reaffirm their agency by recognizing their dangerousness. The rhetorical structure of danger implies the continuing existence of the state or governing apparatus’s interests, and these interests become a nodal point at which the hysterical demand is discharged. This structure generates enjoyment of the existence of oppressive state policies as a point for the articulation of identity. The addiction to the state and the demands for the state’s love is also bound up with a fundamental dependency on the oppression of the state: otherwise the identity would collapse. Such demands constitute a reaffirmation of a hysterical subject position: they reaffirm not only the subject’s marginality in the global system but the danger that protestors present to the global system. There are three practical implications for this formation. First, for the hysteric the simple discharge of the demand is both the beginning and satisfaction of the political project. Although there is always a nascent political potential in performance, in this case the performance of demand comes to fully eclipse the desires that animate content of the demand. Second, demand allows institutions that stand in for the global order to dictate the direction of politics. This is not to say that engaging such institutions is a bad thing; rather, it is to say that when antagonistic engagement with certain institutions is read as the end point of politics, the field of political options is relatively constrained. Demands to be recognized as dangerous by the Mexican government or as a powerful antiglobalization force by the WTO often function at the cost of addressing how practices of globalization are reaffirmed at the level of consumption, of identity, and so on or in thinking through alternative political strategies for engaging globalization that do not hinge on the state and the state’s actions. Paradoxically, the third danger is that an addiction to the refusal of demands creates a paralyzing disposition toward institutional politics. Grossberg has identified a tendency in left politics to retreat from the “politics of policy and public debate.”45 Although Grossberg identifies the problem as a specific coordination of “theory” and its relation to left politics, perhaps a hysterical commitment to marginality informs the impulse in some sectors to eschew engagements with institutions and institutional debate. An addiction to the state’s refusal often makes the perfect the enemy of the good, implying a stifling commitment to political purity as a pretext for sustaining a structure of enjoyment dependent on refusal, dependent on a kind of paternal “no.” Instead of seeing institutions and policy making as one part of the political field that might be pressured for contingent or relative goods, a ~~hysterical~~ politics is in the incredibly difficult position of taking an addressee (such as the state) that it assumes represents the totality of the political field; simultaneously it understands its addressee as constitutively and necessarily only a locus of prohibition. These paradoxes become nearly insufferable when one makes an analytical cut between the content of a demand and its rhetorical functionality. At the level of the content of the demand, the state or institutions that represent globalization are figured as illegitimate, as morally and politically compromised because of their misdeeds. Here there is an assertion of agency, but because the assertion of agency is simultaneously a deferral of desire, the identity produced in the hysterical demand is not only intimately tied to but is ultimately dependent on the continuing existence of the state, hegemonic order, or institution.

#### 8. Framework is a power play and forced choice to either play by their rules or lose. They open a small space of inclusion just to discipline us, while leaving exclusion in debate intact- using the state appropriates our argument for its own agenda

Aidid 15 [Safia, PhD candidate in African History at Harvard University. Her research focuses on Ethiopia and the Somali region. “After #CadaanStudies,” December 4, 2015 The New Inquiry <http://thenewinquiry.com/essays/after-cadaanstudies/> c.shack]

The original concerns and stakes of #CadaanStudies were abstracted, sanitized and made palatable in the statement. #CadaanStudies itself was renamed as “The Whose Voice debate” to remove any reference to race, as though the intervention simply raised questions of identity and perspective, rather than offered an analysis interrogating how systems of power, histories of racialization and Eurocentric concerns shape knowledge production in Somali Studies. The statement added that SSIA organizers “hope to start a tradition of reflecting on the field of Somali Studies with the aim of improving and developing it as a field that is more relevant, robust, and ethical in the knowledge it produces” and that their document is “the beginning of a conversation,” erasing the intellectual labour of the young Somali scholars who began the conversation months earlier. I joined the listserv and told them that, in a statement of my own. A day before the Congress was to convene, I received an email from the organizing committee, letting me know that they had reconsidered and asked if I would be willing to participate in a debate. I would be given seven minutes as the first of three speakers, along with a Finnish researcher and committee member, and a third participant to be decided and announced by organizers. Though I knew the main organizer of the Congress personally, having met her several times during her research in Toronto, it was a Somali woman directed to email me on behalf of the committee. I agreed to be part of a panel if the third speaker would be a young Somali scholar who has been involved from the beginning. When concerns that the panel would no longer be inclusive as a result were expressed, I declined to participate. They said they were sorry, but that the panel would go on without me. Power works through management and control. It draws you into its field and forces you to play by its rules, giving you forced choices within the confines of the only options made available to you. It sustains itself by opening up impossibly tiny spaces for inclusion, disciplining you until you are made to fit, while leaving the structures of exclusion intact. It operates under the facade of acceptance, masking the refusal, the resistance. Inclusion in these instances exists only to reinforce and diversify the never-changing norm. We refused to play. The morning of my flight to Helsinki, I receive a threatening anonymous email in defense of the SSIA Congress. It is the third “we’ll see you in Helsinki” email I receive, all from throwaway email accounts. “You’re a liar who is portraying herself to be someone who is not, a “scholar”? Rubbish. Why do you think you should the one to dedicate who should be in the panel of speakers?” “We hope that you enjoy Finland, and provide us with a solid argument to hear what the hashtag you created is all about.” “We really hope to see you at the Finland conference.” Power works through intimidation and harassment. At the opening reception that evening, Congress organizers announce that they had met and decided to give me and Ahmed, the other young Somali scholar, the full roundtable. We are to present on the last day, and they congratulate themselves for “taking the discussion forward constructively.” Power works to absorb critique and appropriate ideas and concepts as its own. Ahmed and I managed to find a few minutes away from the conference the day before to strategize and think together about the main points we needed to get across at our last minute roundtable. We decide to focus on explaining that #CadaanStudies is an argument about systems and structural relations of power in knowledge production about the Somali territories. We make a point to emphasize that our analysis cannot be reduced to individual identities or identity politics, as has so often been claimed in order to derail the substance of our intervention. From our backgrounds as Africanists in anthropology and history, we also wanted to remind Somali Studies that many of these critiques were made decades ago in other area studies fields, and that Somali Studies has yet to catch up. We are both PhD students. Ahmed has recently returned from a year and a half of fieldwork in Mogadishu and has two presentations of his own in Helsinki; I have flown here from weeks in the archives in London, with papers to present in Helsinki and Warsaw, where Ethiopian Studies is scheduled to meet a few days later. I think of how unfair it is that we are in this position at the most vulnerable stage of our academic careers, to have to deal with the hostility and refusal of organizers for months, to be thrown on to the program days earlier and forced to speak under the worst conditions, to carry the burden of having to explain power and positionality to senior scholars unwilling to listen. I wondered how the same people now speaking of the importance and need to discuss power and knowledge production in Somali Studies could lack such self-awareness. How could they not see themselves as reenacting the very institutional relations of power we were talking about? It reminded me of a Somali saying: baadida ninba kula deydey oo daalna ka badine oon doonihayn inaad heshaa daa’in abidkaaye. There are people who will exhaust themselves trying to help you find your lost stock, who will gesture and pretend to be interested in helping, but not want you to find anything you are looking for. One of the editors of the Somaliland Journal of African Studies, the academic journal with no Somali people, belatedly enters the conversations on #CadaanStudies months later by publishing an article describing the critique as a “a quarrel” and “ill-mannered bickering.” He prefaces his piece by saying he is taking a “constructive approach” on “how to transform Somali Studies.” He accuses me of reverse racism and simple-minded advocacy for “racial quotas in Somali Studies,” and proceeds to appropriate points I’ve made elsewhere to analyze systems of power shaping knowledge produced about Somalis and argue for the need to decolonize Somali Studies. Somalis, after all, are incapable of using ideas responsibly and must be instructed on how to do so. Somalis don’t think or engage productively; they essentialize and they bicker. An Italian anthropologist comments to tell him the piece is problematic, and why. “I tried to say: let us acknowledge the privileged position in the knowledge we produce, all of us (Safia, you, I). The three of us are ‘whites’ vis-a-vis any student in Somaliland,” he responds. I am now whatever he says. First no one was guilty, now we are all guilty. I am talking to a small group of colleagues in the hallway, a few minutes before a keynote lecture is scheduled to begin at the Somali Studies Congress. It is two lectures combined into one hour, a last-minute change Helsinki organizers have made in order to make space for the one hour roundtable on #CadaanStudies. There are five keynote lectures on the program, one for each day of the Congress. Two of the keynotes are members of the organizing committee, and they have agreed to shorten their talks and speak for 30 minutes each, instead of the original full hour. An organizer touches my arm, drawing me away from the conversation. “You should attend the keynotes downstairs,” she says. “It is happening this way because of your roundtable.” We heard from the side that we should take it up, but take up what? Take up the quarrel? No. Let us move forward constructively. Why break the window? \*\*\* “Can everyone hear me?” I am soft-spoken and conscious that my voice may not carry throughout the room, so I speak into the microphone louder than I am used to normally speaking. I choose my words carefully and speak with clarity and precision, because I don’t expect to be heard here in Helsinki. The room is full. A young Finnish Somali woman writing an article on #CadaanStudies and the SSIA Congress for a Helsinki newspaper asks for our permission to record audio of the roundtable, and we agree. It is a public event in a public venue, and we later post the audio online and circulate it on social media, in the spirit of accessibility, transparency and democratizing the spaces in which knowledge is produced. A Somali woman in the audience raises her hand to ask a question after our presentations, and directs it instead to Helsinki SSIA organizers. She asks them why it took so long to include this discussion, and why they were so unwilling to make space for #CadaanStudies. A Finnish organizer responds to her, while speaking to me. The tone that appeared was very aggressive and we didn’t want to have that kind of fight here. What we were expecting was some kind of contact, direct contact… we heard from the side that we should take it up, but take up what? Take up the quarrel? No. What we did finally end up with is this… I think that it could have been initiated in our direction differently by making contact directly with organizers. The way you were doing it, like I said to you yesterday… that it was sort of, breaking the window when the door was not locked. And I think it could have made for a more easy inclusion in the program. Let’s take the discussion forward constructively. Later, over the listserv, the German anthropologist shares the link to the audio of the #CadaanStudies roundtable and publicly calls my ethics into question for not having asked the audience, unidentifiable in the audio, for their permission to record. A Finnish researcher and Congress organizer agrees with him. Neither asks for the audio to be removed, but simply use the listserv as an opportunity to discipline and discredit, to instruct us on what is ethically appropriate. Listserv members read and remain silent while senior academics engage in the academic bullying of a graduate student. The listserv concern for maintaining “the spirit of not hurting anyone in person” does not extend to young Somali women. We are not angry, though we have every right to be. We are exhausted, though we cannot afford to be. \*\*\* I am in Warsaw for the 19th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, beginning the day after Somali Studies concludes its meeting in Helsinki. It is a relief to be here, away from their aggression, away from their racist fantasies of me, the raw Somali, the rebellious native bent on destruction, the angry, emotional, irrational Somali woman spoiling the party for the detached, objective, serious, academic researchers. I feel safe here. Like the Somali Studies International Association Congress, Ethiopian Studies meets every three years, with every other conference held in Ethiopia. I meet colleagues who have been following #CadaanStudies and express their support, and I recognize names from the solidarity section of our open letter. We discuss how the critiques resonate with Ethiopian Studies and many other area studies fields in varying degrees, and how they find the state of Somali Studies particularly appalling. I am at a dinner reception when an older European man who was not at my table previously appears next to me. When the conversation pauses, he interrupts to remark that I look Somali. I tell him I am, and immediately feel uncomfortable and on guard. I have so far been mistaken as Ethiopian at this conference, and I don’t buy that he has a special ability to differentiate between Habesha and Somali that even the Ethiopians at the conference do not have. I am not wearing my name tag, but I am certain that I am speaking to someone who knows me. “My wife is Somali. Most of my family is Somali, which is why it’s interesting when some people say only Somali people can speak about Somali things,” he says. “What is your name?” he asks with a smirk. I realize the man I am speaking to is the academic who wrote to my professor about me. I am that lady. “Oh! So it was YOU who unleashed all of that on Markus!”’ Not knowing I have seen the email exchange, he tells me that my professor was quick to withdraw his support after he let him know that it was nonsense. He laughs at me when I tell him that’s not true, and says he will forward me the emails immediately. He never does. He tells me about the #CadaanStudies tweets he hated the most, like the one with a Somali man saying it is inappropriate that he was asked his clan as part of an NGO job interview. I ask all my Somali students their clans, he says, to keep them safe. He laughs at me again when I say I agree with the tweet. Uncomfortable with the tension and unwilling to intervene or speak up for a young graduate student being harassed by a senior scholar in their presence, one by one my white colleagues disappear from the table, and I am alone. I excuse myself, and leave the conference early. This is how power works. It seeks to silence and discredit the individuals who challenge it. It seeks to order the terms of discourse and engagement. It seeks to dismiss analysis as unproductive, unconstructive and unacademic. It seeks to frame critique as emotional, angry and aggressive. It does all of these things in order to put you back in your place for daring to speak. Everything #CadaanStudies has analyzed about power and the ways in which it manifests itself in knowledge production about Somalis and the Somali territories historically and in the present has played out in the reaction to it by non-Somali scholars and practitioners in Somali Studies. Everything I have experienced as the young Somali female graduate student initiator of #CadaanStudies over the last few months is testament to the validity of the critique.

**9. Passivity DA** – **asking, "what should the government do?" eclipses questions of what we would do as simply ourselves. This creates a spectator mentality that perpetuates stasis.**

**Kappeler 95** (Susanne, Associate Professor at Al-Akhawayn University, The Will to Violence: The politics of personal behavior***,*** Pg. 10- 11)

Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into **thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all**, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, **it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events**, or to **recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions**. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally, and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers, For we tend to think that we cannot 'do' anything. say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why **many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics**, in the style of **'what would I do if I were the general**, the prime minister, **the president**, the foreign minister or the minister of defense?' Since **we** seem to **regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses** tend to **dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities'**: what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like 'I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '**We are this war'**, however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in co-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, **in our non-comprehension': our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer**. And **we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't'**- our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others.' **We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according: to the structures and the values of war and violence.**

#### That makes extinction inevitable.

Beres, 94 (Louis Rene, Professor of International Law in the Department of Political Science at Purdue University, Spring, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, Lexis)

By surrendering ourselves to States and to traditional views of self-determination, **we encourage** not immortality but **premature and predictable extinction**. It is a relationship that can, and must, be more widely understood. There are great ironies involved. Although the corrosive calculus of geopolitics as now made possible the deliberate killing of all life, populations all over the planet turn increasingly to States for security. It is the **dreadful ingenuity of States that makes possible death in the billions**, but it is in the expressions of that ingenuity that people seek safety. Indeed, **as the threat of nuclear annihilation looms** even after the Cold War, n7 1 the **citizens of conflicting States reaffirm their segmented loyalties**, moved by the persistent unreason that is, after all, the most indelible badge of modern humankind.

### AT Limits

#### 1. No offense to predictable limits, as long as both sides have sufficient ground limits only serve to kill education by eliminating the need for critical thinking. All topical Affs do is allow people to read from pre-written blocks without actually thinking about the debate round.

#### 2. Mummification DA impact turns this.

### AT Ground

#### We maximize Neg ground – they can read literally anything they want, as long as they can justify it.

### AT Predictability

#### 1. We are predictable – the Aff’s been disclosed for months.

#### 2. No offense to this – we give them so much ground that all they have to do is think critically.

#### 3. Mummification DA turns this; a little unpredictability is good.

### AT Aff Condo

#### 1. Lolwut, we have an advocacy in the 1AC, and we said it was unconditional.

#### 2. Condo inevitable – straight up Affs can kick out of advantages and read impact add-ons.

#### 3. CX checks – it’s pretty easy to clarify the advocacy of the affirmative.

#### 4. Reciprocity- if the negative is conditional and can switch their advocacies, the affirmative needs to have lee-way on perms to prevent the Aff from getting hijacked.

### AT Mouffe

#### 1. Cede the political makes no sense – we’re debaters in a room, there’s no brink, no right wing takeover. This is the perfect space in which to evaluate our epistemologies.

#### 2. This ev assumes that we want to create progressive political change, which we don’t.

#### 3. Prefer specificity – in the specific instance of the Aff it is key to take a step back from the political and re-evaluate our mindset, this doesn’t necessitate all liberals doing it.

#### 4. No link – the alt could be used by politicians.

#### 5. Non-unique – debaters have been reading K’s since the 70’s and the community is still liberal as fuck.

#### 6. Non-unique – the right wing has already taken over and it wasn’t debate’s fault – if anything we helped make people more liberal and should read even more K’s.

### AT Switch Side Debate

#### 1. Offense is non-unique: if our arg belongs on the neg, then they should be prepared to debate it anyway, means no ground, predictability, or fairness loss.

#### 2. Aff choice solves: aff choice means you get to switch side too. Net benefit is that they otherwise moot 8 minutes of the Aff speech.

#### 3. Apathy DA: allows us to justify any atrocity because we have learned to “see the other side.”

#### 4. Neo-con DA: Switch side is the worst education – teaches debaters how to become neocons. This disempowers struggles of the oppressed as they are assumed by democratic decision-making.

#### 5. Nietzsche DA: Switch side debate leads to a politics of superficiality – we role-play as a vast range of conflicting actors, hoping to gain real-world education but instead lock ourselves into cycles of simulation that erode any actual identity or connection to reality. The impact is Ted Cruz, an emotionless sacrifice of ethics at the altar of our aleatory scripts.

Antonio, Robert J. “Nietzsche's Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History.” American Journal of Sociology, vol. 101, no. 1, 1995, pp. 1–43. [www.jstor.org/stable/2782505](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2782505). WC

The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrications to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, [and] decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by ~~paralyzing~~ overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? 12 The important passages on actor and role in The Gay Science were added to the second edition in 1887 and, thus, reflect Nietzsche's mature thought. 14 Nietzsche's Antisociology A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely astring to throttle all culture. ... Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning~~, cringing,~~ arrogant, all according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great ~~man~~ of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severelya god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

### AT: You make it hard to be Neg

#### 1. No we don’t, you have tons of ground.

#### 2. Even if we do that’s a good thing – forces critical thinking and high quality debate.

#### 3. Mummification DA turns this – trying to avoid challenges kills any sort of education and makes life meaningless.

#### 4. We outweigh – it’s better to have a meaningful debate than an easy debate because it creates real-world benefits and if you really want easy debates than switch to PF.

## AT Marx

### If They Read Framework

#### This is a methods debate, we don’t care if cap is good or bad, but only if their alt is effective.

#### 1. Cross-apply the same case extensions as on framework – they specifically take out Marx because:

####  a. The Neg’s seeming radical alt is still locked into the progress-based mindset that guarantees serial policy failure through the death drive, that means if we can win the Aff it turns the alt.

####  b. They only interact with conscious knowledge, means they can’t actually solve.

####  c. Their projection of a utopian, Marxist society links into the genocidal mindset arg – that’s a pre-fiat reason to reject them.

####  d. The Mills evidence create a solvency deficit because any theory that doesn't fully account for the death drive inevitably fails.

### If Just Marx

#### 1. Cross-apply the case extensions I just explained made – they have 4 implications on the framework flow:

####  a. The first three McGowan cards turn framework because the Neg is locked into a policy-making mindset that inevitably fails.

####  b. The conscious and unconscious arg (that’s the 7th McGowan card) is a solvency deficit because to their interp because they preclude interaction with the unconscious, and thus can’t truly solve.

####  c. McGowan 4 (in Contention 2), proves that the mindset of their framework perpetuates oppression and genocide because they force us into projecting better future world, that’s a pre-fiat reason to reject them.

####  d. The first two pieces of Mills evidence create a solvency deficit because any theory that doesn't fully account for the death drive inevitably fails.

### Shell

#### 2. Perm do both – double bind. We’re proving that psychoanalysis is the only way to break out of cycles of failure, means if they can win that the perm is impossible it also dooms their K.

#### 3. They don’t account for the psychological structures that produce capitalist exploitation in the first place – means our K is a pre-requisite, otherwise the alt collapses into utopianism.

Hunter 11 [Mark Hunter is Professor of Humanities at St. Petersburg College. June 21, 2011 To Attack Capitalism Is To Attack Human Nature <http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2011/06/21/to_attack_capitalism_is_to_attack_human_nature_99087.html>]

McCarraher's denunciation of capitalism is in fact an attack on human nature [in] disguised as political discourse. The "pernicious" traits he attributes to capitalism are, in fact, traits globally present in every political/social order-in many cases far worse in non-capitalistic societies-because they are traits of humanity itself. His entire argument against capitalism consists of nothing more than an elaborate correlation-proves-causation fallacy (cum hoc ergo propter hoc - "with this, therefore because of this"). He wants us to believe that since capitalism contains greed it causes greed. Furthermore, McCarraher seems content to overlook the fact that capitalism is an organic economic system not created as much as evolving naturally as a consequence of free individuals interacting with other free individuals. Private property and the production of goods may be a part of capitalism, but its most essential virtue is as a guardian of man's freedom. Criticizing capitalism for its avarice is not unlike condemning representative democracy for its failure to elect the wisest of men - each may occur, but it is not relevant to their fundamental purpose. Both capitalism and representative democracy maximize freedom by diffusing power and responsibility across the broadest spectrum of society. Rigid control is antithetical to freedom and it is this that most vexes the liberal intellectual. What McCarraher is unwilling to come to terms with is that his inherent criticism of capitalism is not so much an indictment of capitalism but rather a revealing supposition he is making about humanity itself. His attack on capitalism masks a general contempt for a free people who in his worldview will inevitably choose a path of greed and avarice unless a coercive political order prevents it. Therefore, any liberal political/economic system proposed to replace capitalism must have at its core a process through which the masses are controlled and coerced to overcome the human attributes so abhorred by the liberal intellectual that he wrongly attributes to capitalism rather than people. McCarraher presents the reader with a moral crusade cleverly cloaked as political theory. He sees the Deadly Sins ever present in modern capitalism, and like the fourth century ascetic Evagrius Ponticus, McCarraher seems particularly obsessed with man's rapacious gluttony. While capitalism's natural and organic nature is condemned for its "deliberate nurturance of our vilest qualities" he fails to put forth the ramifications of the artificial and contrived alternative. The progressive alternative to capitalism must of necessity resemble Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor because the crux of the matter for both modern liberals and Dostoyevsky is human freedom. The infinite variety that is millions of people making millions of decisions to reflect their own self interest needs to be replaced with a 21st century Ubermensch or new political aristocracy that is able to impose on the masses a sin-free, enlightened order. Redemption comes through man's inability to choose the indulgence of sin, and as such the anointed elite - having removed man's freedom - become the deliverers of man's salvation by taking upon themselves the burden of choice. Mankind, now being absolved of the burden of freedom, can live content without the anxiety of responsibility. However beautiful the veneer of his lofty rhetoric, this "Wellspring" is in the end enslavement. The only way to deliver mankind from the demon Mammon will be by removing the greatest gift of the gods - freedom. In this Faustian exchange we are guaranteed the Marxist security of bread, authoritarian certainty of order and utopian unity of world government. Far from new, McCarraher's Wellspring of Radical Hope is one more self-righteous proclamation by a moral prig intent on delivering mankind to elusive Olympian heights. Beyond the rhetoric, one suspects this experiment would end as other such utopian pursuits have concluded in history - hopeless.

#### **4. Psychoanalysis turns Marxism – no matter how hard they try they just repeat the failures of Stalinism and increase suffering.**

McGowan, Todd. Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis. Lincoln, U of Nebraska P, 2013. WC

While Freud expresses sympathy with the Russian Revolution and contends that it seemed “like the message of a better future,” he continually emphasizes the intractable barriers that [the Russian Revolution] any project of emancipatory politics would encounter.2 About the Soviet Union in particular, he speculatively grasps the incipient horrors of Stalinism at a time when no one in the West had any direct knowledge of them (and the worst had yet to occur). In Civilization and Its Discontents he notes, “One only wonders, with concern, what the Soviets will do after they’ve wiped out their bourgeois.”3 This is a psychoanalytic insight into the nature of the emancipatory political project that pursues the good society. For Freud, the Soviet attempt to create a better future not only chases an impossible goal, but it also exacerbates existing human suffering. It is not simply Freud’s personal judgment or prejudice that renders this verdict and installs an incompatibility between psychoanalytic thought and progressive political programs; this incompatibility inheres within the very psychoanalytic approach to the world.

#### 5. Orthodox Marxism will only make cap stronger – history proves.

Newman 2007. (Anarchism, Poststructuralism and the Future of Radical Politics, Saul Newman PhD University of New South Wales 1998, is a Senior Lecturer in Politics at Goldsmiths University of London. <http://muse.jhu.edu.lib-proxy.fullerton.edu/journals/substance/v036/36.2newman.html>)

The state remains one of the central and most persistent problems of radical politics. Revolutions in the past have attempted to seize state power with the view to its eventual "withering away;" however, the result has often been a strengthening and expansion of the state, and with it a repression of the very revolutionary forces that sought to control it. This is the problem that I have termed the "place of power"—the structural imperative of the state to perpetuate itself even in moments of [End Page 4] revolutionary upheaval. Alain Badiou also sees this problem as being of fundamental importance: More precisely, we must ask the question that, without a doubt, constitutes the great enigma of the century: why does the subsumption of politics, either through the form of the immediate bond (the masses), or the mediate bond (the party) ultimately give rise to bureaucratic submission and the cult of the State? In other words, perhaps there is something in the political forms that revolutions have taken in the past that led to the perpetuation of the state. We might recall that this was the same problem that classical anarchists during the nineteenth century confronted in their debates with Marx. Anarchists like Mikhail Bakunin warned of the dangers of a workers' revolution that sought not to dismantle the state, but to seize control of it and use it to complete the revolution. He predicted that this would end up in the emergence of a new bureaucratic class of technocrats who would exploit and oppress workers and peasants, much in the same way as the old class system did (Bakunin 1973: 266).

#### 6. Perm do the Aff then the Neg – legit no reason why it can’t happen, and it solves best because we need to first target the death drive otherwise their alt fails.

#### 7. No link – two warrants:

 **a. No reason changing our mindset exacerbates capitalism – at best the link is a description of the world in which the Aff takes place, which isn’t a link.**

 **b. Psychoanalysis could happen just as easily in a communist society.**

#### 8. Historical materialism is a joke, it:

 **A: Doesn’t preclude the Aff.**

 **B: Has no internal link to real-world change.**

#### 9. Not only will attempts to transition away from cap fail, but they guarantee environmental apocalypse.

Parenti, Ph.D. in Sociology from the London School of Economics, 13

[Christian, 06-28-11, Climate and Capitalism, “Review: Tropic of Chaos: Climate Change and the New Geography of Violence”, <http://climateandcapitalism.com/2011/09/14/tropic-of-chaos-climate-change-and-the-new-geography-of-violence/>, 07-13-14, TCT]

There is one last imperative question. Several strands of green thinking maintain that capitalism is incapable of arriving at a sustainable relationship with nature because, as an economic system, capitalism must grow exponentially, while the earth is finite. You will find this argument in the literature of ecosocialism, deep ecology, and ecoanarchism. The same argument is often cast by liberal greens in deeply ahistorical and antitheoretical terms that, while critical of the economic system, often decline to name it. Back in the early 1970s, the Club of Rome’s book Limits to Growth fixated on the dangers of “growth" but largely avoided explaining why capitalism needs growth or how growth is linked to private ownership, profits, and interfirm competition. Whether these literatures describe the problem as “modern industrial society," “the growth cult," or the profit system, they often have a similar takeaway: we need a totally different economic system if we are to live in balance with nature. Some of the first to make such an argument were Marx and Engels. They came to their ecology through examining the local problem of relations between town and country—which was expressed simultaneously as urban pollution and rural soil depletion. In exploring this question they relied on the pioneering work of soil chemist Justus von Liebig. And from this small- scale problem, they developed the idea of capitalism’s overall “metabolic rift” with nature. Here is how Marx explained the dilemma: Capitalist production collects the population together in great centres, and causes the urban population to achieve an ever-growing preponderance. This has two results. On the one hand it concentrates the historical motive force of society; on the other hand, it disturbs the metabolic interaction between man and the earth, i.e. it prevents the return to the soil of its constituent elements consumed by man in the form of food and clothing; hence it hinders the operation of the eternal natural condition for the lasting fertility of the soil .... All progress in capitalist agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the worker, but of robbing the soil. From that grew the Marxist belief that capitalism, as a whole, is irreconcilably in contradiction with nature; that the economic system creates a rift in the balance of exchanges, or metabolism, connecting human society and natural systems. As with “soil robbing," so too with forests, fish stocks, water supplies, genetic inheritance, biodiversity, and atmospheric CO2 concentrations. The natural systems are out of sync; their elements are being rearranged and redistributed, ending up as garbage and pollution. As Mary Douglas, paraphrasing William James, put it, “Uncleanliness is matter out of place.”At a large enough scale, that disruption of elements threatens environmental catastrophe. It may be true: capitalism may be, ultimately, incapable of accommodating itself to the limits of the natural world. However, that is not the same question as whether capitalism can solve the climate crisis. Because of its magnitude, the climate crisis can appear as if it is the combination of all environmental crises—overexploitation of the seas, deforestation, overexploitation of freshwater, soil erosion, species and habitat loss, chemical contamination, and genetic contamination due to transgenic bioengineering. But halting greenhouse gas emissions is a much more specific problem; it is only one piece of the apocalyptic panorama. Though all these problems are connected, the most urgent and all encompassing of them is anthropogenic climate change. The fact of the matter is time has run out on the climate issue. Either capitalism solves the crisis or it destroys civilization. Capitalism begins to deal with the crisis now, or we face civilizational collapse beginning this century. We cannot wait for a socialist, or communist, or anarchist, or deep- ecology, neoprimitiverevolution; nor for a nostalgia-based localista conversion back to the mythical small-town economy of preindustrial America as some advocate. In short, we cannot wait to transform everything—including how we create energy. Instead, we must begin immediately transforming the energy economy. Other necessary changes can and will flow from that. Hopeless? No. If we put aside the question of capitalism’s limits and deal only with greenhouse gas emissions, the problem looks less daunting. While capitalism has not solved the environmental crisis—meaning the fundamental conflict between the infinite growth potential of the market and the finite parameters of the planet— it has, in the past, solved specific environmental crises. The sanitation movement of the Progressive Era is an example. By the 1830s, industrial cities had become perfect incubators of epidemic disease, particularly cholera and yellow fever. Like climate change today, these diseases hit the poor hardest, but they also sickened and killed the wealthy. Class privilege offered some protection, but it was not a guarantee of safety. And so it was that middle-class do-gooder goo-goos and mugwumps began a series of reforms that contained and eventually defeated the urban epidemics. First, the filthy garbage-eating hogs were banned from city streets, then public sanitation programs of refuse collection began, sewers were built, safe public water provided, housing codes were developed and enforced. And, eventually, the epidemics of cholera stopped. So, too, were other infectious diseases, like pulmonary tuberculosis, typhus, and typhoid, largely eliminated. Thus, at the scale of the urban, capitalist society solved an environmental crisis through planning and public investment. Climate change is a problem on an entirely different order of magnitude, but past solutions to smaller environmental crises offer lessons. Ultimately, solving the climate crisis—like the nineteenth- century victory over urban squalor and epidemic contagions—will require a relegitimation of the state’s role in the economy. We will need planning and downward redistribution of wealth. And, as I have sketched out above, there are readily available ways to address the crisis immediately—if we make the effort to force our political leaders to act. We owe such an effort to people like Ekaru Loruman, who are already suffering and dying on the front lines of the catastrophic convergence, and to the next generation, who will inherit the mess. And, we owe it to ourselves.

#### 10. Alt fails and causes ressentiment – pre-fiat reason to reject the team and don’t let them sever out of their epistemologies.

Connolly 11

(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)

But such cinematic labors of the negative are not sufficient; they certainly do not suffice to promote positive attachment to this world. Even a "negative dialectic" does not suffice. If things are left there, the embers of ressentiment can easily become more inflamed. That is one reason Deleuze is never happy with negative critique alone: the next task is to highlight how our participation in a world of real creativity that also finds expression elsewhere in the universe depends on and draws from such fugitive interruptions. To put it too starkly (for situational nuances and adjustments are pertinent here), the more people who experience a positive connection between modes of interruption and the possibility of our modest participation as individuals, constituencies, states, and a species in creative processes extending beyond us, the more apt we are to embrace the new temporal experiences around us as valuable parts of existence as such. Certainly, absent a world catastrophe or a repressive revolution that would create worse havoc than the conditions it seeks to roll back, these consummate features of late‑modem life are not apt to dissipate soon. The fastest zones of late‑modem life, for instance, are not apt to slow down in the absence of a catastrophe that transforms everything. So the radical task is to find ways to strengthen the connection between the fundamental terms of late‑modem existence and positive attachment to life as such. **This should be accomplished not by embracing exploitation and suffering, but by challenging them as we come to terms with the larger trends.**

**11. In their attempts to resolve capitalism, they willfully ignore the thousands of other K’s that try the exact same thing. Their political affect has failed time and again but their response is to engage in the same revolutionary strategy that was beaten before – they keep dropping pebbles into the jar, so why haven't they had anything to drink? Nadia C. knows:**

CrimthInc 13(Ex workers collective, “Your Politics Are Boring As Fuck”, <http://www.crimethinc.com/texts/atoz/asfuck.php>)

Face it, your politics are boring as fuck. You know it's true. Otherwise, why does everyone cringe when you say the word? Why has attendance at your anarcho-communist theory discussion group meetings fallen to an all-time low? Why has the oppressed proletariat not come to its senses and joined you in your fight for world liberation? Perhaps, after years of struggling to educate them about their victimhood, you have come to blame them for their condition. They must want to be ground under the heel of capitalist imperialism; otherwise, why do they show no interest in your political causes? Why haven't they joined you yet in chaining yourself to mahogany furniture, chanting slogans at carefully planned and orchestrated protests, and frequenting anarchist bookshops? Why haven't they sat down and learned all the terminology necessary for a genuine understanding of the complexities of Marxist economic theory? The truth is, your politics are boring to them because they [it] really are [is] irrelevant. They know that your antiquated styles of protest—your marches, hand held signs, and gatherings—are now powerless to effect real change because they have become such a predictable part of the status quo. They know that your post-Marxist jargon is off-putting because it really is a language of mere academic dispute, not a weapon capable of undermining systems of control. They know that your infighting, your splinter groups and endless quarrels over ephemeral theories can never effect any real change in the world they experience from day to day. They know that no matter who is in office, what laws are on the books, what "ism"s the intellectuals march under, the content of their lives will remain the same. They—we—know that our boredom is proof that these "politics" are not the key to any real transformation of life. For our lives are boring enough already! And you know it too. For how many of you is politics a responsibility? Something you engage in because you feel you should, when in your heart of hearts there are a million things you would rather be doing? Your volunteer work—is it your most favorite pastime, or do you do it out of a sense of obligation? Why do you think it is so hard to motivate others to volunteer as you do? Could it be that it is, above all, a feeling of guilt that drives you to fulfill your "duty" to be politically active? Perhaps you spice up your "work" by trying (consciously or not) to get in trouble with the authorities, to get arrested: not because it will practically serve your cause, but to make things more exciting, to recapture a little of the romance of turbulent times now long past. Have you ever felt that you were participating in a ritual, a long-established tradition of fringe protest, that really serves only to strengthen the position of the mainstream? Have you ever secretly longed to escape from the stagnation and boredom of your political "responsibilities"? It's no wonder that no one has joined you in your political endeavors. Perhaps you tell yourself that it's tough, thankless work, but somebody's got to do it. The answer is, well, NO. You actually do us all a real disservice with your tiresome, tedious politics. For in fact, there is nothing more important than politics. NOT the politics of American "democracy" and law, of who is elected state legislator to sign the same bills and perpetuate the same system. Not the politics of the "I got involved with the radical left because I enjoy quibbling over trivial details and writing rhetorically about an unreachable utopia" anarchist. Not the politics of any leader or ideology that demands that you make sacrifices for "the cause." But the politics of our everyday lives. When you separate politics from the immediate, everyday experiences of individual ~~men and women~~[people], it becomes completely irrelevant. Indeed, it becomes the private domain of wealthy, comfortable intellectuals, who can trouble themselves with such dreary, theoretical things. When you involve yourself in politics out of a sense of obligation, and make political action into a dull responsibility rather than an exciting game that is worthwhile for its own sake, you scare away people whose lives are already far too dull for any more tedium. When you make politics into a lifeless thing, a joyless thing, a dreadful responsibility, it becomes just another weight upon people, rather than a means to lift weight from people. And thus you ruin the idea of politics for the people to whom it should be most important. For everyone has a stake in considering their lives, in asking themselves what they want out of life and how they can get it. But you make politics look to them like a miserable, self-referential, pointless middle class/bohemian game, a game with no relevance to the real lives they are living out. What should be political? Whether we enjoy what we do to get food and shelter. Whether we feel like our daily interactions with our friends, neighbors, and coworkers are fulfilling. Whether we have the opportunity to live each day the way we desire to. And "politics" should consist not of merely discussing these questions, but of acting directly to improve our lives in the immediate present. Acting in a way that is itself entertaining, exciting, joyous—because political action that is tedious, tiresome, and oppressive can only perpetuate tedium, fatigue, and oppression in our lives. No more time should be wasted debating over issues that will be irrelevant when we must go to work again the next day. No more predictable ritual protests that the authorities know all too well how to deal with; no more boring ritual protests which will not sound like a thrilling way to spend a Saturday afternoon to potential volunteers—clearly, those won't get us anywhere. Never again shall we "sacrifice ourselves for the cause." For we ourselves, happiness in our own lives and the lives of our fellows, must be our cause! After we make politics relevant and exciting, the rest will follow. But from a dreary, merely theoretical and/or ritualized politics, nothing valuable can follow. This is not to say that we should show no interest in the welfare of humans, animals, or ecosystems that do not contact us directly in our day to day existence. But the foundation of our politics must be concrete: it must be immediate, it must be obvious to everyone why it is worth the effort, it must be fun in itself. How can we do positive things for others if we ourselves do not enjoy our own lives? To make this concrete for a moment: an afternoon of collecting food from businesses that would have thrown it away and serving it to hungry people and people who are tired of working to pay for food—that is good political action, but only if you enjoy it. If you do it with your friends, if you meet new friends while you're doing it, if you fall in love or trade funny stories or just feel proud to have helped a woman by easing her financial needs, that's good political action. On the other hand, if you spend the afternoon typing an angry letter to an obscure leftist tabloid objecting to a columnist's use of the term "anarcho-syndicalist," that's not going to accomplish shit, and you know it. Perhaps it is time for a new word for "politics," since you have made such a swear word out of the old one. For no one should be put off when we talk about acting together to improve our lives. And so we present to you our demands, which are non-negotiable, and must be met as soon as possible—because we're not going to live forever, are we? 1. Make politics relevant to our everyday experience of life again. The farther away the object of our political concern, the less it will mean to us, the less real and pressing it will seem to us, and the more wearisome politics will be. 2. All political activity must be joyous and exciting in itself. You cannot escape from dreariness with more dreariness. 3. To accomplish those first two steps, entirely new political approaches and methods must be created. The old ones are outdated, outmoded. Perhaps they were NEVER any good, and that's why our world is the way it is now. 4. Enjoy yourselves! There is never any excuse for being bored . . . or boring! Join us in making the "revolution" a game; a game played for the highest stakes of all, but a joyous, carefree game nonetheless!

#### 12. Alt fails – movement’s too small, elite backlash, no material interests

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(Uri, Anarchist Economics in Practice in The Accumulation of Freedom, pg. 215)

On the one hand, the anarchist movement is so small that even its most consistent and visible efforts are but a drop in the ocean. On the other hand, political elites have proven themselves extremely proficient at pulling the ground from under movements for social change, be it through direct repression and demonization of the activists, diversion of public attention to security and nationalist agendas, or, at best, minimal concessions that ameliorate the most exploitative aspects of capitalism while contributing to the resilience of the system as a whole. It would seem that ethical commitments to social justice and the enhancement of human freedom can only serve as a motivation for a comparatively small number of people, and that **without the presence of genuine material interests among large sections of the population there is little hope for a mass movement to emerge that would herald the departure from existing social, economic, and political arrangements**.

#### 16. Transition Wars Double Bind: Either the alt does nothing or it leads to transition wars that turn their solvency and causes mass death.

Harris, ‘02

[Lee, 12-1-02, “The Intellectual Origins of America-Bashing”, Hoover Institute, http://www.hoover.org/research/intellectual-origins-america-bashing , accessed July 8th, 2016, MJG]

This is the immiserization thesis of Marx. And it is central to revolutionary Marxism, since if capitalism produces no widespread misery, then it also produces no fatal internal contradiction: If everyone is getting better off through capitalism, who will dream of struggling to overthrow it? Only genuine misery on the part of the workers would be sufficient to overturn the whole apparatus of the capitalist state, simply because, as Marx insisted, the capitalist class could not be realistically expected to relinquish control of the state apparatus and, with it, the monopoly of force. In this, Marx was absolutely correct. No capitalist society has ever willingly liquidated itself, and it is utopian to think that any ever will. Therefore, in order to achieve the goal of socialism, nothing short of a complete revolution would do; and this means, in point of fact, a full-fledged civil war not just within one society, but across the globe. Without this catastrophic upheaval, capitalism would remain completely in control of the social order and all socialist schemes would be reduced to pipe dreams.

#### These transition wars only further capitalist suffering and strengthen the system.

Flood, anarchist organizer and writer, 2005

(Andrew, 10/6, anarkismo.net, “Civilization, Primitivism, Anarchism,” <http://www.anarkismo.net/newswire.php?story_id=1451>, 7/13/14, JC)

However it is worth doing a little mental exercise on this idea of the oil running out. If indeed there was no alternative what might happen? Would a primitivist utopia emerge even at the bitter price of 5,900 million people dying? No. The primitivists seem to forget that we live in a class society. The population of the earth is divided into a few people with vast resources and power and the rest of us. It is not a case of equal access to resources, rather of quite incredible unequal access. Those who fell victim to the mass die off would not include Rubert Murdoch, Bill Gates or George Bush because these people [they] have the money and power to monopolise remaining supplies for themselves. Instead the first to die in huge number would be the population of the poorer mega cities on the planet. Cairo and Alexandria in Egypt have a population of around 20 million between them. Egypt is dependent both on food imports and on the very intensive agriculture of the Nile valley and the oasis. Except for the tiny wealthy elite those 20 million urban dwellers would have nowhere to go and there is no more land to be worked. Current high yields are in part dependent on high inputs of cheap energy. The mass deaths of millions of people is not something that destroys capitalism. Indeed at periods of history it has been seen as quite natural and even desirable for the modernization of capital. The potato famine of the 1840's that reduced the population of Ireland by 30% was seen as desirable by many advocates of free trade.(16) So was the 1943/4 famine in British ruled Bengal in which four million died(17). For the capitalist class such mass deaths, particularly in colonies afford opportunities to restructure the economy in ways that would otherwise be resisted. The real result of an 'end of energy' crisis would see our rulers stock piling what energy sources remained and using them to power the helicopter gunships that would be used to control those of us fortunate enough to be selected to toil for them in the biofuel fields. The unlucky majority would just be kept where they are and allowed to die off. More of the 'Matrix' then utopia in other words. The other point to be made here is that destruction can serve to regenerate capitalism. Like it or not large scale destruction allows some capitalist to make a lot of money. Think of the Iraq war. The destruction of the Iraqi infrastructure may be a disaster for the people of Iraq buts it's a profit making bonanza for Halliburton and co[18]. Not coincidentally the Iraq war, is helping the US A, where the largest corporations are based, gain control of the parts of the planet where much future and current oil production takes place.]

#### 17. For all the power they preach, they have none. They are just one more team among a crowd of young optimistic revolutionaries in this event, their Neg another movement lost in the archive. However, their reorientations are imbued with self-righteous optimism that allows the ruling class to dictate the direction of politics.

**Dupont 9** (Dupont, Monsieur: clown, diarist, essayist, correspondent, *Nihilist Communism*. Ardent Press, 2009, 66-73, pilch)

The optimism of revolutionaries

Long ago I felt the utter weariness that religion induced in me. So I abandoned all respect for it. Later in my life I came to the conclusion that ghosts did not ex- ist, that there was no such thing as magic or miracles, and that aliens have never visited planet earth. It took a great weight off my shoulders to come to these conclu- sions. I was reminded of when I had given up allowing for the possibility that a god existed. It is common sense that permits one to come to such decisions. It was once said that “the only true histories are those that have been written by men who have been sincere enough to speak truly about themselves”. Shakespeare said, “This above all: to thine own self be true, and it must follow, as night the day, thou canst not then be false to any man”. If we can look out from our own eyes and judge the world with our own feelings then we will get closer to the truth about things than in any other way. The point of religion, the belief in ghosts or the supernatural, the belief in aliens, all ideology in fact, is to distract people from thinking about, and from, themselves and to make them feel humble and powerless. Instead of basing our world-view on our own experience we are coerced into looking out onto the world through a filter of hope and fear. When I was young, after I had passed through a peri- od of reading that started with tales about King Arthur and ended with the Conan the Barbarian books, I began read- ing serious and great literature. I did not read everything by any means, but I read enough. As a young man I read less; I was in the search for how to actually live my life, which for me meant doing as little work as possible. However, if I had to work I preferred manual labour to anything else. I was a student for a while, to put off inevitabilities. Here I met many Marxist lecturers. In fact, in those days every ac- ademic seemed to be a Marxist of some sort. One of them, a man whose thinning black hair and full, unkempt beard suited his passion for the French Revolution, once said to me that he had given up reading fiction a long time ago. I remember him saying this but do not remember exactly why he said it. Probably it was because I had asked him if he had read some novel or other. Being of an impressiona- ble age and, indeed, nature, I resolved to abandon my silly novel reading. What use was fiction when there were so many factual books around that could tell you more about real life and the forces that shape the world? But I was unsuccessful. I could rarely read factual books; they hung like a dead weight on my hands. (There are a few excep- tions to this rule, I remember, for example, reading with great gusto an academic book I had borrowed from Sydney Library, while lazing by a pool in Fiji, on the Ruhr and its role in the German Revolution.) One of the problems with factual books is that the reader cannot tell if they are telling the truth. For this reason it is no good reading one version of events – you have to read all of them and only then can you attempt to form your own opinion on matters, or give up in despair. This is too tiresome a task for the likes of me, so I tried to find the right interpretations of events by only reading writers I thought were close to my way of thinking. So I read a few obscure political works: anarchist, ultra-left, council communist, Marxist, Situationist, etc. I did not read everything by any means, but I read enough. As I said, I read much less in general than when I was a teenager, but still I was drawn to great novels, and I contin- ued to read them, slowly. The political works I read, the people I was involved with, and the texts I produced myself, although often having some worthy characteristics, **were imbued with an optimism and a faith that bore no relation to the real world that I saw around me.** I had become a kind of politi- cal animal. However, since I never actually lived for any length of time in any political social scene I was always able to critique it from outside. Macho gestures; lack of serious thought; lack of self-reflection; insularity; condescending and do-good impulses better suited to the rigorously alienated world of social work – these were elements I became aware of in the Revolutionary social scene. It seemed to me to be a grave error to see your personal lifestyle, your personal politics, as evidence of genuine revolt. It is also tragically egotistical and, in the end, comic. After a short while all bohemias become restrictive, moralistic, and deadly boring. We cannot escape this society while the fundamental aspects of its continuation are still function- ing, we cannot come up with any real alternatives, beyond half-told dreams, **until the economy comes crashing to a halt**. It is the way the economy of the world works – not to say that it always works perfectly of course – that makes it possible for the ruling class to exercise its power. And the ruling ideas of society are the ideas of the ruling class. And in this democratic and mass world the ruling class provides us with many differing and even competing ideas. By providing us with these false opposites (globalisation/ anti-globalisation, imperialism/anti-imperialism, vegan café/McDonalds, etc) **the ruling classes [it] can ensure that debates are kept on their terrain**, that those with a sense of self-righteousness are kept busy playing the tiresome political games of good versus evil**. These political movements, naturally, never threaten to destroy the economy** (how could they?), they only offer empty threats to refine it or save it. History shows us that **it is not movements that lead to genuinely revolutionary events, it is only complete economic failure and mis-management.** If this occurs, and it was close to happening at the time of World War One, then it may be that the workers in those industries that are essential for the economy to keep running will be forced to take them over. It is at this point that the material basis of society will have altered, and it is now that humanity has the chance to assert itself, and prevent the re-imposition of economics. Where movements are the dominant force in events one will only see a hasty replacement of effec- tive government, a coup d’etat; one will not see the collapse of all sections of the ruling class as all these sections lose control, however temporarily, of the economy. There is a difference between the toppling of political parties in, for example, Serbia in 2001, and the turmoil in society in Eu- rope at the end of WW1. There is a difference, for example, between the toppling of political parties in recent years in the Philippines and the limited events in France in 1968. Apart from my distance from the revolutionary lifestyle I also had an enlightening experience in a postal workers group. This was not really a rank-and-file group, it was mostly a group of political postal workers who wanted to gain some influence over other postal workers and increase tensions at work. (Attempting to expose all anti-worker tendencies at one’s workplace is the nihilist communist’s daily fare – “Cheer up, folks, in a hundred years we’ll all be dead and forgotten!”) It wasn’t long after I joined it that the group began to fall apart. My experi- ences in this group and at work in the delivery office con- vinced me of certain things. I became aware of how those who are for communist revolution should act and behave in workplaces. I also became aware that most of my politi- cal associates did not work, and would not ever work, in any essential industry. This, I felt, helped sustain the cur- rent and general misunderstanding of where the power of the working class lies. On the other hand, simply working in essential industries does not in any way guarantee clar- ity of observation for so-called revolutionaries. Anyway, I can see now that it was this experience that helped me move away from more liberal, leftist, anarchist convictions and take on more communist positions. It was from this point that much of my political writing became aimed at the whole of the political milieu that I associated with. Over the years my critique of this milieu has deepened, and in- deed my critique of my own actions and texts has also be- come sharper. For example, I used to do a small magazine called Proletarian Gob. While there is much in this magazine that is still useful there is also much that relies on a kind of religious faith. A while ago I thought about re-issuing the whole set, but now I realise that it could only be re-issued with heavy annotation. Better, in fact, that the whole minor work is left in the oblivion (my loft) in which it now lies. The optimism of so-called revolutionaries now produces an utter weariness in me. And I have abandoned all respect for the various self-appointed midwives of com- munism; all those who talk about what sort of movement is needed to destroy capital – they who insist on putting their ideological and restricting cart before the horse of material events. It has been like a weight lifted from my shoulders. Recently my critique of Revolutionary Experts and activists has sharpened to the point that I am now no longer much welcome in revolutionary circles. People don’t like to have their bubbles threatened by little pricks like me. I am now in the group Monsieur Dupont. The two of us in this group are generally despised. The common fault we see across the whole of the communist and anarchist milieu is one of a faith in the concept of consciousness, particularly Working Class Consciousness and the general belief that conscious- ness in The Masses can be raised by revolutionaries. We have come to the conclusion that the useful proletariat only consist of those workers who work in the essential sectors of the economy. **Those who produce and/or distribute things without which the economy would crumble**. And these proletarians are only useful when they are actually at the point of production, that is, actually at work, whether it be working normally or preventing work through strikes and similar. We have also come to the conclusion that people will only be able to decide on new ways of living when the old ways have been broken materially. The concept of Consciousness is mistaken. There is no way that millions of people across the world will eventually arrive at a communist perspec- tive and then overthrow the economy. It is common sense that permits one to come to such conclusions. It was once said that “the only true histories are those that have been written by men who have been sincere enough to speak truly about themselves.” If we can look out from our own eyes and judge the world with our own feelings then we will get closer to the truth about things than in any other way. One major factor in Revolutionary Politics is this optimism that workers will wake up. But the only way workers will be considered to have woken up is when they have become organised by revolutionary experts, this leadership of experts will then end up killing workers the same way Lenin did. Steve Biko of South Africa was a proponent of consciousness-raising and the ANC was successful in organising workers through this process. They started killing workers routinely even before they got into power. These revolutionaries – who tell us that one day people will change their minds because they will realise the sinfulness of present society – **are trying to make us see the world through a filter of hope.** They have put common sense aside, they are offering us that same old pie in the sky that the clerics used to sell. **There is no hope** (but this does not mean I need not be enthusiastic in my life, or a participant in events. My negativity, which is at last written through me like rock, does not make me unhappy). A famous Revolutionary once said, “Nihilists, one more effort if you want to be revolu- tionaries!” This was a slogan of the generally remarkable Situationists. But this is also the optimism of the Christian missionaries, “Be positive about the future of the world; if we work hard enough then the rest of the people will see the truth of what we say and the world will be saved,” not forgetting the stage whisper, the secret goal: “And then we will get a place in government!” **Someone once said, “No- body speaks the truth when there is something they must have**.” This maxim seems to apply to the majority of the revolutionary milieu across the world, who want to pre- serve their sense of self-importance above all else. We would reverse the slogan and say, “Revolutionar- ies, one more effort to become nihilists!” And **we would say that from your critique of everything, from your non-belief, it may be possible for you to connect with your own human- ity.** My criticisms of revolutionism have always been based in my attempts to establish a personal perspective and ex- perience. This has not been an easy task, and it is ongoing – it is easy to fall back on holy mantras. It is easier to promote dogma, to let dogma rise to the surface, than it is to engage with the world through one’s own experience. These days I have almost completely abandoned reading factual books because I have discovered that there is more truth in one page of good fiction than there is in a shelf of academic or political works. I am for communism now more than ever. I am against religious faith, intolerance, hidden agendas, and machismo now more than ever.

#### **18. Psychoanalysis and Marxism are similar; psychoanalysis is just better. Marx fails to account for the underlying structures of desire – dooms their project to failure.**

McGowan, Todd. Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis. Lincoln, U of Nebraska P, 2013. WC

Psychoanalysis begins with individual subjects and their suffering. By allowing subjects to speak freely in the analytic session and by offering an interpretative intervention in this speech, psychoanalysis aims to reduce the impairment that their psychic disorder creates in their lives. In contrast to Marxism, which also attempts to ameliorate human suffering, psychoanalysis has no explicit political program designed to lessen the misery that Freud and his descendants find in their patients. There is no revolt of the patients that would correspond to the revolt of the proletariat. When Freud makes political pronouncements, they tend to be negative ones, expressing his skepticism about plans for social betterment. But it is my contention that a viable political project does inhere within psychoanalytic theory and that this project provides an avenue for emancipatory politics after the end of Marxism in the twentieth century. There are points at which this psychoanalytic politics remains proximate to Marxism, but it represents a genuine alternative that has the virtue of explaining the latter’s failures. The task of this book will be to lay out the contours of this political project, one that has never been fully developed despite numerous attempts at bringing psychoanalytic thinking to bear on politics. Unlike most previous formulations of a psychoanalytic politics, what follows will take as its point of departure not the early Freud of the sexual drive but the later Freud of the death drive (and its development in the thought of Jacques Lacan and his followers). I will conspicuously ignore all psychoanalytic thinking that deviates from Freud and from his specific 2 Introduction rendering of the death drive. This means that psychoanalytic luminaries such as Alfred Adler, Carl Jung, Melanie Klein, Donald Winnicott, Wilfred Bion, and even Freud’s own daughter Anna Freud will have no role to play in this account of the psychoanalytic political project. The death drive has historically acted as a stumbling block for psychoanalytic politics because it involves our self-sabotage. It leads us to work unconsciously against social betterment. This is why, after its discovery in 1920, Freud becomes so much more pessimistic as a thinker. But just as the death drive leads to self-sabotage, it also acts as the source of our enjoyment, and by shifting the terrain of emancipatory politics to that of enjoyment, psychoanalysis offers what Marxism’s political program could not. The politics of psychoanalysis after Marxism is an emancipatory project based on the self-sacrificing enjoyment located in the death drive. Marxism is able to theorize sacrifice as necessary for future pleasure, but it is unable to conceive sacrifice as an end in itself, as a source of enjoyment.1 This represents its fundamental limitation. […] While Freud expresses sympathy with the Russian Revolution and con- tends that it seemed “like the message of a better future,” he continually emphasizes the intractable barriers that any project of emancipatory politics would encounter.2 About the Soviet Union in particular, he speculatively grasps the incipient horrors of Stalinism at a time when no one in the West had any direct knowledge of them (and the worst had yet to occur). In Civilization and Its Discontents he notes, “One only wonders, with concern, what the Soviets will do after they’ve wiped out their bourgeois.”3 This is a psychoanalytic insight into the nature of the emancipatory political proj- ect that pursues the good society. For Freud, the Soviet attempt to create a better future not only chases an impossible goal, but it also exacerbates existing human suffering. It is not simply Freud’s personal judgment or prejudice that renders this verdict and installs an incompatibility between psychoanalytic thought and progressive political programs; this incompatibility inheres within the very psychoanalytic approach to the world.

#### 19. Their link logic is circular – we link to cap because the alts are competitive, and we can’t perm the alt because the links are a disad to the perm. This is a logical fallacy – means you don’t grant them the link and do grant perm do both.

#### 20. Interpretation: The K’s link has to be specific to the advocacy or representations of the Aff.

Violation:

Standards:

 1. Clash

 They avoid any actual argumentation about the K – hurts education.

 2. Ground

 They take away the link debate – key component of our responses to K’s.

 3. Education

 Kills educational discussion about what does and doesn’t link.

 4. Creativity

 Takes away creative debates, forces us to debate the same generics every round.

Evaluate competing interps over reasonability because:

 1. Makes the best rule.

 2. Reasonability arbitrary and forces judge intervention.

 3. Precedent-setting.

Drop the team to:

 1. Make up for time spent running theory.

 2. Deter future abuse.

Presume Aff because the Neg has structural advantages – time pressed 1AR allows them to overwhelm us on theory.

#### 21. Interpretation: The alt has to have a specific action or advocacy.

Violation:

Standards:

 Cross-apply the standards from above, and replace the word link with alt, it applies just as well.

 Shiftiness:

 Without a specific advocacy, they can shift what exactly the alt does, which is why historical materialism is invariably used as a cure-all.

Voter for the same reasons.

#### 22. Materialist analysis can’t explain all forms of production in the world

Chenault’06 (John Chenaultis an author, freelance writer, poet, playwright, and musician. He is author of [*Blue Blackness*](http://nkaa.uky.edu/source.php?source_id=154) and [*The Invisible Man Returns*](http://nkaa.uky.edu/source.php?source_id=466). He has been a member of the New Theater/Free Theater of Cincinnati since its inception in 1967. Chenault's work has appeared in a number of publications, and he has a number of playwright credits, including the television drama, [*Young Men Grow Older*](http://nkaa.uky.edu/source.php?source_id=955). “Dismantling THE MASTER’S HOUSE: DECONSTRUCTING THE ROOTS OF ANTIBLACK RACISM AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE “OTHER” IN JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM” http://ir.library.louisville.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1237&context=etd)//JP

Economic theories in fact have surpassed ethnographic and anthropological analyses as the means to evaluate the central question raised above by William Green: “how do people become civilized?” It can be argued that the advent of modern era marks a break between the old deus ex machina explanations of social change and the emergence of new secular-materialist explanations. Part of this change in social analysis involves the conflation of capital with capitalism. Capital tends to mediate all forms of modern social production, but not all forms of production in the world can be described as capitalist, or, contrary to Marx and Engles, as linearly progressing through various stages of evolution to capitalism. In a sense it could be argued that the advent of postmodernism would entail a break with the materialist, and until that occurrence the world will remain completely in the acquisitive grasp of the modernist cultural imperative. But to posit this next step in social evolution suggests a moribund kind of thinking still trapped in the linear fallacies of periodizations or stage theory as explanations of social change.

#### 23. History disproves materialism and the alt is impossible

Domhoff, 5

(William Domhoff, Professor in Sociology at UC Santa Cruz. “A Critique of Marxism” <http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/theory/marxism.html>) Henge

#### Historical Materialism From a Four Networks point of view, Marxism's emphasis on historical materialism is too narrow a base for understanding the complexity and variety of power structures across time and places. The idea that all power is rooted ultimately in the ownership and control of the means of production, with the ensuing class struggle providing the motor of history, does not fit the origins of civilization in the years from 3000 to 2300 B.C.E., when most property was held by the state and there was no class conflict; nor the 2500 years of empires of domination, when military networks were in the ascendancy; nor the 900 years after the fall of the Roman Empire, when the ideology network called "Christendom" combined with the independent armies of the nobility to create the framework within which a class-ridden capitalism and a closely intertwined system of nation-states began to rise to the fore. In short, there have been great stretches of history when economic forces, no matter how broadly conceived to accommodate the Marxian claim about the primacy of the "mode of production," were not primary in either the first or last instance. Moreover, there were other epochs where the activities of the ruling class were far more important in understanding new developments than any "class struggle" with direct producers, who were far too localized and lacking in organizational infrastructure to challenge the dominant class, let alone to be considered a class themselves. The Origin and Function of the State For Marxists, the state is a structure of domination that protects private property, even though they argue among themselves about the way in which this state domination takes place. Marx's general view of the state followed logically from the fact of human productivity. As already stated, the surplus created by this productivity led to inevitable conflict between the forces and relations of production, an increasing division of labor, inevitable class conflict, and then the creation of the political state as the defender of property. There are several problems with this theory of the state. First, archaeological and historical evidence do not support the claim that the state has its origins in class struggle and the rise of private property. Early states were a mix of religious and political institutions that had functions for small societies as a whole in terms of the need for a common way to store grain and other foodstuffs. These states also had other regulatory functions as city life became more crowded and complicated compared to what faced small groups of hunters and gatherers. Second, changes in the nature of the state are not usually a product of changes in society due to conflict between social classes. One of the biggest impacts on the nature of the state was the need for a common defense against nomadic groups, and later, rival states. Third, even in later times states are not always involved in subjugating the producing classes. Sometimes dominant classes do the subjugating directly, as during the Middle Ages (Mann, 1986, pp. 391-392, 411). Fourth, by conceiving of the state so narrowly, and not seeing its political and religious dimensions, Marxists minimize the potential for patriotic and religious feelings in shaping how groups and classes act. They therefore underestimate the strong possibility that common social bonds also can exist between the social classes in a country. Fifth, the Marxist analysis of the state, with its emphasis on its alleged original role in protecting private property, led to a false homology between the state and the economic system that creates a tendency to downplay the importance of representative democracy. Not all Marxists accept the argument that follows, but many do. For this large subset, representative democracy is an illusion that grows out of the same type of mystification that is created by the marketplace. Just as the capitalists appropriate surplus value "behind the backs" of the workers through the seemingly fair mechanism of the market, when the real story is in ownership and control of the forces of production, so too does representative democracy appropriate the political power of the workers through the seemingly fair mechanism of elections, when the major action is over in a state bureaucracy that responds to the interests of the owners of private property. This view is best summarized in Stanley Moore's A Critique of Capitalist Democracy (1957), a book based on an extremely close reading and synthesis of everything that Marx, Engels, and Lenin wrote on the subject of the state. It is so crucial to understanding how some Marxists view representative democracy, and thus to understanding the politics of those Marxists, that it needs to be quoted at length: These distinctive features of the bourgeois democratic state correspond to distinctive features of the capitalist economy. The capitalist economy appears to be controlled through a series of competitive exchanges, in which all members of the society participate voluntarily under conditions of universal freedom and equality. Similarly, the bourgeois democratic state appears to be controlled through a series of competitive elections, in which all members of the society participate voluntarily under conditions of universal freedom and equality. But beneath the formal freedom and equality of capitalist exchange lie the material bondage and exploitation of capitalist production, resulting from the monopoly over the means of production exercised by members of the capitalist class. And beneath the formal freedom and equality of bourgeois democratic elections lie the material bondage and oppression of bureaucratic administration, resulting from the monopoly over the means of coercion exercised by agents of the capitalist class. The democratic republic is the optimum political shell for capitalism because the relation between bureaucratic administration and universal suffrage is the optimum political counterpart for the relation between capitalist exploitation and commodity exchange. (Moore, 1957:87-88.) The ongoing importance of this analysis can be seen in the work of the Marxist economist James O'Connor, who had a major impact on the thinking of the generation of Marxists who came of age in the 1970s and 1980s. He is still carefully read by radical environmentalists and many members of the global justice movement. O'Connor had the following to say about these matters in Accumulation Crisis (1984): In Marxist theory, the "liberal democratic state" is still another capitalist weapon in the class struggle. This is so because the democratic form of the state conceals undemocratic contents. Democracy in the parliamentary shell hides its absence in the state bureaucratic kernel; parliamentary freedom is regarded as the political counterpart of the freedom in the marketplace, and the hierarchical bureaucracy as the counterpart of the capitalist division of labor in the factory. (O'Connor, 1984, p. 188.) There are some Marxists who would say that this is really the Marxist-Leninist view of representative democracy, not of Marxists in general. Be that as it may, the point for now is that this analysis is often accepted as "the" Marxist view by new Marxists, and is identified as such by O'Connor in the passage quoted above. I think it is a crucial point to consider because the idea that liberal freedoms are really a thin veil for the repression of the working class, when combined with the idea that the market is inherently exploitative, generates a contempt for liberal values and democracy that leads to crucial misunderstandings of the United States. It says that representative democracy is all a sham. I think this may be one of the root problems of Marxist politics in the United States, a problem that makes it difficult for Marxists to join into coalitions with liberals. For those Marxists who see representative democracy as a sham, the solution is "direct democracy," meaning small face-to-face groups in which the people themselves, not elected representatives, make decisions. This is in fact the meaning of the term "soviet." But historical experience shows that such groups came to be controlled by the members of the Communist Party within them. Problems also developed within direct democracy groups, often called "participatory democracy groups," in the New Left and women's movements in the 1960s. Although they tried to foster open participation among equals, they developed informal power structures led by charismatic or unbending members. There came to be a "tyranny of structurelessness" that shaped the group's decisions, often to the growing frustration of the more powerless members (Ellis, 1998, Chapter 6; Freeman, 1972). Based on this experience, it seems that selection of leaders through elections is necessary to avoid worse problems. Rather than downplaying the elected legislature, as some Marxists do, the Four Networks theory suggests that the creation of legislatures was a key factor in breaking down the unity of the monarchical state and thereby limiting its potential autonomy. Put another way, representative democracy and legislatures are one of the few counterpoints to the great potential power of an autocratic state. They should not be dismissed as inevitable mystifications of class rule, even if empirical investigations show that legislatures in capitalist societies are often dominated by capitalists, as is generally the case in the United States. The idea that Marxists and liberals should agree on is to extend the openness of legislatures in ways discussed in the Social Change section of this Web site. The Problems of Socialism The planned economy envisioned by classical Marxists has not proved to be workable either in terms of productivity or democratic responsiveness. There are several reasons for these failures. The productivity problem is rooted in the fact that the range and depth of information needed to run a complex consumer economy is too great for any planning bureaucracy. Moreover, no planning agency currently has the capability to analyze the information that does exist in a timely enough fashion to deal with sudden shifts in the availability of raw materials or changes in consumer preferences. The result is an unproductive economy. As the planners and plant managers come under criticism, they start to cut corners and cheat in ways that can allow them to meet their quotas. The result is hoarding of raw materials that other plants need, and shoddy goods. In other words, all the potential problems with large-scale bureaucracies come into play. Power accrues at the top. Then corruption ensues, such as placing friends and relatives of questionable competence in positions of responsibility, withholding important information from rival agencies, and skimming off resources for the personal benefit of the top officials. All this adds to the morale problems generated by the failures of the economy and multiplies the large economic inefficiencies. The disappointing conclusion that emerges from the social sciences and history is that non-market planning cannot work, even in democratic societies. Thus, progressives and other egalitarians have to develop methods of planning through the market in order to realize their egalitarian goals. For all its potential weaknesses, a planned market system within the context of a representative democracy can be both productive and more equal than present-day societies because it relies on many different people with small pieces of information to make small and limited decisions. Many contemporary Marxists are rethinking these issues as well. There are interesting arguments about "market socialism" (Elson, 1998; Ollman, 1998).

#### 24. The alt can’t solve – only perpetuates cap.

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(Uri, Anarchist Economics in Practice in The Accumulation of Freedom, pg. 205-7)

Withdrawal

Perhaps better defined as a "non‑practice" than as a practice, the term "withdrawal" here indicates the various ways in which anarchists may abstain from participation in central institutions of the capitalist economy‑primarily the wage system and the consumption of purchased goods. The goal of such a strategy is to weaken capitalism by sapping its energy, reducing its inputs in terms of both human labor and cultural legitimation. To be sure, the ubiquity of capitalist relations means that the options for withdrawal remain partial at best. Most of us must work for someone else to survive, and buy necessities that are not otherwise available for acquisition. Nevertheless, there are ways in which participation in capitalism can be significantly reduced, or undertaken on its qualitatively different margins. Rather than seeking full employment and aspiring to a lifelong career, anarchists can choose to work part‑time or itinerantly, earning enough to supply their basic needs but not dedicating more time to waged work than is absolutely necessary‑perhaps on the way towards the abolition of work as compulsory, alienated production.3 In the area of housing, squatting a living space rather than renting one also abstains from participation in capitalism, though this option is less sustainable in most countfies since it will almost certainly end in eviction. Anarchists may also reduce their participation in the moneyed circulation of commodities by reusing and recycling durable goods, and by scavenging or growing some of their own food rather than purchasing it from the supermarket. 4 **Such practices can never by themselves destroy capitalism, since in the final analysis they remain confined to the level of personal lifestyle and rely on capitalism’s continued existence in order to inhabit its margins and consume its surpluses**. Nevertheless, strategies of withdrawal **do complement** other practices in carving out a separate space from capitalism, as well as in expressing a rejection of its ideologies of dedication to the workplace and of consumption as the road to happiness.

### AT Solves the Aff

#### **Marx can’t solve the Aff – it can never fully account for the death drive.**

McGowan, Todd. Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis. Lincoln, U of Nebraska P, 2013. WC

But such a program is constitutively incapable of admitting the idea of the death drive with all of its theoretical force. Marcuse acknowledges the death drive in order to show how an ideal society might minimize its power, but the existence of the death drive sabotages the political program as such. It leads Freud to say, toward the end of Civilization and Its Discontents, “I have not the courage to rise up before my fellow-men as a prophet, and I bow to their reproach that I can offer them no consolation.”20 The death drive eliminates the possibility of offering consolation in the form of a traditional political program because it erects a fundamental barrier to progress to an extent that Marcuse cannot fully recognize due to his Marxist political commitment.

# \*\*AT’s\*\*

## AT Precludes Change/Complacency

#### 1. No offense to this – we’re debaters in a room, there’s no brink, we obviously won’t cause right wing take-over. This is the ideal space to re-evaluate our mindset with no risk.

#### 2. Impact turn – without the Aff, progress is just an illusion that masks cycles of failure – that’s literally the entire 1AC.

#### 3. **Psychoanalysis actually aids political projects by creating an understanding of structures of oppression – this understanding is a prerequisite to taking real action.**

McGowan, Todd. Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis. Lincoln, U of Nebraska P, 2013. WC

On the face of it, this claim appears counterintuitive: one can imagine, for instance, a psychoanalytic understanding of the nature of desire aiding political theorists in their attempts to free desire from ideology, which is the recurring difficulty of leftist politics. There are even historical examples of this theoretical assistance at work. Louis Althusser develops his theory of ideological interpellation through his acquaintance with Jacques Lacan’s conception of the subject’s entrance into language, and Juliet Mitchell elaborates her critique of the structural effects of patriarchy through her experience with Freudian conceptions of masculinity and femininity. In each case, psychoanalysis allows the theorist to understand how a prevailing social structure operates, and this provides a foundation for imagining a way to challenge this structure. As Mitchell claims, “Psychoanalysis is not a recommendation for a patriarchal society, but an analysis of one. If we are interested in understanding and challenging the oppression of women, we cannot afford to neglect it.”4 Precisely because she sees psychoanalysis as a useful tool for political struggle, Mitchell here dismisses feminism’s longstanding quarrel with psychoanalysis for its complicity with patriarchy.5

#### This arg isn’t a double-turn, change without the pre-requisite of the Aff is problematic, only the alt allows political projects to be successful.

## AT Cede the Political

#### 1. Cede the political makes no sense – we’re debaters in a room, there’s no brink, no right wing takeover. This is the perfect space in which to evaluate our epistemologies.

#### 2. This assumes that we want to create progressive political change, which we don’t.

#### **3. Impact turn – psychoanalysis is key *because* it cedes the political. This allows us to take a step back and evaluate the reasons for serial policy failure.**

McGowan, Todd. Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis. Lincoln, U of Nebraska P, 2013. WC

Underlying a position like Mitchell’s (which almost all political theorists who turn to psychoanalysis embrace) is the idea that the political usefulness of psychoanalysis stems, ironically, from its lack of a political commitment. That is to say, psychoanalysis aims to discover the unconscious truth of the subject and the society in which the subject exists, not to change this truth. It is thus at the most basic level a descriptive rather than a prescriptive art. Even the psychoanalytic cure itself does not portend radical change for the subject who accomplishes it. This subject simply recognizes, in Jacques Lacan’s words, “I am that.” The cure is more a recognition of who one is rather than a transformation of one’s subjectivity. Though psychoanalysis does view this recognition as the most radical kind of revolution, the revolu- tion changes how the subject relates to its activity, not the activity itself. In this sense, psychoanalysis has no political axe to grind, which allows it to devote its energies to the project of interpretation and understanding. The understanding it produces can then form the basis for the different sorts of leftist political contestation that may appropriate it.

#### 4. Prefer specificity – in the specific instance of the Aff it is key to take a step back from the political and re-evaluate our mindset, this doesn’t necessitate all liberals doing it.

#### 5. We don’t preclude policies, we’re just a pre-requisite to them being effective.

#### 6. Using legal methods legitimates the dominant order and precludes any actual challenges to oppressive power structures.

Crenshaw, Kimberle Williams. "Race, Reform, And Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law". Harvard Law Review 101.7 (1988): 1331. Web. 14 Oct. 2016.

The concept of hegemony allows Critical scholars to explain the continued legitimacy of American society by revealing how legal [law] consciousness induces people to accept or consent to their own oppression. Legal historian Robert Gordon, for example, declares that one should look not only at the undeniably numerous, specific ways in which the legal system functions to screw poor people . . . but rather at all the ways in which the system seems at first glance basically uncontroversial, neutral, acceptable. This is Antonio Gramsci's notion of "hegemony," i.e., that the most effective kind of domination takes place when both the dominant and dominated classes believe that the existing order, with perhaps some marginal changes, is satisfactory, or at least represents the most that anyone could expect, because things pretty much have to be the way they are. 76 According to Gordon, Gramsci directs our attention to the many thoughts and beliefs that people have adopted that limit their ability "even to imagine that life could be different and better."77 Although society's structures of thought have [has] been constructed by elites out of a universe of possibilities, people reify these structures and clothe them with the illusion of necessity.78 Law is an essential feature in the illusion of necessity because it embodies and reinforces ideological assumptions about human relations that people accept as natural or even immutable. People act out their lives, mediate conflicts, and even perceive themselves with reference to the law. By accepting the bounds of law and ordering their lives according to its categories and relations, people think that they are confirming reality - the way things must be. Yet by accepting the view of the world implicit in the law, people are also bound by its conceptual limitations. Thus conflict and antagonism are contained: the legitimacy of the entire order is never seriously questioned. Relating this idea to the limitations of antidiscrimination law, Alan Freeman argues that the legal reforms that grew out of the civil rights movement were severely limited by the ideological constraints embedded within the law 79 and dictated by "needs basic to the preservation of the class structure."80 These ideological pillars supporting the class structure were simultaneously repositories of racial domination and obstacles to the fundamental reordering of society. For example, Freeman argues that formal equality, combined with the fact that American law does not formally recognize any difference based on wealth, precluded most remedies which would have required the redistribution of wealth.81 Yet economic exploitation and poverty have been central features of racial domination - poverty is its long-term result. A legal strategy that does not include redistribution of wealth cannot remedy one of the most significant aspects of racial domination. Similarly, the myths of "vested rights" and "equality of opportunity" were necessary to protect the legitimacy of the dominant order and thus constituted insuperable barriers to the quest for significant redistri- butive reform.82 Freeman's central argument is that the severe limi- tations of legal reform were dictated by the legitimating role of legal discourse. If law functions to reinforce a world view that things should be the way they are, then law cannot provide an effective means to challenge the present order. […] According to Tushnet, the danger that arises from being swept into legal rights discourse is that people lose sight of their real objectives. Their visions and thoughts of the possible become trapped within the ideological limitations of the law. Tushnet suggests that, "[i]f we treated experiences of solidarity and individuality as directly relevant to our political discussions, instead of passing them through the filter of the language of rights, we would be in a better position to address the political issues on the appropriate level."87 Peter Gabel suggests that the belief in rights and in the state serves a hegemonic function through willed delusion:88

#### 7. No link – the alt could be used by politicians.

#### 8. Non-unique – debaters have been reading K’s since the 70’s and the community is still liberal as fuck.

#### 9. Problematizing is a prerequisite to effective policy.

Nieto 12 /Diego, full-time professor at the Political Studies Department, Universidad Icesi, Neoliberalism, Biopolitics, and the Governance of Transnational Crime Colombia Internacional 76, julio a diciembre de 2012: 137-165/

Affirming that nation-states face diverse challenges to their power due to the transformations experienced in the international arena is not as controversial as it once was. How to understand these transformations and the consequences for power relations in the international system is still, however, a matter of much debate. My aim is to contribute to this debate through examining a specific problem in transnational politics: transnational crime. This, of course, is a methodological choice, and one I believe gives us a vantage point over other approaches to engage with global governance. I draw on Foucault’s later works in which he suggested that to study government in modernity, we need to re-trace the problematizations of political issues that acquire wide recognition and authority about the ways to dispose and govern the life of populations (Foucault 1984, 79). That is, if we are to explain shifts in governance, we ought to start with the specific concerns, questions, and intended answers to political problems in particular moments in the history of a given society. Thus, rather than privileging the role of the state or other actors in the international system, I see it as more appropriate to ask first how globalization has come to exist politically. This, in turn, obliges us to look at the issues and problems that demand new forms of political imagination to govern beyond the nation-state. Only then does it make sense to ask why and how they structure, in discourse and practice, transnational governance. In this sense, issues such as crime give us a concrete entry for understanding these transformations in contemporary forms of power and authority. Moreover, in this way we will be able to see that transnational governance is not limited to changes in state power and the international system but that it is attached to longer trajectories and wider shifts in the forms of governance in modern times. In this regard, Foucault’s notion of problematizations offers a key to make sense of these changes; problematizations give us a historical perspective on governance that combines its discursive framing and concrete expression in government practices and techniques. This last contention is what makes this approach distinct from other “constructivist” analyses. Even when sharing with them several epistemological and methodological premises, I consider they still give too much emphasis, either to the meanings and understandings actors give of problems in the international system or to how these discourses come to define their identities, behavior, interests, and rules of the game. In this way, not only is less attention being given to the concrete problematizations from which public policies take form, but also the examination of how they materialize in specific techniques of government has yet to be more deeply analyzed.2 The idea of starting from problematizations of political life demonstrates strengths in this respect. This approach does not limit itself to explaining the daily functioning, processes, and power exchanges between actors in the international arena. Neither does this approach consider it sufficient to analyze the meanings and understandings that construct the world of these agents. When we direct our research to problematizations, this approach provides a different way of going about explaining governance: identify the role that rationalities of government such as neoliberalism play[s] in the shifts of power relations and techniques of governance. This implies that it is necessary to establish the relation between two interrelated and co-constituted domains: on the one hand, the convention governed setting of controversies and struggles where the problems of political life emerge and reproduce (Stenson 1999, 55), and on the other hand, the rationalities of political action devised to govern these problems. The former provides with particularity and originality such rationalities, whereas the latter are understood in an instrumental sense, historical and not metaphysical; they are employed to see how discourses and practices of government emerge as a “necessary” solution for fulfilling the standards and objectives defined by these forms of rationalization of domains of life (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 133-140). These rationalities of government or governmentalities refer, therefore, to the general analytical grid of political ideas that give form to programs and strategies of governance. Hence, these rationalities are not only discourses in a strictly philosophical or ideological sense but are also constituted by practices and techniques of intervention, and strategies of policy formation and implementation (Rose and Miller 1992, 174). The study of these governmentalities and all the different dimensions entailed is what defines the methodological distinctiveness of our research.

## AT Death Drive Fake

#### 1. Extend Pectocz 15 from the 1AC – psychoanalysis is empirically supported. Prefer this to their ev because it draws on empirics taken from a diverse range of scientific (and postdates, meaning it’s based on more advanced research).

#### 2. Extend Mills 6 – the death drive is clinically proven, and most critics are just hacks. Prefer this because: 1) Mills is the most qualified author, we read his quals in the 1AC. 2) It’s specific to the death drive – psychoanalysis is a broad field, means their generic indicts probably don’t apply.

#### 3. The death drive is real, has clinical and empirical support, applies to countries, and ends in nuclear war—we’ve also got the most qualified author

KNOLL, MD, **Associate Professor & Director of Forensic Psychiatry at SUNY Medical University, Editor-in-Chief of the Psychiatric Times, and more** 2013

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The death drive may sometimes be directed outward. If this is the case, the drive is observed as aggression or destruction. Part of the confusion surrounding Freud’s concept of the death drive may be due to the fact that he originally regarded the life and death instincts “as forces underlying the sexual and aggressive instincts.” [6] In subsequent decades, the more prevalent psychoanalytic view became one in which the dual instincts of sexuality and aggression sufficed to explain most clinical phenomena. Regardless, we need look no further than our own street corner for validation of aggression/destruction diverted into the external world. According to a recent study by the Centers for Disease control, an estimated 50,000 persons die annually in the United States as a result of violence-related injuries. [7] The study summarizes data from the National Violent Death Reporting System (NVDRS) on violent deaths from 16 U.S. states for the year 2006. It found that homicides (outward directed aggression) were precipitated primarily by interpersonal conflicts, mental-health problems, and recent crises. But just as the death drive can be directed outward, it is sometimes the case that “self-destructiveness is brought about by diverting the aggressivness” inward, towards oneself. [8] Again, not only clinical evidence confirms this, but research data does as well. In a study of the deaths of 132 young persons, a strong link was found between childhood environment, the development of antisocial behavior, and “sudden violent death” at an early age. [9] The most common causes of the violent deaths were accidents, suicides, murder/manslaughter, and alcohol/drug abuse. As alluded to earlier, there is and always has been controversy around the concept of a “death drive.” [10] One eminent psychoanalyst, Otto Kernberg, has noted that, “The death drive runs deeply against more optimistic views of human nature, based on the assumption that if severe frustrations or trauma were absent in early development then aggression would not be a major human problem.” [11] Yet as Kernberg points out, his work over “the last 30 years has given even further evidence to the fundamental nature of deep self-destructive tendencies in human beings that clinically would support the concept of a death drive.” [12] Kernberg has argued that the death drive is more perceptible in severe personality disorders, particularly “severe narcissistic pathology.” [13] This observation is consistent with recent suicidology research suggesting that suicide attempters diagnosed with narcissistic personality disorder have suicide attempts characterized by higher lethality. [14] But while the aggressive drive is thought of as naturally present, the concept of a death drive is not invoked unless “such aggression becomes dominant… and when its main objective is… the elimination of the representations of all significant others and, in that context, the elimination of the self as well.” [15] I shall not here attempt to resolve the long-standing controversy surrounding the death drive, as this subject could fill several texts. Instead, let us proceed for now under the assumption that humans do, in fact, possess sexual and aggressive/destructive drives which can be observed in everyday life. Next, if we are to consider this dual drive theory in more depth and, “[i]f… Freud’s conception of the two instincts is taken to its ultimate conclusion, the interaction of the life and death instincts will be seen to govern the whole of mental life.” [16] The outcome of this interaction then may be attributed to the manner in which these two instincts are balanced against one another. 3. Homeostasis: Eros & Thanatos Nothing, whether public or private, is stable; the destinies of men, no less than those of cities, are in a whirl. Whatever structure has been reared by a long sequence of years…. an instant of time, suffices for the overthrow of empires. – Seneca The routinely observable process in the natural world is for biological organisms to undergo a pattern of decay, disintegration, and ultimate return to their constituent, non-living particles. Freud simply applied this scientific fact to the mind and its constituent instincts. He asserted that “instincts tend towards a return to an earlier state,” and theorized that the two basic instincts were simply two sides of the same coin. That is, they are a “pair of opposing forces – attraction and repulsion – which rule in the inorganic world.” [17] Thus, he believed an aggressive/destructive instinct could be traced back to the “original death instinct of living matter.” [18] Eschewing any value judgments and pressing forward, Freud stressed that “[i]t is not a question of an antithesis between an optimistic and a pessimistic theory of life,” rather, it was merely an issue of biologically “concurrent or mutually opposing action of the two primal instincts” which explained the “rich multiplicity of the phenomena of life.” [19] Thus, one way of conceptualizing Freud’s theory on the death instinct is to view it as part of the organism’s natural function of homeostasis. While the libidinal instinct endeavored to “combine what exists into ever greater unities,” the destructive instinct sought to “dissolve those combinations and to destroy the structures to which they have given rise.” [20] In essence, this was a balancing act between creation and destruction, observed regularly in the natural world, where the death instinct was simply one side of the equation that acted on living matter in an effort to “return it to an inanimate state.” [21] To clarify, Freud seemed to simply imply that all living matter inexorably “returns” to non-living matter – no great controversy here. It is in the application of this process to mental life where the controversy arises. Having already described the phenomenon in which humans pursue pleasure and avoid pain (the Pleasure Principle), he went on to explain why some individuals appeared to violate this principle. By invoking a natural homeostatic process, the pleasure principle remains intact. How? By observing that some individuals may become fixed in an emotional state so painful, that “escape” into death is preferable, as it means no more pain. The immensity of pain weighing in on the side of continued life can only be balanced by the finality of the weight in direct opposition: non-life. This is simply an early metaphor for describing what more recent social science has confirmed. For example, the “escape theory” of suicide has been used to explain the suicidal individual’s motivation to escape from aversive (excessively painful) self-awareness. [22] When the drive to avoid painful emotions becomes strong enough, there is a significantly increased risk of distorted judgment that may lead to suicide and/or self-destructive behaviors. Returning to Kernberg, he singles out specific, severe “personality disorders” when pointing out the relevance of a death drive. [23] Further, he notes that the death drive is not invoked unless aggression becomes “dominant,” and produces the desire to eliminate the self and/or others. Yet I would like to broaden this hypothesis with the observation of a simple fact: aggression has been dominant throughout the entire history of Homo sapiens for many thousands of years. Indeed, we all “belong to the human race that killed over one hundred million members of its own species in the twentieth century alone.” [24] Just as the homeostatic conception of life and death can be applied to the individual, it may also be applied to groups, nations and species. In sum, while the “individual dies of his internal [instinctual] conflicts… the species dies of its unsuccessful struggle against the external world if the latter changes in a fashion which cannot be adequately dealt with by the adaptations which the species has acquired.” [25] How often has our species been on the brink of potential self-destruction, particularly since the advent of nuclear weaponry? There are certainly no guarantees that we will continue to tip the balance for our species in the favor of life. It is a sobering fact that “no society, no country is free of the history of senseless wholesale massacre of imagined or real enemies. The relative ubiquity of these phenomena throughout the history of civilization cannot be ignored.” [26] Yet, as Ernest Becker so keenly observed, death is ignored. In fact, it is outright denied in a variety of ways.

## **AT We Solve Death**

#### **Any attempt to “solve” the death drive inevitably fails – the drive is inherent in our psyche. The alt is thus the only way to challenge problems within the status quo.**

Mills, Jon. "Reflections on the Death Drive." Process Psychology.com, 2006, www.processpsychology.com/new-articles2/Freud%20on%20Todestrieb.pdf. Accessed 25 Nov. 2016. Dr. Mills is a board **certified clinical** psychologist and **psychoanalyst**, and a certified member in good standing with the Canadian Register of Health Service Providers in Psychology. **He holds six university and post-graduate degrees including two doctorates, as well as post-doctoral training and international scholarly recognition.** With **twenty years of clinical experience**, he specializes in the assessment and treatment of many psychological disorders upon which **he is widely published. He is founding President of the Section on Psychoanalytic** and Psychodynamic **Psychology of the Canadian Psychological Association, Editor of two international book series, author and/or editor of over one-hundred publications including twelve books**, and teaches as Core Faculty and clinical supervisior at the Adler School of Graduate Studies in Toronto. He is the only psychologist in Canada with double board certification in clinical psychology & psychoanalysis. WC

What could be more banal than death, than the inevitable, something predictable, utterly certain? It is banal by virtue of the fact that it is unimaginatively routine—eternal. Death cannot be waved or amended, what Heidegger (1927) avows “stands before us—something impending” (p. 294), something imminent—our thrownness—to be postponed, even denied. For Freud, death is much more than that which stands before us, rather it resides within us, an impulsion toward annihilation. But before the will to murder exists an insidious self-implosion, namely, suicidal desire. Here the banality of death is not just something that happens to us, it is us—our inner being, only to be experienced in novel fashions, repetitiously, circuitously, ad nauseam. Recall that Freud had aspirations to become a philosopher before deciding on medicine, was tutored by Franz 1 Brentano in university, and told Fliess that “Through the detour of being a physician . . . I most secretly nourish the hope of reaching my original goal, philosophy” (p. 159). See Letter to Fliess, January 1, 1896. 2 Death-work for Freud (1933) was ultimately in the service of restoring or reinstating a previous state of undifferentiated internal being, a drive “which sought to do away with life once more and to re-establish [an] inorganic state” (p. 107). Freud did not argue that death was the only aim of life, only that it maintained a dialectical tension in juxtaposition to a life principle under the ancient command of Eros, yet the two forces of mind remained ontologically inseparable. In this relational age, the death drive appears to be a drowning man. Even many classical analysts have difficulty accepting this central postulate in Freud’s theoretical corpus. From my account, these attitudes appear to be either based on unfamiliarity with what Freud actually said in his texts, are opposed due to theoretical incompatibilities, or are the result of reactionary defenses. It is incumbent on any critic to know exactly what one is criticizing, and that means having to delve into the nuances of what Freud truly had to say, not to mention what he implied or the logical inferences that can be inferred. Freud’s seminal work on the primacy of death particularly highlights his ability to think as a philosophical scientist using the discipline of logical rigor wed to clinical observation. Regardless of what opinion 1 contemporary psychoanalysts have toward Freud’s conception of the death drive, it becomes worthwhile for historical, clinical, and philosophical reasons to engage Freud’s thoughts on the matter. As a result, this essay is largely an exegetical reflection on Freud’s introduction of the destructive principle to psychoanalytic theory and is therefore not intended to address all the controversy, dissension, or detractors who have debunked his contributions largely on evolutionary grounds. If psychoanalysis is destined to prosper and advance, it must be open to revisiting controversial ideas that gave it radical prominence to begin with.

## AT Fem

#### There is no contention between feminism and psychoanalysis – psychoanalysis avoids sexism and provides feminists with a starting point to disrupt problematic conceptions of gender.

Zakin, Emily. "Psychoanalytic Feminism". Plato.stanford.edu. N. p., 2011. Web. 14 Oct. 2016. WC

This article will discuss psychoanalytic feminism, not feminist psychoanalysis (i.e., except indirectly, it will not address ideas about developing feminist principles in clinical practice, although most of the authors discussed below are trained analysts). Psychoanalysis develops a theory of the unconscious that links sexuality and subjectivity ineluctably together. In doing so, it discloses the ways in which our sense of self, and our political loyalties and attachments, are influenced by unconscious drives and ordered by symbolic structures that are beyond the purview of individual agency. It might appear at the outset that any alliance between feminism and psychoanalysis would have to be coordinated on treacherous ground: in Sigmund Freud's lecture on “Femininity,” for instance, while discussing the “riddle of femininity” (Freud 1968 [1933], 116) or of sexual differentiation, Freud's rhetoric impeaches women as “the problem” (113) and excuses members of his audience from this indictment by offering the hope that they are “more masculine than feminine” (117). Many feminists have been wary both of the biases contained in Freud's oratory and of the overt content of his claims. This article will explain how and why feminist theory has, nonetheless, undertaken a serious reading of Freud and developed careful analyses of his fundamental concepts, working out their limits, impasses, and possibilities. In the same essay cited above, Freud writes that “psychoanalysis does not try to describe what a woman is—that would be a task it could scarcely perform—but sets about enquiring how she comes into being, how a woman develops out of a child with a bisexual disposition” (Freud 1968 [1933], 116). In using the term ‘bisexual,’ Freud refers to a quality of the sexual instinct, not a relation to a sexual object (which would be denoted by the term ‘inversion’); the bisexual child is one who psychically is not yet either a man or a woman, whose instinctual life functions prior to sexual difference. Freud here portrays femininity as one trajectory of the Oedipal Complex and indicates that sexed identity is a fragile achievement rather than a natural given or essence. By circumscribing the terrain on which the psychoanalytic account of sexual difference moves, and by seeing unresolved, even unresolvable, riddles where others might see the work of nature or culture, Freud problematizes any causal, seamless, or direct tie between sex, sexuality, and sexual difference. Psychoanalytic inquiry does not fit comfortably with, and even unsettles, biological theories of sex and sociological theories of gender, thus also complicating the sex/gender distinction as it has often been formulated in feminist debates. While sex and gender are sometimes construed in feminist theory in terms of the contrast between biology and culture, or nature and nurture, Freud's theory, as discussed below, challenges these dualisms, developing an account of the sexual drive that traverses the mental and the physical, and undergoes idiosyncratic vicissitudes rather than assuming a uniform anatomical or social shape. Whatever the hazards of Freud's writings on women, then, his work explores in new ways the meaning and possibilities of sexed identity. Likewise, as I will argue below, psychoanalytic feminism interrupts many assumptions about what feminism is and the conceptual and material objects it theorizes, including especially the very concept of woman. In unsettling our understanding of this concept, psychoanalysis also poses questions to feminism about the value of difference and the quest for equality, and the unresolved tensions between these divergent pursuits. While there is no doubt a vast ouvre of disparate positions that might fall within the framework of psychoanalytic feminism, what is shared in common is a descent from, respect for, and some minimal borrowing of Freudian accounts of the unconscious, even while criticizing and/or revising his theoretical apparatus. Any properly psychoanalytic theory must at the least offer an account of the unconscious and its bond with sexuality and, arguably, death. Precisely this descent, however, has also provided a barrier to feminist deployment since Freud is sometimes read, at least superficially, as proffering misogynist, and perhaps Procrustean, elaborations of psychic structuration, curtailing and diminishing the diversity of individual women's experiences into a restricted and unvarying formula that will fit within its own theoretical parameters. Nevertheless, Freud's reflections and hypotheses concerning hysteria, the Oedipal Complex, female sexuality and femininity, and women's role in civilization, among other ideas, have provided the volatile grounds, the sites of contention, for feminist re-articulation. Before any of the multiple and divergent articulations of psychoanalytic feminism can be discussed in more detail, we must thus first establish their historical roots and the conceptual terrain on which they arise. Since a great deal of psychoanalytic feminist theory is specifically concerned with revising the Oedipal narrative of Freud, this article will devote particular attention to Freud's theories of the unconscious as they pertain to the Oedipal Complex.

Turn – psychoanalysis key to combatting the patriarchy.

McGowan, Todd. Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis. Lincoln, U of Nebraska P, 2013. WC

On the face of it, this claim appears counterintuitive: one can imagine, for instance, a psychoanalytic understanding of the nature of desire aiding political theorists in their attempts to free desire from ideology, which is the recurring difficulty of leftist politics. There are even historical examples of this theoretical assistance at work. Louis Althusser develops his theory of ideological interpellation through his acquaintance with Jacques Lacan’s conception of the subject’s entrance into language, and Juliet Mitchell elaborates her critique of the structural effects of patriarchy through her experience with Freudian conceptions of masculinity and femininity. In each case, psychoanalysis allows the theorist to understand how a prevailing social structure operates, and this provides a foundation for imagining a way to challenge this structure. As Mitchell claims, “Psychoanalysis is not a recommendation for a patriarchal society, but an analysis of one. If we are interested in understanding and challenging the oppression of women, we cannot afford to neglect it.”4 Precisely because she sees psychoanalysis as a useful tool for political struggle, Mitchell here dismisses feminism’s longstanding quarrel with psychoanalysis for its complicity with patriarchy.5

## AT Other K’s Solve the Aff

#### **Any project that attempts to solve psychoanalysis without our alt inevitably fails – it cannot adequately address the death drive.**

McGowan, Todd. Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis. Lincoln, U of Nebraska P, 2013. WC

But such a program is constitutively incapable of admitting the idea of the death drive with all of its theoretical force. Marcuse acknowledges the death drive in order to show how an ideal society might minimize its power, but the existence of the death drive sabotages the political program as such. It leads Freud to say, toward the end of Civilization and Its Discontents, “I have not the courage to rise up before my fellow-men as a prophet, and I bow to their reproach that I can offer them no consolation.”20 The death drive eliminates the possibility of offering consolation in the form of a traditional political program because it erects a fundamental barrier to progress to an extent that Marcuse cannot fully recognize due to his Marxist political commitment.

## AT Complacency

#### **1. Link turn – cross-apply McGowan 6 from Contention 3 – psychoanalysis doesn’t lead to complacency, it actually ensures that political action is successful because it allows us to understand the relation between the subject and society.**

#### **2. Trying to solve oppression without psychoanalysis not only fails, but leads to things like genocide – that’s the external/internal limit analysis.**

#### **3. No offense, we don’t have access to the levers of power anyway - we’re debaters in a room.**

## AT Counter-K’s (Race, Queer, etc.)

#### This is a methods debate, meaning the only relevant question is whether or not their alt is effective.

#### Case extensions obliterate the K – we’ve already explained these arguments, but we’ll apply them specifically.

#### 1. Cross-apply our Contention 1 – this turn the K’s solvency because the Neg’s supposedly radical alt is still locked into the progress-based mindset that guarantees serial policy failure through the death drive, that means if we can win the Aff it turns the alt.

#### 2. Cross-apply Contention 3, sub-point B – it’s a terminal solvency deficit because their K only interacts with conscious knowledge, ignoring the unconscious drives that re-create policy failure.  Psychoanalysis thus a pre-requisite.

#### 3. Cross-apply the first card in Contention 2, proves that the utopian mindset of the alt leads to genocide because it necessitates the elimination of the other. Their genocidal mindset is an independent reason to reject them.

#### 4. Cross-apply the two first two pieces of Mills evidence - terminal solvency deficit to the alt because it proves that any theory that doesn't fully account for the death drive is doomed to failure. Also a reason why the Aff is a prerequisite – that was explained above.

#### 5. Perm do both – double bind. We’re proving that psychoanalysis is the only way to break out of cycles of failure, means if they can win that the perm is impossible it also dooms their K.

#### **6. Psychoanalysis is a prereq and solves the K – creates an understanding of the structures of oppression that allows real-world action to be successful.**

McGowan, Todd. Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis. Lincoln, U of Nebraska P, 2013. WC

On the face of it, this claim appears counterintuitive: one can imagine, for instance, a psychoanalytic understanding of the nature of desire aiding political theorists in their attempts to free desire from ideology, which is the recurring difficulty of leftist politics. There are even historical examples of this theoretical assistance at work. Louis Althusser develops his theory of ideological interpellation through his acquaintance with Jacques Lacan’s conception of the subject’s entrance into language, and Juliet Mitchell elaborates her critique of the structural effects of patriarchy through her experience with Freudian conceptions of masculinity and femininity. In each case, psychoanalysis allows the theorist to understand how a prevailing social structure operates, and this provides a foundation for imagining a way to challenge this structure. As Mitchell claims, “Psychoanalysis is not a recommendation for a patriarchal society, but an analysis of one. If we are interested in understanding and challenging the oppression of women, we cannot afford to neglect it.”4 Precisely because she sees psychoanalysis as a useful tool for political struggle, Mitchell here dismisses feminism’s longstanding quarrel with psychoanalysis for its complicity with patriarchy.5

#### 7. The radical politics of the K creates a rebel identity that produces a perverse enjoyment of oppression that can only be sustained by its continuation.

**Lundberg 12** --- ‎Professor and Communication Strategies Consultant (Christian, Lacan in Public, Published by The University of Alabama Press, Project Muse)//trepka

On Resistance: The Dangers of Enjoying One’s Demands The demands of student revolutionaries and antiglobalization protestors provide a set of opportunities for interrogating hysteria as a political practice. For the antiglobalization protestors cited earlier, demands to be added to a list of dangerous globophobes uncannily condense a dynamic inherent to all demands for recognition. But the demands of the Mexico Solidarity Network and the Seattle Independent Media project demand more than recognition: they also ddremand danger as a specific mode of representation. “Danger” functions as a sign of something more than inclusion, a way of reaffirming the protestors’ imaginary agency over processes of globalization. If danger represents an assertion of agency, and the assertion of agency is proportional to the deferral of desire to the master upon whom the demand is placed, then demands to be recognized as dangerous are doubly hysterical. Such demands are also demands for a certain kind of love, namely, [that] the state might extend its love by recognizing the dangerousness of the one who makes the demand. At the level the demand’s rhetorical function, dangerousness is metonymically connected with the idea that average citizens can effect change in the prevailing order, or that they might be recognized as agents who, in the instance of the list of globalophobic leaders, can command the Mexican state to reaffirm their agency by recognizing their dangerousness. The rhetorical structure of danger implies the continuing existence of the state or governing apparatus’s interests, and these interests become a nodal point at which the hysterical demand is discharged. This structure generates enjoyment of the existence of oppressive state policies as a point for the articulation of identity. The addiction to the state and the demands for the state’s love is also bound up with a fundamental dependency on the oppression of the state: otherwise the identity would collapse. Such demands constitute a reaffirmation of a hysterical subject position: they reaffirm not only the subject’s marginality in the global system but the danger that protestors present to the global system. There are three practical implications for this formation. First, for the hysteric the simple discharge of the demand is both the beginning and satisfaction of the political project. Although there is always a nascent political potential in performance, in this case the performance of demand comes to fully eclipse the desires that animate content of the demand. Second, demand [it] allows institutions that stand in for the global order to dictate the direction of politics. This is not to say that engaging such institutions is a bad thing; rather, it is to say that when antagonistic engagement with certain institutions is read as the end point of politics, the field of political options is relatively constrained. Demands to be recognized as dangerous by the Mexican government or as a powerful antiglobalization force by the WTO often function at the cost of addressing how practices of globalization are reaffirmed at the level of consumption, of identity, and so on or in thinking through alternative political strategies for engaging globalization that do not hinge on the state and the state’s actions. Paradoxically, the third danger is that an addiction to the refusal of demands creates a paralyzing disposition toward institutional politics. Grossberg has identified a tendency in left politics to retreat from the “politics of policy and public debate.”45 Although Grossberg identifies the problem as a specific coordination of “theory” and its relation to left politics, perhaps a hysterical commitment to marginality informs the impulse in some sectors to eschew engagements with institutions and institutional debate. An addiction to the state’s refusal often makes the perfect the enemy of the good, implying a stifling commitment to political purity as a pretext for sustaining a structure of enjoyment dependent on refusal, dependent on a kind of paternal “no.” Instead of seeing institutions and policy making as one part of the political field that might be pressured for contingent or relative goods, a ~~hysterical~~ politics is in the incredibly difficult position of taking an addressee (such as the state) that it assumes represents the totality of the political field; simultaneously it understands its addressee as constitutively and necessarily only a locus of prohibition. These paradoxes become nearly insufferable when one makes an analytical cut between the content of a demand and its rhetorical functionality. At the level of the content of the demand, the state or institutions that represent globalization are figured as illegitimate, as morally and politically compromised because of their misdeeds. Here there is an assertion of agency, but because the assertion of agency is simultaneously a deferral of desire, the identity produced in the hysterical demand is not only intimately tied to but is ultimately dependent on the continuing existence of the state, hegemonic order, or institution. At the level of affective investment, the state or institution is automatically figured as the legitimate authority over its domain. As Lacan puts it: “demand in itself . . . is demand of a presence or of an absence . . . pregnant with that Other to be situated within the needs that it can satisfy. Demand constitutes the Other as already possessing the ‘privilege’ of satisfying needs, that it is to say, the power of depriving them of that alone by which they are satisfied.”46 One outcome of framing demand as an affective and symbolic process tied to a set of determinate rhetorical functions enjoins against the simple celebration of demands as either exclusively liberatory, as unproblematic modes of resistance, as exhausting the political, or as nodes for the production of political identity along the lines of equivalence. Alternatively, a politics of desire requires that the place of the demand in a political toolbox ought to be relativized: demands are useful as a precursor to articulating desire; they are important when moored to a broader political strategy; but they are dangerous if seen as the summum bonum of political life. A politics of desire thus functions simply as a negative constraint on the efficacy of a politics of demand, and as a practice a politics of desire asks that political subjects constantly test their demands against the measure of desire or against an explicitly owned set of political investments that envision an alternative world. It is the presence of this alternative, explicitly owned as a desired end state of the political, that might become the prerequisite for desire-based solidarities instead of demand-driven affinities, and as such, a politics of desire recognizes the inevitability and productivity of frustrated demand as part and parcel of antagonistic democratic struggle.

#### 8. Perm do the Aff then the Neg – legit no reason why it can’t happen, and it solves best because we need to first target the death drive otherwise their alt fails.

#### **9. The Neg’s depiction of oppression is a form of “charity cannibalism” that turns suffering into a commodity to be exchanged on the spectacle market. The impact is endless cycles of disaster; we re-create suffering in order to feed our perverse addiction to spectacle. This turns the K – even if the alt solves in one isolated instance they fuel the culture of exploitation that re-creates suffering.**

Baudrillard 94 [Jean, “The Illusion of the End” p. 66-71] WC

We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' [['autre monde]. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty - charity cannibalism [as] being worse than oppressive violence. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source.¶ We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media nourishment for our daily lives. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history. The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. [is] The last phase of colonialism: [is] the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground. Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market ); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West.¶ In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, when we run out of disasters from elsewhere or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself , in order to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it even more than its voracious appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world.¶ Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures. In short, there is such distortion between North and South, to the symbolic advantage of the South (a hundred thousand Iraqi dead against casualties numbered in tens on our side: in every case we are the losers), that one day everything will break down. One day, the West will break down if we are not soon washed clean of this shame, if an international congress of the poor countries does not very quickly decide to share out this symbolic privilege of misery and catastrophe. It is of course normal, since we refuse to allow the spread of nuclear weapons, that they should refuse to allow the spread of the catastrophe weapon. But it is not right that they should exert that monopoly indefinitely. In any case, the under-developed are only so by comparison with the Western system and its presumed success. In the light of its assumed failure, they are not under-developed at all. They are only so in terms of a dominant evolutionism which has always been the worst of colonial ideologies. The argument here is that there is a line of objective progress and everyone is supposed to pass through its various stages (we find the same eyewash with regard to the evolution of species and in that evolutionism which unilaterally sanctions the superiority of the human race). In the light of current upheavals, which put an end to any idea of history as a linear process, there are no longer either developed or under-developed peoples. Thus, to encourage hope of evolution - albeit by revolution - among the poor and to doom them, in keeping with the objective illusion of progress, to technological salvation is a criminal absurdity. In actual fact, it is their good fortune to be able to escape from evolution just at the point when we no longer know where it is leading. In any case, a majority of these peoples, including those of Eastern Europe, do not seem keen to enter this evolutionist modernity, and their weight in the balance is certainly no small factor in the West's repudiation of its own history, of its own utopias and its own modernity. It might be said that the routes of violence, historical or otherwise, are being turned around and that the viruses now pass from South to North, there being every chance that, five hundred years after America was conquered, 1992 and the end of the century will mark the comeback of the defeated and the sudden reversal of that modernity. The sense of pride is no longer on the side of wealth but of poverty, of those who - fortunately for them - have nothing to repent, and may indeed glory in being privileged in terms of catastrophes. Admittedly, this is a privilege they could hardly renounce, even if they wished to, but natural disasters merely reinforce the sense of guilt felt towards them by the wealthy – by those whom God visibly scorns since he no longer even strikes them down. One day it will be the Whites themselves who will give up their whiteness. It is a good bet that repentance will reach its highest pitch with the five-hundredth anniversary of the conquest of the Americas. We are going to have to lift the curse of the defeated - but symbolically victorious - peoples, which is insinuating itself five hundred years later, by way of repentance, into the heart of the white race. No solution has been found to the dramatic situation of the under-developed, and none will be found since their drama has now been overtaken by that of the overdeveloped, of the rich nations. The psychodrama of congestion, saturation, super abundance, neurosis and the breaking of blood vessels which haunts us - the drama of the excess of means over ends – calls more urgently for attention than that of penury, lack and poverty. That is where the most imminent danger of catastrophe resides, in the societies which have run out of emptiness. Artificial catastrophes, like the beneficial aspects of civilization, progress much more quickly than natural ones. The underdeveloped are still at the primary stage of the natural, unforeseeable catastrophe. We are already at the second stage, that of the manufactured catastrophe - imminent and foreseeable - and we shall soon be at that of the pre-programmed catastrophe, the catastrophe of the third kind, deliberate and experimental. And, paradoxically, it is our pursuit of the means for averting natural catastrophe - the unpredictable form of destiny - which will take us there. Because it is unable to escape it, humanity will pretend to be the author of its destiny. Because it cannot accept being confronted with an end which is uncertain or governed by fate, it will prefer to stage its own death as a **species**.

#### 10. The Aff tries to resolve oppression, willfully ignoring the hundreds of other K’s that try the same thing. Their political affect has failed time and time again but their response is to engage in the same revolutionary strategy that was beaten before – they keep dropping pebbles into the jar, so why haven't they had anything to drink? Nadia C. knows:

CrimthInc 13(Ex workers collective, “Your Politics Are Boring As Fuck”, <http://www.crimethinc.com/texts/atoz/asfuck.php>)

Face it, your politics are boring as fuck. You know it's true. Otherwise, why does everyone cringe when you say the word? Why has attendance at your anarcho-communist theory discussion group meetings fallen to an all-time low? Why has the oppressed proletariat not come to its senses and joined you in your fight for world liberation? Perhaps, after years of struggling to educate them about their victimhood, you have come to blame them for their condition. They must want to be ground under the heel of capitalist imperialism; otherwise, why do they show no interest in your political causes? Why haven't they joined you yet in chaining yourself to mahogany furniture, chanting slogans at carefully planned and orchestrated protests, and frequenting anarchist bookshops? Why haven't they sat down and learned all the terminology necessary for a genuine understanding of the complexities of Marxist economic theory? The truth is, your politics are boring to them because they really are irrelevant. They know that your antiquated styles of protest—your marches, hand held signs, and gatherings—are now powerless to effect real change because they have become such a predictable part of the status quo. They know that your post-Marxist jargon is off-putting because it really is a language of mere academic dispute, not a weapon capable of undermining systems of control. They know that your infighting, your splinter groups and endless quarrels over ephemeral theories can never effect any real change in the world they experience from day to day. They know that no matter who is in office, what laws are on the books, what "ism"s the intellectuals march under, the content of their lives will remain the same. They—we—know that our boredom is proof that these "politics" are not the key to any real transformation of life. For our lives are boring enough already! And you know it too. For how many of you is politics a responsibility? Something you engage in because you feel you should, when in your heart of hearts there are a million things you would rather be doing? Your volunteer work—is it your most favorite pastime, or do you do it out of a sense of obligation? Why do you think it is so hard to motivate others to volunteer as you do? Could it be that it is, above all, a feeling of guilt that drives you to fulfill your "duty" to be politically active? Perhaps you spice up your "work" by trying (consciously or not) to get in trouble with the authorities, to get arrested: not because it will practically serve your cause, but to make things more exciting, to recapture a little of the romance of turbulent times now long past. Have you ever felt that you were participating in a ritual, a long-established tradition of fringe protest, that really serves only to strengthen the position of the mainstream? Have you ever secretly longed to escape from the stagnation and boredom of your political "responsibilities"? It's no wonder that no one has joined you in your political endeavors. Perhaps you tell yourself that it's tough, thankless work, but somebody's got to do it. The answer is, well, NO. You actually do us all a real disservice with your tiresome, tedious politics. For in fact, there is nothing more important than politics. NOT the politics of American "democracy" and law, of who is elected state legislator to sign the same bills and perpetuate the same system. Not the politics of the "I got involved with the radical left because I enjoy quibbling over trivial details and writing rhetorically about an unreachable utopia" anarchist. Not the politics of any leader or ideology that demands that you make sacrifices for "the cause." But the politics of our everyday lives. When you separate politics from the immediate, everyday experiences of individual ~~men and women~~[people], it becomes completely irrelevant. Indeed, it becomes the private domain of wealthy, comfortable intellectuals, who can trouble themselves with such dreary, theoretical things. When you involve yourself in politics out of a sense of obligation, and make political action into a dull responsibility rather than an exciting game that is worthwhile for its own sake, you scare away people whose lives are already far too dull for any more tedium. When you make politics into a lifeless thing, a joyless thing, a dreadful responsibility, it becomes just another weight upon people, rather than a means to lift weight from people. And thus you ruin the idea of politics for the people to whom it should be most important. For everyone has a stake in considering their lives, in asking themselves what they want out of life and how they can get it. But you make politics look to them like a miserable, self-referential, pointless middle class/bohemian game, a game with no relevance to the real lives they are living out. What should be political? Whether we enjoy what we do to get food and shelter. Whether we feel like our daily interactions with our friends, neighbors, and coworkers are fulfilling. Whether we have the opportunity to live each day the way we desire to. And "politics" should consist not of merely discussing these questions, but of acting directly to improve our lives in the immediate present. Acting in a way that is itself entertaining, exciting, joyous—because political action that is tedious, tiresome, and oppressive can only perpetuate tedium, fatigue, and oppression in our lives. No more time should be wasted debating over issues that will be irrelevant when we must go to work again the next day. No more predictable ritual protests that the authorities know all too well how to deal with; no more boring ritual protests which will not sound like a thrilling way to spend a Saturday afternoon to potential volunteers—clearly, those won't get us anywhere. Never again shall we "sacrifice ourselves for the cause." For we ourselves, happiness in our own lives and the lives of our fellows, must be our cause! After we make politics relevant and exciting, the rest will follow. But from a dreary, merely theoretical and/or ritualized politics, nothing valuable can follow. This is not to say that we should show no interest in the welfare of humans, animals, or ecosystems that do not contact us directly in our day to day existence. But the foundation of our politics must be concrete: it must be immediate, it must be obvious to everyone why it is worth the effort, it must be fun in itself. How can we do positive things for others if we ourselves do not enjoy our own lives? To make this concrete for a moment: an afternoon of collecting food from businesses that would have thrown it away and serving it to hungry people and people who are tired of working to pay for food—that is good political action, but only if you enjoy it. If you do it with your friends, if you meet new friends while you're doing it, if you fall in love or trade funny stories or just feel proud to have helped a woman by easing her financial needs, that's good political action. On the other hand, if you spend the afternoon typing an angry letter to an obscure leftist tabloid objecting to a columnist's use of the term "anarcho-syndicalist," that's not going to accomplish shit, and you know it. Perhaps it is time for a new word for "politics," since you have made such a swear word out of the old one. For no one should be put off when we talk about acting together to improve our lives. And so we present to you our demands, which are non-negotiable, and must be met as soon as possible—because we're not going to live forever, are we? 1. Make politics relevant to our everyday experience of life again. The farther away the object of our political concern, the less it will mean to us, the less real and pressing it will seem to us, and the more wearisome politics will be. 2. All political activity must be joyous and exciting in itself. You cannot escape from dreariness with more dreariness. 3. To accomplish those first two steps, entirely new political approaches and methods must be created. The old ones are outdated, outmoded. Perhaps they were NEVER any good, and that's why our world is the way it is now. 4. Enjoy yourselves! There is never any excuse for being bored . . . or boring! Join us in making the "revolution" a game; a game played for the highest stakes of all, but a joyous, carefree game nonetheless!

#### This takes out their K but not our Aff because we aren’t trying to create change.

#### 11. For all the power they preach, they have none. They are just one more team among a crowd of young optimistic revolutionaries in this event, their Neg another movement lost in the archive. However, their reorientations are imbued with self-righteous optimism that ensures that the system is never truly challenged.

**Dupont 9** (Dupont, Monsieur: clown, diarist, essayist, correspondent, *Nihilist Communism*. Ardent Press, 2009, 66-73, pilch)

The optimism of revolutionaries

Long ago I felt the utter weariness that religion induced in me. So I abandoned all respect for it. Later in my life I came to the conclusion that ghosts did not ex- ist, that there was no such thing as magic or miracles, and that aliens have never visited planet earth. It took a great weight off my shoulders to come to these conclu- sions. I was reminded of when I had given up allowing for the possibility that a god existed. It is common sense that permits one to come to such decisions. It was once said that “the only true histories are those that have been written by men who have been sincere enough to speak truly about themselves”. Shakespeare said, “This above all: to thine own self be true, and it must follow, as night the day, thou canst not then be false to any man”. If we can look out from our own eyes and judge the world with our own feelings then we will get closer to the truth about things than in any other way. The point of religion, the belief in ghosts or the supernatural, the belief in aliens, all ideology in fact, is to distract people from thinking about, and from, themselves and to make them feel humble and powerless. Instead of basing our world-view on our own experience we are coerced into looking out onto the world through a filter of hope and fear. When I was young, after I had passed through a peri- od of reading that started with tales about King Arthur and ended with the Conan the Barbarian books, I began read- ing serious and great literature. I did not read everything by any means, but I read enough. As a young man I read less; I was in the search for how to actually live my life, which for me meant doing as little work as possible. However, if I had to work I preferred manual labour to anything else. I was a student for a while, to put off inevitabilities. Here I met many Marxist lecturers. In fact, in those days every ac- ademic seemed to be a Marxist of some sort. One of them, a man whose thinning black hair and full, unkempt beard suited his passion for the French Revolution, once said to me that he had given up reading fiction a long time ago. I remember him saying this but do not remember exactly why he said it. Probably it was because I had asked him if he had read some novel or other. Being of an impressiona- ble age and, indeed, nature, I resolved to abandon my silly novel reading. What use was fiction when there were so many factual books around that could tell you more about real life and the forces that shape the world? But I was unsuccessful. I could rarely read factual books; they hung like a dead weight on my hands. (There are a few excep- tions to this rule, I remember, for example, reading with great gusto an academic book I had borrowed from Sydney Library, while lazing by a pool in Fiji, on the Ruhr and its role in the German Revolution.) One of the problems with factual books is that the reader cannot tell if they are telling the truth. For this reason it is no good reading one version of events – you have to read all of them and only then can you attempt to form your own opinion on matters, or give up in despair. This is too tiresome a task for the likes of me, so I tried to find the right interpretations of events by only reading writers I thought were close to my way of thinking. So I read a few obscure political works: anarchist, ultra-left, council communist, Marxist, Situationist, etc. I did not read everything by any means, but I read enough. As I said, I read much less in general than when I was a teenager, but still I was drawn to great novels, and I contin- ued to read them, slowly. The political works I read, the people I was involved with, and the texts I produced myself, although often having some worthy characteristics, **were imbued with an optimism and a faith that bore no relation to the real world that I saw around me.** I had become a kind of politi- cal animal. However, since I never actually lived for any length of time in any political social scene I was always able to critique it from outside. Macho gestures; lack of serious thought; lack of self-reflection; insularity; condescending and do-good impulses better suited to the rigorously alienated world of social work – these were elements I became aware of in the Revolutionary social scene. It seemed to me to be a grave error to see your personal lifestyle, your personal politics, as evidence of genuine revolt. It is also tragically egotistical and, in the end, comic. After a short while all bohemias become restrictive, moralistic, and deadly boring. We cannot escape this society while the fundamental aspects of its continuation are still function- ing, we cannot come up with any real alternatives, beyond half-told dreams, **until the economy comes crashing to a halt**. It is the way the economy of the world works – not to say that it always works perfectly of course – that makes it possible for the ruling class to exercise its power. And the ruling ideas of society are the ideas of the ruling class. And in this democratic and mass world the ruling class provides us with many differing and even competing ideas. By providing us with these false opposites (globalisation/ anti-globalisation, imperialism/anti-imperialism, vegan café/McDonalds, etc) **the ruling classes can ensure that debates are kept on their terrain**, that those with a sense of self-righteousness are kept busy playing the tiresome political games of good versus evil**. These political movements, naturally, never threaten to destroy the economy** (how could they?), they only offer empty threats to refine it or save it. History shows us that **it is not movements that lead to genuinely revolutionary events, it is only complete economic failure and mis-management.** If this occurs, and it was close to happening at the time of World War One, then it may be that the workers in those industries that are essential for the economy to keep running will be forced to take them over. It is at this point that the material basis of society will have altered, and it is now that humanity has the chance to assert itself, and prevent the re-imposition of economics. Where movements are the dominant force in events one will only see a hasty replacement of effec- tive government, a coup d’etat; one will not see the collapse of all sections of the ruling class as all these sections lose control, however temporarily, of the economy. There is a difference between the toppling of political parties in, for example, Serbia in 2001, and the turmoil in society in Eu- rope at the end of WW1. There is a difference, for example, between the toppling of political parties in recent years in the Philippines and the limited events in France in 1968. Apart from my distance from the revolutionary lifestyle I also had an enlightening experience in a postal workers group. This was not really a rank-and-file group, it was mostly a group of political postal workers who wanted to gain some influence over other postal workers and increase tensions at work. (Attempting to expose all anti-worker tendencies at one’s workplace is the nihilist communist’s daily fare – “Cheer up, folks, in a hundred years we’ll all be dead and forgotten!”) It wasn’t long after I joined it that the group began to fall apart. My experi- ences in this group and at work in the delivery office con- vinced me of certain things. I became aware of how those who are for communist revolution should act and behave in workplaces. I also became aware that most of my politi- cal associates did not work, and would not ever work, in any essential industry. This, I felt, helped sustain the cur- rent and general misunderstanding of where the power of the working class lies. On the other hand, simply working in essential industries does not in any way guarantee clar- ity of observation for so-called revolutionaries. Anyway, I can see now that it was this experience that helped me move away from more liberal, leftist, anarchist convictions and take on more communist positions. It was from this point that much of my political writing became aimed at the whole of the political milieu that I associated with. Over the years my critique of this milieu has deepened, and in- deed my critique of my own actions and texts has also be- come sharper. For example, I used to do a small magazine called Proletarian Gob. While there is much in this magazine that is still useful there is also much that relies on a kind of religious faith. A while ago I thought about re-issuing the whole set, but now I realise that it could only be re-issued with heavy annotation. Better, in fact, that the whole minor work is left in the oblivion (my loft) in which it now lies. The optimism of so-called revolutionaries now produces an utter weariness in me. And I have abandoned all respect for the various self-appointed midwives of com- munism; all those who talk about what sort of movement is needed to destroy capital – they who insist on putting their ideological and restricting cart before the horse of material events. It has been like a weight lifted from my shoulders. Recently my critique of Revolutionary Experts and activists has sharpened to the point that I am now no longer much welcome in revolutionary circles. People don’t like to have their bubbles threatened by little pricks like me. I am now in the group Monsieur Dupont. The two of us in this group are generally despised. The common fault we see across the whole of the communist and anarchist milieu is one of a faith in the concept of consciousness, particularly Working Class Consciousness and the general belief that conscious- ness in The Masses can be raised by revolutionaries. We have come to the conclusion that the useful proletariat only consist of those workers who work in the essential sectors of the economy. **Those who produce and/or distribute things without which the economy would crumble**. And these proletarians are only useful when they are actually at the point of production, that is, actually at work, whether it be working normally or preventing work through strikes and similar. We have also come to the conclusion that people will only be able to decide on new ways of living when the old ways have been broken materially. The concept of Consciousness is mistaken. There is no way that millions of people across the world will eventually arrive at a communist perspec- tive and then overthrow the economy. It is common sense that permits one to come to such conclusions. It was once said that “the only true histories are those that have been written by men who have been sincere enough to speak truly about themselves.” If we can look out from our own eyes and judge the world with our own feelings then we will get closer to the truth about things than in any other way. One major factor in Revolutionary Politics is this optimism that workers will wake up. But the only way workers will be considered to have woken up is when they have become organised by revolutionary experts, this leadership of experts will then end up killing workers the same way Lenin did. Steve Biko of South Africa was a proponent of consciousness-raising and the ANC was successful in organising workers through this process. They started killing workers routinely even before they got into power. These revolutionaries – who tell us that one day people will change their minds because they will realise the sinfulness of present society – **are trying to make us see the world through a filter of hope.** They have put common sense aside, they are offering us that same old pie in the sky that the clerics used to sell. **There is no hope** (but this does not mean I need not be enthusiastic in my life, or a participant in events. My negativity, which is at last written through me like rock, does not make me unhappy). A famous Revolutionary once said, “Nihilists, one more effort if you want to be revolu- tionaries!” This was a slogan of the generally remarkable Situationists. But this is also the optimism of the Christian missionaries, “Be positive about the future of the world; if we work hard enough then the rest of the people will see the truth of what we say and the world will be saved,” not forgetting the stage whisper, the secret goal: “And then we will get a place in government!” **Someone once said, “No- body speaks the truth when there is something they must have**.” This maxim seems to apply to the majority of the revolutionary milieu across the world, who want to pre- serve their sense of self-importance above all else. We would reverse the slogan and say, “Revolutionar- ies, one more effort to become nihilists!” And **we would say that from your critique of everything, from your non-belief, it may be possible for you to connect with your own human- ity.** My criticisms of revolutionism have always been based in my attempts to establish a personal perspective and ex- perience. This has not been an easy task, and it is ongoing – it is easy to fall back on holy mantras. It is easier to promote dogma, to let dogma rise to the surface, than it is to engage with the world through one’s own experience. These days I have almost completely abandoned reading factual books because I have discovered that there is more truth in one page of good fiction than there is in a shelf of academic or political works. I am for communism now more than ever. I am against religious faith, intolerance, hidden agendas, and machismo now more than ever.

#### **12. The aff's imagination of a better world create a “will to truth” that associates all that is good with all that is not of this world – breeding ressentiment and precluding real-world change. The aff's imagination of a better world breeds ressentiment and precludes real-world change.**

Turlani in 2003 (Aydan, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Faculty of Letters and Sciences
Istanbul Technical University, “Nietzsche and the Later Wittgenstein: An Offense to the Quest for Another World”, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 26 (2003), 55-63)

The craving for absolutely general specifications results in doing metaphysics. Unlike Wittgenstein, Nietzsche provides an account of how this craving arises. The creation of the two worlds such as apparent and real world, conditioned and unconditioned world, being and becoming is the creation of the ressentiment of metaphysicians. Nietzsche says, "to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative" (WP III 579). Escaping from this world because there is grief in it results in asceticism. [End Page 61] Paying respect to the ascetic ideal is longing for the world that is pure and denaturalized. Craving for frictionless surfaces, for a transcendental, pure, true, ideal, perfect world, is the result of the ressentiment of metaphysicans who suffer in this world. Metaphysicians do not affirm this world as it is, and this paves the way for many explanatory theories in philosophy. In criticizing a philosopher who pays homage to the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche says, "he wants to escape from torture" (GM III 6). The traditional philosopher or the ascetic priest continues to repeat, "'My kingdom is not of this world'" (GM III 10). This is a longing for another world in which one does not suffer. It is to escape from this world; to create another illusory, fictitious, false world. This longing for "the truth" of a world in which one does not suffer is the desire for a world of constancy. It is supposed that contradiction, change, and deception are the causes of suffering; in other words, the senses deceive; it is from the senses that all misfortunes come; reason corrects the errors; therefore reason is the road to the constant. In sum, this world is an error; the world as it ought to be exists. This will to truth, this quest for another world, this desire for the world as it ought to be, is the result of unproductive thinking. It is unproductive because it is the result of avoiding the creation of the world as it ought to be. According to Nietzsche, the will to truth is "the impotence of the will to create" (WP III 585). Metaphysicians end up with the creation of the "true" world in contrast to the actual, changeable, deceptive, self-contradictory world. They try to discover the true, transcendental world that is already there rather than creating a world for themselves. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the transcendental world is the "denaturalized world" (WP III 586). The way out of the circle created by the ressentiment of metaphysicians is the will to life rather than the will to truth. The will to truth can be overcome only through a Dionysian relationship to existence. This is the way to a new philosophy, which in Wittgenstein's terms aims "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (PI §309).

#### Ressentiment leads to violence and war.

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History offers us an infinite array of examples of major and minor conflicts born of ressentiment. Revolutions, the key periods marking a break from the past and generating major cycles of history, are often the result of a sudden explosion of old ressentiments. Following the great revolutions of the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries and the eruption of major ideologies and virulent nationalist movements which have all, in some way, instrumentalized legitimate ressentiments, the 21st century offers us the spectacle of a worldwide political map consumed by every sort of ressentiment. To paraphrase René Descartes, we could almost say that ressentiment is the most widely shared thing in the world. It is indeed difficult to observe current affairs without perceiving the ressentiments that are the causes or consequences of the major events that make up our daily lives. Let us take a recent example. What can we make of the current financial crisis? That it will create a mountain of ressentiments, notably in Southern hemisphere countries which could be freed from poverty with just a fraction of the hundreds of billions of euros and dollars released with disconcerting speed by rich countries to save their banks. The events of 11 September 2001 provide another example. The causes behind it? For many observers, Islamic terrorism springs from the ressentiment felt by the Muslim world towards the West. The war in Iraq? How many long-standing ressentiments has it created or exacerbated in the Middle East?¶ There is an endless supply of examples. Most current conflicts are primarily fed by ressentiment, such as the conflict in the Middle East, tensions between India and Pakistan, and inter-ethnic conflicts in Africa. The genocide in Rwanda and Burundi, the bloodiest conflict of the last fifty years, was essentially a war of ressentiment, as were the wars in the former Yugoslavia. And aside from these examples of open conflicts, how many countries and peoples are influenced by enduring animosity dating from the past, recent or distant, which the collective memory keeps alive just below the surface, ready to explode? China, for instance, has yet to forgive Japan the acts of violence it committed in the 1930s. Neither have the Armenians forgiven the Turks for the genocide of 1915, their bitterness only exacerbated by the Turks’ refusal to recognise the event. The Spanish continue to nurture bitter memories of Napoleon and, increasingly now that Civil War mass graves are being opened, Franco, as well as of the Muslim colonisation, despite several centuries having passed since it took place. The Greeks continue to hold a strong grudge against the Turks for the centuries of subjugation they inflicted upon them. The Africans and Indians have ambivalent relationships with their former colonial nations, France, England, Portugal and the Netherlands. Since the days of Monroe and, especially, Theodore Roosevelt, the US has given its southern neighbours plenty of grounds for ressentment, and still today does nothing to overturn the feelings of animosity. Peru and Bolivia have not yet forgiven the Chileans for having sequestered a vast territory and, for the Bolivians, access to the sea. Throughout the Americas, from Chile to Argentina and the great Canadian north, Amerindian peoples feel the consequences of European colonization in their daily lives, just like the Aborigines and Maoris, amongst others, in the Pacific region. Ressentiment gnaws at people’s minds and hearts and shuts the door on forgiveness.

#### 13. Their static position allows them to get coopted – they package it and tell the system what to coopt.

Mann 96 – (Paul Mann has a Ph.D. in English at Pomona, Jan. 1996, "The Nine Grounds of Intellectual Warfare", Post Modern Culture, Volume 6, No. 2, Project Muse)

When the notion that knowledge is not only power but a mode of warfare has gained sufficient currency, criticism will take it upon itself to develop the strategic implications of thought, and to combat the coordination of the "knowledge industries" with the military-industrial complex. Here, however, on this final ground, already razed by the self-consuming turbulence of battle, the project of war study is neither to serve the state nor to oppose it, but rather to trivialize the very idea of war, as we trivialize everything we take up as sublime. Even as it imposes itself with unprecedented force, intellectual warfare is already dead. It is death carried out by other means. Do not mistake this claim. It has nothing to do with saying that war talk will stop; on the contrary, we will be subjected to it as never before precisely because it is dead. Let me repeat this essay's fundamental law: The object of criticism is always a phenomenalization of some systemic device of discourse, and it always appears in a surrogate form at the very moment it is no longer functional. The task in respect to the knowledge and critique of war is thus not developmental but simulacral, a term whose own recent fate attests to its truth. Everything that Baudrillard's theory of simulation was about happened to the theory itself: the sublime disappearance of its own referent through its obscene overexposure, its precipitous reduction to a mere bit of intellectual currency that quickly expended all its value and force. But what if that is the task of intellectual warfare as well: not to advance and defend the new truths of war but to ruin them in the very act of construing them, to level whatever criticism has assigned to itself of war's sublimity, to recast it in the proxy forms of mental war toys and pitch them about in mock combats, in ritual battles for possession of the dead, waged in the name of the dead and on dead ground, and most of all to cast their shades across the future. We – and who really is speaking here? is it the dead themselves? – we come to fight discourse's war against itself. We are soldiers of an intellectual "suicide state" that practices the politics of its own disappearance (PW 90). War for us is no longer an idea, a historical object, or even a sublime image: all these are only symptoms of an autoaggressive drive, a rage for self-destruction, a turbulent movement that distributes and evacuates every image and idea. We are like Kleist's Kolhaas or Penthesilea, in a question posed by Deleuze and Guattari: "Is it the destiny of the war machine, when the State triumphs, to be caught in this alternative: either to be nothing more than the disciplined, military organ of the State apparatus, or to turn against itself, to become a double suicide machine?” It is certainly one task of “A Thousand Plateaus” to avoid reducing its field to such alternatives, such ethico-political choices -- to project and affirm different possibilities. But here, at this moment and on this ground, imagine Kolhaas on the scaffold, reading the future of the state in a text that he always carried close to his heart but never before considered, and swallowing it without uttering its truth at the very instant he expires.

### Commodification

#### The affirmative’s role as peddler of suffering ensures that they become addicted to their colonial praxis, creating an endless cycle of appropriation as their make their way into the upper echelons of the academy.

Nayar 13 (Jayan Nayar, PhD from the University of Cambridge, Department of Law at the University of Warwick, February 2013, “The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-The-World: Thinking Exteriority,” *Law and Critique* Volume 24 Issue 1, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2001975>) gz

Suffering, as a witnessed condition of others, serves as a renewable, inexhaustible and non-polluting commodity for the insatiable industries of (still colonial) theory production, both individually for the theory-producer as s/he progresses through professional and academic career paths, and institutionally as policy, educational and civil society markets are sought to be captured.15 And these are mega-industries whose reach covers vast spans of the (neo/post)colonised/integrated/globalised, world where the desires of civil-isation in the form of expertise accumulation and accreditation are peddled in the name of education and training. There are no losses in this economic enterprise of exploiting the suffering condition as commodity, only profits. Suffering does indeed generate surplus value. Both the academic and the policy-maker may invoke the suffering condition of the Other fearlessly as we product-place our suffering-based theoretical/policy merchandise – those variously conjured up designs for the various exteriorites of suffering to be redeemed in totality - within global epistemological markets. There is no danger that we may be confronted by any sufferer seeking payment over their ownership of their suffering, or for royalties for the use of their suffering, in the production of either the printed word of the theory-producers, or in teaching/research programmes as marketable products for global consumption.16 Neither¶ do we have to suffer the inconvenience of the material nature of bodies that suffer contaminating the sanitised conditions within which our production takes place, or even the repercussion that these suffering bodies may rise-up and expect the theories thought in the name of suffering to deliver the promised transformations of totality! And most advantageously, suffering-based theory production is a marketing god-send for its non-polluting nature - what is more pristine in its emissions than (the promise) of global human welfare out of suffering? Few of us who exploit the suffering condition in our intellectual-economic production stand to account in any way, to any one real embodiment of suffering (in)Humanity; the suffering-Other plays her part well in this, and importantly, remains in her place compliantly. Suffering is indeed plentiful for our productive plunder, and how profitably we, thinkers of hope, suffer in this respect.